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Abstract of Dissertation 
The purpose of this research is to reconsider Korean judicial mediation as a part of alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) and to discuss the possible legal transition of Korean judicial 
mediation into private sector mediation. 
Similar to other states’ judicial problems, Korea has also faced overloaded case dockets, 
congestion of the civil process, an expensive legal process, and emotional stress on parties during 
the procedures.  The Korean judicial authority continuously developed the Korean mediation 
programs, which can be categorized as court-related mediation, including court-annexed and court-
connected mediations.  Based on enactment of the Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of 
1990 (“JCCDA”) , the Korean Supreme Court launched the Court-annexed Mediation Center 
(“CMC”) as a pilot program in 2009 and expanded this program in 2011 in order to reduce the 
overloaded caseworks and provide better legal services to the public.  This dissertation reveals that 
the Korean judicial authority could not achieve its goal of reducing high caseloads under the 
current court-annexed mediation programs.  Therefore, this dissertation proposes the possibility of 
adopting a private mediation program while reviewing obstacles of transition into private 
mediation. 
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 Chapter I.  Introduction of Korean Civil Mediation 
The purpose of this research is to reconsider Korean judicial mediation as a part of 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), based on the demand for achieving justice, and to discuss 
the possible legal transition of Korean judicial mediation into private sector mediation.1 2 
                                                          
1 See generally MARC GALANTER & JAYANTH KRISHNAN, DEBASED INFORMALISM: LOK ADALATS AND 
LEGAL RIGHTS IN MODERN INDIA (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller et al. eds., (2003)) [hereinafter GALANTER 
& KRISHNAN, DEBASED INFORMALISM]; See generally Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, “BREAD FOR 
THE POOR”: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NEEDY IN INDIA, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004) 
[hereinafter Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor];  NORMAN METZGER ET AL., INDIANA LEGAL 
SERVICES, INDIANA BAR FOUNDATION, & INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, UNEQUAL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR IN INDIANA, 99-104 (2008) 
[hereinafter METZGER, UNEQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; Minjung Kim, Minsasajungwa ADR [Civil Cases 
and ADR] 26 JEONBUK L. REV. 21, 23 (2008) (Korean) (In Korea, there are a few researches for a linkage 
between the judicial mediation and private sector mediation. Some professors just mention that it is 
necessary for us to develop the private ADR or private mediation). 
2 (Table 1) 
Year 1979 1981 1986 1991 1996 1998 2001 2006 2011 2015 
Total Number 
of Civil Cases 79,328 183,634 320,922 308,806 563,740 915,448 838,473 1,288,987 1,048,963 1,078,873 
Total Number 
of Judges 640 687 887 1,188 1,388 1,878 1,738 2,124 2,844 2,851 
Average Cases 
per Judge 124 267.3 361.8 259.9 406.2 487.5 482.4 606.9 368.8 378.4 
Number of 
Attorneys 940 1,058 1,414 2,258 3,188 3,521 4,618 7,602 10,976 20,531 
 
Prior to 1990, the Korean Supreme Court began the process of reforming the current mediation laws, 
because the Court recognized that there would soon be too many cases for the system to tolerate (Sungtae 
Kim, Bubwonjojeongcenter Baljeon Hyunhwang [Present Condition of development of Court Mediation 
Center] 33 SOONGSIL L. REV. 51, 55 (2015) 
The table above shows how the dramatic increase in the number of civil cases filed in Korea over time, and 
how the number of cases per judge, corresponds to those statistics.  As seen above, the number of civil 
cases, judges, and lawyers have gradually and steadily increased since 1979.   
The table above indicates that the number of civil cases continuously and significantly increased in two 
years: 1998 and 2006.  The sudden increase of cases filed in 1998 was caused by a financial crisis under 
IMF control, and, in 2006, the global financial impact also caused a financial crisis in Korea.  For such 
2 
 
a. Urgent Need for Adopting Judicial Mediation 
It is necessary to briefly review why Korea, despite its current and firmly-organized 
litigation system, needs alternative ways for resolving disputes.  The most urgent reason for Korea 
to adopt additional judicial mediation is to reduce an already overloaded case docket.    In the 
current Korean legal system, court trials are expensive,3 cause congestion and delays, and create 
additional emotional stress.4   
To understand the need for alternative dispute resolution reform in Korea, it is first 
necessary to examine the challenges facing Korean judges and mediators in the current system.  
This chapter now explains the difficulties of working in the congested environment of the current 
Korean court system, and then reviews that system to determine how to reform the current ADR 
process in light of traditional methods of mediating and arbitrating disputes. 
                                                          
reasons, the number of civil cases might rapidly increase.  The number of civil cases increased from 8,837 
in 1952, to 1,288,987 in 2006. Furthermore, while each Korean judge in the civil courts handled 329 civil 
cases in 1985, the caseload had increased to 566 civil cases in 2006. (Hong-Suck Cho, Sunjinkum Jinip 
Jeonjeroseoyi Shinroiwa Wonchic: Beobchijuyiyi Hyunsilgwa Jeon [The Trust and Principle as the 
Precondition for an Advanced Country: The Reality and Suggestion of the Rule of Law in Korea] 12-4 
PUBLIC L. J. 331, 335 (2011) (Korean)) According to the data above, the number of civil cases has 
dramatically increased over time: reaching 1,288,987 as of 2006. The total number of legal professionals, 
including judges, has gradually increased in response, but judges are nonetheless overwhelmed by their 
extremely large caseloads. 
 
3  Younghoa Jung, Hankukyi Beobmunhwa Byonhwaeseo Beobwongwa Beobryulgayi yeokhwal: 
Beobwonyongae Minsajojeongyi Hwalsunghwabangan [The Role of Court and Lawyers in the Change of 
Legal Cultures: The Revitalization of Court-Annexed Civil Mediation], 42 KANGWON L. REV. 443, 454 
(2014) (Korean) (There are two different aspects toward the cost of litigation. First, the court would take 
responsibility of operating the Korean legal system, such as fees for maintenance of court building and 
facilities, and salaries for judges and court officers. In other, the parties also would pay for legal assistance 
fee for lawyer and filing fee for pursuing a litigation). 
 
4 Generally see  Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 274-75 (1982); Sungtae Kim, 
supra note 3, at 52-53; Soo Jong Lee, ADRyi Sahoitonghapjeok Kinung [The Social Integrative Function 
of ADR], 134-3 THE JUSTICE 225, 236 (2013) (Korean); In Joo, Minsajojeongyi Hwalsunghwawa 
Sajeokjachi [A Study on the Private Autonomies of the Disputes in the Process of Conciliation] 13-2 
ARBITRATION 613, 613 (2004) (Korean). 
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 A simple explanation for the overloaded case docket and hard working conditions for the 
civil bench trials is provided in the Table 1.  To provide an equivalent number to handle the total 
civil cases filed, the judiciary has gradually increased the number of judges.  Both numbers of total 
civil cases and number of judges have continuously and gradually increased.  Therefore, it seems 
that the number of judges has only slowly increased in comparison to the total number of civil 
cases that has rapidly grown.  
The statistics present above are not exact, because they were calculated using the total 
number of civil cases and judges per year, and they do not factor in criminal litigation; they do, 
however, accurately represent the correlation between a rapid increase in cases and the judiciary’s 
lagging response.5   
Because the Korean judiciary does not release the number of civil judges, it is difficult to 
calculate the number of cases loaded per judge.  This dissertation indicates that it has not been 
adequate to catch up with the total number of civil cases even though the number of judges has 
gradually increased.6  The number of non-criminal cases per judge in 2006, for instance, was 
                                                          
5  
Year Korean Populations Total Number of Cases in Korea 
2006 48,991,000 (100) 18,870,971 (100) 
2015 51,529,000 (105.2) 20,609,851 (109.2) 
   
For 10 years, while Korean population increased in 5.2%, cases filed also increased in 9.2%.  It means the 
increasing rate of cases filed was almost double than increasing rate of population in Korea.  
  
6 For example, in 2004, the total number of available judges was 1660 and each ruled on an average of 971 
official civil cases; however, the actual number of cases each judge was assigned in 2004 averaged around 
3782, because, according to Professor Dohyun Kim’s research, each judge officiated an extra 2811 cases.  
Even though the number of judges has gradually increased, it has not been adequate to catch up with the 
total number of civil cases.  The number of non-criminal cases per judge in 2006, for instance, was almost 
sextuple that of 1979, and current trends generally indicate that Korean judges will continue to be burdened 
by an ever-increasing supply of cases over time (Dohyun Kim, Byunhosa Baechulgwa Sosongdaeriyulyi 
Hamsu Gwangae, [Massie number of lawyers and Legal Services] (Korean) (not published in Law 
Journal)). 
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almost sextuple that of 1979, and current trends generally indicate that Korean judges will continue 
to be burdened by an ever-increasing supply of cases over time.  
Second, it is necessary to investigate whether the number of civil cases handled per judge 
has increased or decreased after the JCCDA was applied for adopting several mediation programs. 
The judiciary recognized that current legal problems would not be overcome through the 
current legal system for two reasons: first, judges are overloaded, which diminishes the quality of 
legal services; and, second, the judiciary could not expect productive work from judges because 
apprenticeship training for judges would not be sustainable into the near future.7  Therefore, the 
judiciary concluded that one of the most effective methods for reducing the number of otherwise 
overloaded cases would be to adopt the U.S. model of mediation.8  Therefore, my argument posits 
that the Korean judiciary cannot not successfully achieve its desire to reduce its casework under 
the current civil mediation programs because the court-annexed programs that are currently in 
place proceed in a manner much like that of other civil court processes.9   In order to provide better 
                                                          
7 Interview with Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015 (The U.S. type of law school system was adopted in 2008, 
The Judicial Research & Training Institution, which provides the training programs for two (2) years to 
persons who passed the state law examination, would be closed soon. And experienced lawyers would be 
appointed for the position of judges without the similar apprenticeship of training and the judiciary expects 
that the judges appointed in near future could not make rulings as much as current judges do).  
  
8 Siyoon Lee, Hankookeseoyi ADRyi Kyunghumgwa Jinjeon [Experience and Improvement of ADR in 
Korea] 19-1 CIVIL PROCEDURES 479 (2015) (Korean). 
 
9 Actually, the Korean judiciary have used the mediation programs prior to the enactment of JCCDA.  In 
order to understand Korean ADR programs, it is necessary to first review both settlement and mediation 
programs in civil matters.  In Korea, there are two different types of settlement (compromise) programs: 
settlements under civil law and in-court settlements. First, settlements under civil law are treated as 
contracts. (Korean Civil Law, art 731, “a compromise shall become effective when the parties have agreed 
to terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions”)  The processes of settlement and mediation 
are similar and these two programs have the same legal effects.  What is difference between settlement in 
the court and civil mediation in Korea?  Basically, the succeful and compromised outcomes from settlement 
and mediation would have a same legal effect of irrevocable judgment.  But, settlement should be reviewed 
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legal services and achieve the judiciary's aim, the Korean judiciary should consider the 
implementation of private mediation program that are both party-oriented and able to meet the 
parties’ needs and expectations. 
Disputes have always existed in every society and community, and the governing authority 
tries to provide proper and efficient methods for resolving disputes.10   ADR has gradually become 
a favored method of problem solving in the world.11  Also, the Korean Supreme Court has been 
                                                          
by the judge in a trial date and mediation process should be set in a new mediation date or reviewed by the 
judge.  Therefore, the mediation process is not open to the public unlike the public-open trial.  
Therefore, this type of settlement would be enforceable, but would not have a claim-preclusive effect. In 
this sense, it would be similar to U.S. settlements or mediation governed by the contract law.  Second, in-
court settlement has a legal effect of res judicata because it should take place in a trial date before a judge. 
In-court settlements have two different types of settlement: Settlements before trial and settlements during 
trial.  Settlements before trial have a special character: Before filing a suit, in either a post-dispute or a pre-
dispute circumstance, parties make an agreement before a judge with the settlement with the effect of res 
judicata.  Settlement during trial means that, after filing and during a trial, both parties compromise before 
the judge. These settlement processes are operated in trial date and have a claim-preclusive effect.  
The Korean civil mediation programs are led by courts.  In this regards, I proposed to call Korean civil 
mediation as court-led mediation.  All civil mediation cases go through court process and regulated by the 
courts.  In addition, the claim-preclusive effect is rendered to mediated agreements and mediator’s non-
binding decision which is not objected by either party in two weeks.  Unlike enforcement of U.S. mediation, 
outcomes of Korean civil mediation have a same legal effect of a final and irrevocable judgment.   The 
reason that I could define Korean civil mediation as a court-led mediation is the judiciary provides mediated 
settlement or undisputed decision of recommendation could have a claim-preclusive effect as same as a 
final and conclusive judgment.  This legal effect might prevent participant from appealing based on the 
defenses in contract, such as mistake or fraud. 
10 Deborah R. Hensloer, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-
sharping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165168 (2003); OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND 
RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT, 1-6 (2005); Soo Jong Lee, supra note 4, at 
227. 
11  KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 1-2 (2000): Herry T. Edwards, 
Alternative dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669 (1986); Marc S. 
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we know and don’t know (and this think we know) 
about our allegedly contentious and litigious society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 37 (1983); Deborah R. Hensloer, 
supra note 10, at 165-66; Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Meditative 
Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 889-92 (1997); Soo Jong 
Lee, supra note 4, at 237. 
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deeply involved in the adaptation and development of ADR since 1987,12 specifically through its 
collaboration with a court-annexed program 13 —judicial mediation—enacted by the Judicial 
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of 1990 (“JCCDA”) (민사조정법, 民事調停法).14  In addition, 
                                                          
12 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 60. 
13 In Korea, civil mediation could be classified into three different types: In-court, court-annexed, and court-
connected mediation programs.  In-court mediations are led by judges and mediation judges. A significant 
difference from settlement during trial is that judges should set a new mediation date as well as obtain a 
mediator position.   
In Korea, as mentioned above, mediation programs are operated in three categorized places: mediation in 
court, court-annexed mediation, and court-connected mediation.  Also, there is no exact definition of court-
annexed and court-connected mediation programs.  In general, ADR programs are classified into two types: 
private ADR or court-annexed ADR program.  According to Anne Morgan, “Private ADR is consensual 
and can be individualized by the parties to suit their needs.”  However, Morgan mentions that “court-
annexed [ADR] is ordered and/or conducted by the trial judge,” such as “judicially-managed.” (Anne 
Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court: Strandell v. 
Jackson County,  40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493-94 (1990)) Under the Black’s law dictionary, court-annexed 
ADR programs are “taking place in accordance with a court order.” (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 95 
(Bryan Garner et al, 10th ed.) But, the other explains that mediation occurs only by consent of the parties. 
(Jack Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice through ADR, 11-2 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 241, 285, footnote 196 (1996)). 
Black’s definition of mediation could not be applicable to explain the Korean court-mediation process 
because the complaint could voluntarily file a mediation case into CMC.  Also, judge Weinstein’s definition 
could not be held applicable because the judge could refer a case to mediation process without parties’ 
consent in Korean civil process.   Therefore, I propose that court-annexed means that the mediation 
programs are strongly tied with court, such as using court buildings, obtaining financial supports from the 
court, and sharing court officers in order to operate the programs.   The court-connected mediation program 
is relatively less close than the court-annexed.  Because a judge refer a mediation case to the outer-council 
mediation organizations, the programs are operating outside court buildings and does not share human 
resources with the court.  It might classify court-annexed and court-connected programs with a view of 
physical appearance of court relationship, such as places and financial/human resources of mediation. 
According to a judge Jung’s article, he categorizes CMC and Mediation council as court-annexed mediation 
and outer-mediation programs as court-connected without explaining reasons.  In Korea, court-annexed 
civil mediation programs are strongly tied to the court. E.g., programs are operated within court-buildings 
and share human resources with the court. (JUNYOUNG JUNG, MINSAJOJEONG JEDOYI HYUNHWANGGWA 
JUNMANG [CURRENT REVIEW AND PROSPECT OF THE CIVIL MEDIATION] 71, 103 in THE OFFICE OF COURT 
ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL 
DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean)). 
14 According to the Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, it uses a term “conciliation” in “Judicial 
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of 1990 (“JCCDA”).” I will use this term without changing to 
“mediation” available at 
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20%
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the Korean Supreme Court launched the Court-annexed Mediation Center (“CMC”) 
(법원조정센터, 法院調停 Center) as a pilot program in two major cities, Seoul and Pusan, in 
2009—then expanded into four other large cities, Daegu, Deajeon, Kwangju and Incheon, in 
2011.15   The program was expanded with the expectation of reducing an extremely overloaded 
case docket.16  
Pursuant to the goal of lightening the court’s caseload, the Supreme Court launched the 
CMC, and, in 2009, outsourced “early mediation” programs to outer-council mediation 
organizations.17  While the Korean “court of first incident”18 transfers the cases to mediation 
programs, more than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases are still handled by the court of first 
incident.19  The Korean Supreme Court recognized that judges were under a lot of pressure and 
attempted to find alternative methods to reduce the judges’ caseloads, although there are mediation 
programs in the Korean legal system.20  
                                                          
EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%A1%B0%EC%A0%95%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0 (last visited in Jan. 
10,2017); Soo Jong Lee, supra note 4, at 225-26; Soonil Kwon, Mikukyi Multi-Door Courthousejedoe 
Gwanhan Gochal [Critique of the Washington, D.C., Superior Court’s Multi-Door: Courthouse 
Experiments and Its Screening Method]s, 26 JUSTICE 76, 78 (1993) (Korean). 
15Generally see, Nohyoung Park, Court-Annexed Mediation in Korean, 17-3 ASIA PACIFIC L. REV. 151 
(2009); Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58. 
16 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58.; Interviewed current standing mediator on June 12, 2013 and current 
judges on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
17 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 63-64. 
18 Instead of using the term “court” in this dissertation, I will instead use the term “court of first incident.”  
I want to emphasize that the court that originally take a case refer to mediation by itself.  The same judge 
refers a case by himself or herself and turns into the mediator.    
19 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 76.  
 
20  Sang-Chan Kim & Young-Hwa Yang, Sang-Chan Kim & Young-hwa Yang, Urinala ADRjejoyi 
Hwalsunghwa Bangan [The Methods How to Activate Korean ADR System, 45 KOR. L. ASS’N 247, 248 
(2012) (Korean). 
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There is the question of whether the several mediation programs adopted by the JCCDA 
enacted in 1990 will be insufficient to resolve the overloaded work on the bench.  To the contrary, 
the rate of civil cases is increasing too fast to catch up.  In order that the judicial authority in Korea 
should provide better legal service by reducing the overloaded caseload on the bench, the authority 
should reconsider the current civil mediation programs.  This dissertation reveals that the Korean 
judicial authority could not achieve its goal of reducing high caseloads under the current court-
annexed mediation programs as discussed in chapters III, IV, and V. This result is primarily based 
on the ‘customer-exclusive’ policy that the current court-annexed mediation programs in Korea 
pursue in relation to judicial-management practices.  Because of the mediator’s judge-like 
behavior, court-annexed mediation programs are unable to improve in their efficiency.  Therefore, 
this dissertation proposes the possibility of adopting a private mediation program while reviewing 
obstacles of transition into private mediation.    
b. Value of Dissertation 
Korean scholars merely have to-date contributed to the improvement of commercial 
arbitration, instead of providing a theoretical foundation for the critical movement of judicial 
mediation.21  In previous research, legal scholars attempted to distinguish differences between 
programs in ADR-programs: such as mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, and 
mini trial.22   Unlike the development of ADR programs in the U.S., Korean court-led mediation 
                                                          
 
21 Seok-Beom Choi, Kukgajudohyung ADRgwa Minganjudohyung ADRe Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study on the 
National Leading ADR and Private Leading ADR], 29-3 ARBITRATION 71, 73 (2010) (Korean); Nohyoung 
Park, supra note 13, at 151. 
22 Chin-Hyon Kim & Yong-Kyun Chung, Mikukyi Sabeobhyung ADRjedowa Gu Hamyie Deahan Youngu 
[A Study of the Court-Annexed ADR and Its Implications in the United States] 21-3 ARBITRATION REV. 55, 
56-57 (2011) (Korean). 
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did not gain significant ground with scholars and legal professionals, but was only attractive to 
judicial systems.23  Unlike the U.S. empirical research, Korean legal research is focusing on the 
theoretical approach.  This dissertation adopts both theoretical and empirical approaches to review 
ADRs, emphasizing the Korean mediation programs related to court-annexed and court-connected 
mediation.  In the following sections, it provides interviews with judges along with observations 
of both Korean mediation and U.S. mediation—especially mediation programs within the State of 
Indiana, District of Indiana, and 7th Circuit Court—to expose how courts may abuse judicial 
authority in the mediation process and go against the traditional spirit of self-determination.   
While gathering the information necessary for this study, I conducted a series of personal 
interviews and observations over a three-year period, in both Korea and the United States. I also 
interviewed civil court judges and disputants in the Korean Court Mediation Center, spoke with 
certified mediators from Indiana, and observed mediation cases in both jurisdictions.   
In Korea, I personally interviewed two (2) civil court judges in 2014, one (1) standing 
mediator of the Court Mediation Center (“CMC”) in 2013, two (2) commissioners of outer court-
connected mediation organization in 2015.   I also interviewed 20 disputants in the CMC and 
observed twelve mediation cases in 2013.   Furthermore, in America,24 I interviewed two (2) U.S. 
                                                          
23 Generally see Warren Burger, supra note 13; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 1073 (1984); 
Amy J. Cohen, Against Settlement: Twenty-five Years Later: Revisiting against Settlement: Some 
Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009); Sungtae Kim, 
supra note 2, at 55. 
24 In order to provide justification for the selection of U.S. mediators and mediation programs, I carefully 
select the Indiana area (including its corresponding U.S. Federal 7th Circuit) for three reasons: First, Indiana 
has a similar size compared to S. Korea (similar shape of juridiction).  Second, both Indiana and Korea's 
legal cultures are relatively conservative, yet but proactive to adopt ADR processes. Both judiciaries are in 
the transitional period of establishing mediation program into their civil matters. (I want to exphasize that 
Indiana has successfully transited into the private mediation in the conservative legal environment. Then, 
Korean judiciary needs to review how Indiana judiary smoothly launched the private mediation program) 
10 
 
mediators certified by the State of Indiana, two (2) magistrate judges in the Southern District of 
Indiana, and two (2) Conference Attorneys of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh (7th) 
Circuit.  I observed two (2) mediation cases in the Southern District of Indiana and one (1) 
conference settlement in the Seventh (7th) Circuit.   
I received IRB approval for this study, and I additionally participated in the basic mediation 
and restorative justice program hosted by the Community Justice & Mediation Center (“CJAM”)25.  
At the end of the program, in September 2015, I received certification as a community mediator 
for civil and restoration programs. 
There is currently no empirical scholarly research published on Korean mediation, 
particularly regarding the CMC. 26   Several judges have, however, released the articles with 
statistical information, but they did not compare those mediation statistics with those from other 
countries: such comparison is needed in order to effectively criticize the process of Korean 
mediation.27   Therefore, my empirical research will be valuable to examine critiques and causes 
of the misuse of civil mediation in Korea, while showing possible solutions to improve the Korean 
mediation process.28 
                                                          
Third, Indiana has the advantage of providing easy access to survey material and data: After obtaining a 
certification as community mediator, I could participate in actual mediation cases in Indiana. 
 
25 http://www.cjamcenter.org/  (Last visited in Nov. 1, 2016). 
 
26 Cf. Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 54. 
27 Several current and former judges published articles related with current Korean mediation programs of 
court-annexed and court-connected mediations in “Conference of 20 year anniversary of Korean Judicial 
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act” published by the Court Administrative in 2010.  
 
28 I believe my dissertation would be the first empirical research regarding to Korean mediation programs 
in Korea.  
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c. The Meaning of Mediation 
Before moving any further, and in order to discuss the possible legal transition of Korean 
mediation into private mediation, it is necessary to understand the difference of private and court-
annexed mediation. ADR programs could be categorized as either private or court-annexed.29  The 
characteristics of private ADR could be described below: 
“the parties can design process that determine not only who will host their 
negotiations, and what role he or she will play, but also what kinds of information will be 
considered, whether the information will be subject to the filtering of the rules of evidence, 
what the tone of the proceedings will be, in what order various elements of the program 
will be placed, when the events shall occur, whether and what purposes they shall be 
interrupted. In other words, the parties enjoy a level of freedom in shaping processes to fit 
their situation that is without parallel in formal, public adjudication.”30   
It is important to define the meaning of private mediation.  First, to better understand the 
ADR process, it is important to distinguish between private mediation and private negotiation 
based on the involvement of a neutral-third party.31  Private negotiation is operated by the parties 
without a third party.  Private mediation means that a neutral third party would be adopted from 
the private sector.32   Second, mediation also could be divided into court-related (public) and out-
                                                          
29 Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37. 
 
30 Id.  (reciting Anne C. Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal 
District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493-494 (1990)). 
 
31 Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Mediator: A Communitarian Theory 
of Post-Mediation Contracts, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 667, 684 (2010). 
 
32 Leon E. Trakman, Commentary Appropriate Conflict, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 919, 929 (2001). 
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of-court (private) processes.33  This distinction could be explained not only by the location of the 
place of mediation, but also the independency of the mediator from the judicial authority.34   
 In Korea, without distinguishing private mediation, court-related mediation could also be 
divided into court-annexed or court-connected mediations, based on the level of tightness toward 
court interference, including the location of the mediation place. 35   For example, when the 
mediation case is referred and released to the outer-council mediation organization, such as a 
regional Korean bar association or law school and the mediation is held in out-of-court territory:  
this mediation is still categorized as court-connected because the process is firmly regulated by the 
judicial authority.36  Unlike the U.S. private mediator program, the court refers the mediation cases 
to a certain organization, which could handle the mediation cases, and the organization could 
distribute the mediation cases to each member of the organization.37    
                                                          
33 Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed 
Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2006) 
(Professors Sander and Rozdeiczer distinguish between different types of mediation procedures, including 
between court-related [public] mediation and out-of-court [private] mediation). 
 
34 Anne C. Morgan, supra note 13, at 494. 
 
35 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 103 (In Korea, as mentioned above, mediation programs are operated 
in three categorized places, mediation in court, court-annexed mediation, and court-connected mediation.  
Also, there is no exact definition of court-annexed and court-connected mediation programs.  But, according 
to a judge Jung’s article, he categorizes CMC and Mediation council as court-annexed mediation and outer-
mediation programs as court-connected without explaining reasons); Cf. Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose 
Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37 (reciting Anne C. Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order 
Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493 
(1990). 
 
36 Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37 (reciting  Anne C. 
Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District 1Court: Strandell v. 
Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 494 (1990)). 
 
37 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 128. 
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Contrary to U.S. private mediation, the Korean judiciary does not recognize a private 
mediation program yet.38  Because the judiciary has not established a mediation training program, 
it could not adopt a private program.  According to the U.S. theoretical approach for private 
mediation, the judiciary is responsible for the mediator’s conduct in mediation proceedings when 
the neutral third party is from the private sector.39  Per the JCCDA, there is currently no article to 
regulate the protection for outer council’s member, nor the judiciary’s responsibility for 
malfunction or misconduct by the outer council during the mediation process.40 
In sum, after discussing the distinction between public and private mediation programs, the 
Korean mediation programs could be categorized as court-related mediation, including court-
annexed and court-connected mediations.41  Furthermore, the outer-council mediation program 
could be classified as court-connected mediation, because it is still regulated by the court of first 
incident that referred the case.42  In order to establish private mediation, the judiciary needs to set 
up training and educational programs.  Because the judiciary should take responsibility for the 
private mediator’s function during the mediation process, it is necessary to prepare these training 
and certification programs.43 
 
 
                                                          
38 Cf. JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72.  
 
39 Leon E. Trakman, supra note 33, at 929. 
 
40 Please see JCCDA (There is no article for protection of mediator). 
 
41 Please see infra Chapter III. 
 
42 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 113. 
 
43 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 60. 
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Chapter II.    Characteristics of Korean Mediation Programs 
Civil mediation programs have been continuously applied for resolving disputes in Korea 
since the contemporary Korean legal system was established—after achieving independence in 
1950.  Although Korea has ADR programs under the contemporary legal system, the Korean ADR 
programs, particularly Korean mediation, typically have characteristics that would distinguish 
them from the textbook definitions. These distinctions extend to both terminology and usage of 
the term.  This chapter reviews the definition of Korean mediation and whether Korean mediation 
15 
 
is correctly named “Jojeong,” (조정, 調停) comparing the term with the U.S. definition of 
“mediation.”  Second, to better understand the characteristics of Korean mediation, it briefly 
reviews a history of Korean mediation regulations.  Third, it reviews the common characteristics 
of contemporary Korean mediation programs—comparing their strengths and weaknesses.  
a. No Definition of Mediation 
         While the term “ADR” is an acronym for alternative dispute resolution and represents the 
most popular term of method of resolving dispute,44 some scholars are calling it “DR,” or dispute 
resolution: therefore taking out “alternative.”45 In addition, “DR” could be divided into “judicial 
dispute resolution” (“JDR”) and “non-judicial dispute resolution” (NJDR). 46   I agree with 
classifying ADR as JDR and NJDR for three reasons.  First, the term “alternative” means a 
“negative” or “second best” under the contemporary judicial system.47  Second, the current ADR 
programs have been used for a long time.48  Third, according to the interviews in Korea, the 
outcome of mediation would not be different from a judge’s ruling, because experienced lawyers 
or retired judges take on the position of mediator.49  Fourth, the mediation case should be filed into 
the court system and the court and mediation judge have the authority to distribute these mediation 
                                                          
44 John T. Blankenship, Developing your ADR attitude: Med-Arb, a template for adaptive ADR, 42 TENN. 
B.J. 28, 28 (2006).  
 
45 Jennifer W. Reynolds, The Lawyer with the ADR Tattoo, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 413-14 
(2013).  
 
46 Id. 
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.  
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cases to other mediation organizations.50  Therefore, the litigation and court-annexed mediation in 
Korea should be classified as “JDR,” because the entire process of mediation is operated inside 
the court territory and the outcome of mediation has the same effort of a judge’s ruling.  The other 
mediation process, such as administrative ADR would be classified as “NJDR,” because the 
programs are not operated by the judicial authority. 
 Even if there is no distinction between the terms mediation and conciliation, there are two 
distinguishable types of mediation: such as facilitative and evaluative mediation.51           
              According to the JCCDA,52 “the purpose of mediation is to settle civil disputes according 
to a simple procedure based on the mutual concession between the parties, common sense and 
actual circumstances.” 53    Some scholars state that Korean mediation could be classified as 
“evaluative mediation”—which focuses on the parties’ alternatives to settlement—but not as 
                                                          
50  Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 2 (S. Kor.) (Parties of a civil dispute 
may file an application for conciliation with a court); Some of Administrative mediation and arbitration 
have same effect of court ruling. 
 
51 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV. 
153, 175 (1999); Lo-Ri Yi, ‘Mediation’gwa ‘Conciliation’yi Gaenyome gwanhan Bigyobeobjeok Yengu, 
[A Comparative Study on the Concepts of Mediation and Conciliation], 19-2 J. OF ARB. STUD. 27, 34 
(2009). 
52  Generally see YOUNGJU HAM, BUNJEANGHAEGYULBANGBUBRON [DISPUTE RESOLUTION] 171-74 
(2013); The term of mediation and conciliation are not exactly defined in Korea. Mediation is used together 
with conciliation by legal scholars and judges in the legal area.  The Ministry of Government Legislation 
provides the translation of Civil Mediation Act in English naming ‘Korean Judicial Conciliation of Civil 
Disputes Act.’ According to Professor Sungtea Kim and Lo-Ri Yi, because Korean mediators aggressively 
propose their opinions and push parties to accept and settle, a term of ‘conciliation’ might better to explain.  
(Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 54 footnote 6)  However, majority of scholars mention that there is no 
benefit to distinguish two terms. Majority of articles and books are using ‘mediation’ instead of 
‘conciliation.’  For example, the CMC mediator is translated as a standing mediator in his business card. 
This dissertation adopts to use a term of ‘mediation,’ except a name of Act in order for readers to easily 
find the Act. 
 
53 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 1 (S. Kor.).  
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“facilitative mediation,” because mediators of the court-annexed mediation category can make a 
binding decision, unlike in facilitative mediation.54   While facilitative mediation is focused on 
facilitating communication between disputants in a neutral manner, evaluative mediation allows 
mediators to aggressively intervene in the communication between mediating parties, so that 
parties will be pressured into accepting the mediator’s proposal and rapidly reach an agreement.55   
For example, mediators in court-annexed mediation in Korea can make a binding “executive” 
decision when they determine that negotiation is at a deadlock.56 
              Professor Yi states that a general Korean mediation model could be classified as an 
evaluative mediation without explaining the reason, such as a judge-like authority.57  Under Yi’s 
explanation, because the mediator persuades the parties using the common sense and actual 
circumstances, and the mediator could evaluate the facts and propose possible solutions for both 
parties, the Korean mediation could be classified as “evaluative mediation.”58  Furthermore, there 
is another theoretical approach regarding mediation process: the mediation-judgment approach and 
mediation-settlement approach.59  According to the mediation-judgement approach, mediation 
                                                          
54 MICHAEL MOFFITT & ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, 
(2008); YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 195; Lo-Ri Yi, ‘Mediation’gwa ‘Conciliation’yi Gaenyue 
Gwanhan Bigyobubjeg Yongu [A Comparative Study on the Concepts of Mediation and Conciliation] 19-
2 ARB. RES. 27, 39, 41 (2009) (Korean); Authority and problem of biding decision by mediators, it will 
criticize the problems caused by the authority of binding decision by mediators in the court-annexed 
mediation system in Korea. 
55 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194; Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41. 
 
56JCCDA, art. 30; YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 190. 
 
57 Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41. 
 
58 Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41. 
 
59 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194-95 (the mediation-judgment approach could be related with court-
centered and the mediation-settlement approach is related with party-centered). 
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seems to be a court-centered process that aggressively proposes possible solutions with a focus on 
efficiency.60  In the other, mediation-settlement approach, it refers to a party-centered mediation 
process that considers the neutral’s authority to be limited to facilitating or mediating.61  Professor 
Ham states that Korean mediation might be classified as mediation-judgment because the judge-
mediator and the standing mediator can and should make a binding decision when the authority 
could not find reasonable reasons not to provide the decision.62  Even though the term “mediation” 
is frequently used as a legal term, there are several different opinions about its definition.63  
Currently, some scholars conclude that the Korean definition of mediation is similar to that of the 
U.S. mediation.64  In the U.S., the terms mediation and conciliation are not distinguished, because 
the third-party neutral does not propose the binding decision and both parties endeavor to resolve 
dispute.65    
           There is a conflicting meaning in the term: mediation.66  Some scholars used “jojeong,” 
(조정, 調停) in Korean, as the term that is the same as the U.S. mediation: a neutral third party 
                                                          
60 Id. at 194. 
  
61 Id. at 194-95. 
 
62 Id. at 194. 
 
63  Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 28; This dissertation does not distinguish the difference of terms of 
‘mediation’ and ‘conciliation’ because there is no benefit to translate a Korean term of ‘Jojeong’). 
64 Id. at 171-74. 
 
65 Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 33-34. 
66  YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 171-74; MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 223 (2011)  (“Mediation is a process in which 
an impartial third party acts as a catalyst to help others constructively address and perhaps resolve a dispute, 
plan a transaction, or define the contours of a relationship); RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, 
ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 16 (2009) (“Mediation is an informal 
process in which an impartial third party helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction but does not 
impose a solution.  In other words, mediation is facilitated negotiation. The parties often enter into 
19 
 
assisting both disputing parties in reaching their own consensual agreement.67  However, in the 
context of mediation in judicial programs, “jojeong” is analogous to judge-like arbitration.68  For 
example, the naming of the “Beobwon Jojeong Center,” (법원조정센터) (法院調停 Center) 
which could be translated as “Court Mediation Center.”69  But the role of the standing mediator in 
the court-annexed mediation center is similar to that of a med-arbitrator because the mediator has 
the authority to make binding decisions when the negotiation between both parties is at a 
                                                          
mediation voluntarily, but many courts have programs that require parties to mediate before proceeding to 
trial”). 
 
67 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 56-58. 
 
68 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 189-90. 
 
69 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 103; I could not agree to use a term of “court mediation center.” This 
term does not explain an exact meaning of the center.  Furthermore, it is necessary to correctly rename it.  
Because there is no fine definition of mediation, CMC should invent a term including med-arb.  In this 
dissertation, I call it as “Court-annexed mediation center” because it is located in the court-buildings.   
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deadlock.70   Therefore, some Korean mediation should be called mediation but “Med-Arb,”71 
because the Korean mediator is acting not only as a mediator but also as an arbitrator.72  Therefore, 
I propose that contemporary “court-annexed mediation” should be called “court-annexed med-
arb.”73 
                                                          
70 Med-Arb is an acronym for mediation-arbitration and the hybrid method of combining skills of mediation 
and arbitration as part of the dispute resolution process (Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 51, at 176; 
Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb and the legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOTIATION 
L. REV. 157, 159, (2015) (reciting  Martin C. Weisman, supra note 13, at 40); John T. Blankenship, supra 
note 44, at 28 (reciting Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution, 12 Am. Rev. Int’l. Arb. 411, 411 (2001)); Susanna M. Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy 
for Corporate Deadlock: A proposed Model Statute, 60 WASH & LEE L. REV. 111, 131 (2003); James T. 
Peter, Med-Arb International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 83, 88 (1997))  
 “Med-arb is designed to bring together the benefits of both mediation and arbitration in one forum. The 
parties use one neutral person as both mediator and arbitrator. Med-arb is a two-step process, first using 
mediation and then using formal arbitration to decide any issues not settled at the mediation stage. Because 
the med-arbitrator has more authority than the traditional mediator, the parties are encouraged to be more 
honest with each other during the mediation stage, knowing that the neutral person will resolve all 
remaining unsettled matters. The final result of med-arb is a binding decision which includes the agreements 
achieved during the mediation phase and the arbitration decisions.”  (John T. Blankenship, supra note 44, 
at 29)  
It provides the combined process of mediation and arbitration; at first, the third-party neutral assists both 
parties to voluntarily reach an agreement. And if they fail to reach a consensual agreement, the same-neutral 
takes an arbitrator’s position in order to finalize the dispute (Martin C. Weisman, supra note 13, at 40). 
71 RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 17 (“Med-arb 
begins as a mediation.  If the parties do not reach an agreement, they proceed to arbitration, which may be 
performed either by the person who mediated or by another neutral”). 
 
72 DONGWOOK KIM, HANKOOK BUBWONMINSAJOJUNGCENTERYI JOJUNG, [MEDIATION OF KOREAN 
COURT-ANNEXED CIVIL MEDIATION CENTER], 308, 308-309, in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, 
COURT MEDIATION CENTER COLLECTION (2011); supra note 10, JCCDA art. 30 (“Where agreement has 
not been made or where the terms of agreement are unreasonable, a conciliation judge shall make a decision 
on cases for fair resolution of the case, considering interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex 
officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the purport of the application”). 
 
73DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 62, at 308,; Chin-Hyon Kim & Yong-Kyun Chung, supra note 22, at 78 
(reciting Barry Bartel, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History Analysis and Potential, 
27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 665 (1991); contra Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 51 (Profess Sungtae Kim 
and Professor Lori Yi argue that a Korean mediator not only facilitate negotiation between both parties, but 
also aggressively propose the possible agreements for resolving dispute. Therefore, Korean mediation could 
be called as conciliation, instead of mediation); contra Si-Chang Ryu, Hankukeseoyi Sosonge Yihaji Anihan 
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b. Development of the Characteristics: History of Korean Mediation Laws  
ADR has a deep root in human history and a major role in resolving problems in 
communities and cultures across the globe. 74    For example, several Asian countries have 
developed traditional settlement processes handed down from ancient times.75   However, unlike 
in China and Japan, Korean legal culture has not successfully connected the ancient to the current 
legal system: due to rebuilding after the forty-five year Japanese occupation and the following 
Korean civil war in 1950.76   Korean legal culture is instead strongly affected by the Japanese and 
American legal systems, and Korean civil laws are typically influenced by Japanese laws which 
came from German legal background.77   But, unlike other Korean laws, the Korean civil mediation 
regulations have developed with keeping the typical Korean legal characters, but not succeeded to 
the traditional Korean mediation. 
While Korea has traditionally been classified as a “non-litigious” society, the Korean court 
system has been pressured by overloaded caseloads for the past several decades.78   One of the 
                                                          
Bunjaenghaegyuljeolchayi Hwalseonghwa Bangan, [A Study on the Program of Activating Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Korea], 47-4 KYUNGHEE L. REV. 557, 572 (2012) (Korean). 
74 JEROME T. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, 
CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 2 (2004). 
75  Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, Judicial Dispute Resolution: A Global Approach, 2012 GLOBAL LEGAL 
ISSUES 171, 176 (2012); JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A 
NUTSHELL 74 (2013, 4th ed.). 
76 HEEGI SHIM, HANKUKBUBJESA [KOREAN LEGAL HISTORY] 28(Author states that the traditional law is 
not succeeded to the current Korean Laws under the substantial law view, but the traditional legal 
consciousness is succeeded); JUNGHUN LEE, BUBGWA BUBSASANGSA [LAW AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] 297 
(2011) (Korean).  
 
77  Sundong Lee, Hankukyi Minsajojeonghwahaejedo [Korean Civil Mediation and Settlement] 1 (not 
published, the author uploaded the exclusive inner-website of Korean court and personally gave it to writer). 
 
78 Cf. Galanter and Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor,” supra note 1, at 790, Footnote 1. 
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main reasons for the traditional classification may be that Koreans have been influenced by 
Confucianism, and people tolerate neither expressing their emotional feelings, nor revealing their 
conflicts to other people.79    
The Chosun dynasty (1392~1897) had a strong feudal caste system, and this social system 
urged people to obey the social and political authorities—because the Chosun dynasty was strongly 
governed by Confucianism. 80    Because this Chosun society ruled by Confucianism, they 
emphasized social harmony and integration,81 and people in the Chosun society might have been 
uncomfortable to reveal disputes in the community.82  Then, Korea might be categorized as a non-
litigious society.   
However, recent research reveals a new approach: that the Chosun was not a society that 
contained its litigation, nor, per the traditional viewpoint, were Koreans trying to escape from 
                                                          
79YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 365 (Professor Ham emphasize the face-saving culture in Confucian of 
Asia); Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 444, footnote 1; Veronica Taylor & Michael Pryles, The Cultures 
of Dispute Resolution in Asia, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 4 (Michael Pryles ed., 2002); Professor 
Sooyoung Kwon explained that the positive meaning for Korean is a social solidarity and the negative 
meaning for Korean is to be excluded from the solidarity of community or group. available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGsZT7t6heY (last visited on July 3, 2016). 
 
80 Generally see Young-Do Park, King Sejong’s Confucian Rule by Law: Focusing on the relationship 
between law and rule by benevolence, 9-3 REV. OF KOR. STU. 103 (2006) (Korean). 
 
81 Benjamin L. Read & Ethan Michelson, Mediating the Mediation Debate: Conflict Resolution and the 
Local State in China, 52-5 J. of Conflict Resol, 737, 740 (2008); Young-do Park, supra note 80, at 113; 
Junsup So, Jungkukyi Bibeobchijuyi Jeontonge Daehan Yugasasangyi Younghang [Effects of Confucianism 
by Chinese non-Rule of Law legal tradition], 31 CHINESE STUD. 251, 252 (2005) (Korean); Jong-Khil Lee, 
Jeontong bubsasang Jungkukbubmunhwayi Suyonggwa Chosunjoyi Bubbaldal [The Reception of Chinese 
Legal Culture and the Advancement of Laws in Chosun Dynasty]  114 JUSTICE 298, 302-305 (2009) 
(Korean) (This article interprets that Confucianism emphasized the ethics and morality rather than laws and 
put law as a subset conception) (Korean); Jisoo Kim, Sunjinsidae Bunjaengyi Yaebangwa Pyonghwa 
Haegyuyi Chulhaksasang [Prevention of disputes and Peaceful resolution of Pre-Jin Period] 23-2 L. & 
ADMIN. STUD. 10-13(2003) (Korean). 
 
82 Jisoo Kim, Jeontong Beobmunhwayi Hyundaejeok Baljeon [Contemporary Promotion of Traditional 
Legal Culture], 27 KOR. J. OF L. HISTORY 283 289 (2003) (Korean). 
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revealing disputes; instead, there was the Wae-Ji-bu (외지부, 外支部), a private organization to 
help people file suits and represent them during litigation.83   In order to file a lawsuit in the Chosun 
dynasty, the plaintiff and the defendant had to lead the process of the litigation.84   The Wae-ji-bu 
not only represented the case for their clients but also provided additional services, such as filling 
out legal documents.85    The Wae-ji-bu had deep legal knowledge and could advise their clients 
during the law suits in order to get rewards.86   The Chosun dynasty prohibited the Wae-ji-bu from 
representing parties in 1478, because it thought the Wae-ji-bu increased the number of lawsuits 
and caused unnecessary disputes; furthermore, it was against the Chosun’s philosophy and 
Confucianism ideals: such as, their emphasis on non-confrontationism.87  According to Professor 
Han, people would complain about the Wae-ji-bu, because it might cause unreasonable delay in 
the litigation process.88  But the Wae-ji-bu still had work under the table until the nineteenth (19) 
century, because people in the lower level in the Chosun could neither read nor write documents 
for filing litigation, therefore they needed the Wae-ji-bu’s assistance.89   
                                                          
83 Cf. Sangkwon Han, Chosunsidae Sosonghwa Waei-bu: 1560yun Kyengjubugyulsongibanbunseok 
[Lawsuits in the Chosun dynasty and the Waeji-Bu entities: Analysis of the 1560’s Gyeongju-bu Lawsuit 
Document], 69 HISTORY AND ACTUALITY 255 (2008) (Korean) (This article initially introduced the 
existence of the private legal professional organization in Chosun dynasty); Geung-Sik Jung, Aspects of 
Nineteenth-Century Chosun Society As Observed through a Legal Proceeding: Analysis of the 1816 Soji 
filed by the Munhwa Yu Descent Group in Kurye, 5 J. KOREAN L. 97, 103 (2005-2006) (Korean). 
 
84  Han, Id, at 284-85. 
 
85  Id, at 286, 288. 
 
86 Id, at 287. 
 
87  Id, at 286, 290. 
 
88  Id, at 286, 288 (The Wae-ji-bu sometimes caused the delay by filing the complaint of a local 
administrative who dealt with the case). 
 
89 Id, at 264, 289. 
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 At the beginning of the Chosun dynasty, the ruler suffered from the massive number of 
lawsuits.   In order to reduce the filing number, Hyang-Yak (향약, 鄕約)—which originated from 
the Song dynasty of China and local autonomy organizations—was established to provide similar 
mediation programs, by selecting the elders of local villages as mediators or arbitrators.90 
However, the traditional mediation program was criticized, because the plaintiff could file 
a lawsuit with malicious purpose and they would be forced to make an agreement at the mid-point 
between plaintiff and defendant.91   Because they were not educated in mediating disputes, there 
were also limits in getting respectful settlement outcomes from the disputants based on their social 
power, such as age.92 
However, it is an important fact that, even though the Chosun dynasty based its rule on the 
non-litigious ethics of Confucianism, there was still plenty of litigation regardless of social or 
political level in society, and people in Chosun might be aggressive to gain their legal rights.93 
 In sum, despite the traditional view, the Chosun could not be categorized as a non-litigious 
society, even though it was governed by Confucianism, because the Chosun suffered from 
excessive number of civil lawsuits.  While the Chosun dynasty emphasized the prevention of 
disputes and peaceful resolution, the traditional mediation program was not perfectly operated by 
the elders.  Even though people in Chosun dynasty had lived in strong confusism society, they did 
                                                          
90 Young-do Park, supra note 80, at 110. 
 
91 Jisoo Kim, supra note 81, at 10-13 (At the beginning of Chosun dynasty, every claims were ruled to share 
50:50. Then, this 50:50 resolution brought false claims based on malicious plaintiffs). 
 
92 Id, at 13. 
 
93 Han, supra note 83, at 286, 291.  
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not neglect to pursue their rights, using Wae-ji-bu, former legal expert in Chosun.  In the other 
words, they did not sleep on the rights, but aggressively and litigiously gain legal rights, by filing 
a suit.   
Before the contemporary legal system was established, there were different types of 
methods existed for resolving disputes, such as traditional types of civil laws, mediation, and 
arbitration.94  Even though it seemed like Korea had several traditional dispute resolution methods 
in its long history, the current Korean legal system has unfortunately failed to succeed the Korean 
traditional ways of resolving dispute.95  As such, the current Korean civil mediation programs are 
not affected by the traditional Korean way but were newly invented by the contemporary 
judiciary.96  The first Korean mediation law was enacted in 1962 and was called “Chajichaga-
Jojeong-Beob” (차지차가조정법, 借地借家調停法) regulating disputes related to the leasing or 
renting of properties.97   Initially, it was applied in seven larger cities to regulate their disputes 
related to the leasing of properties, but it was expanded to the entire state in 1987.  The other law 
was enacted to regulate small claims in 1973.98  These mediation-related laws allowed the court 
to refer cases to mediation, where the judge who referred the cases acted as the mediator; however, 
                                                          
94 Generally see Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, supra note 75, at 176; Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose 
Gallagher, supra note 11, at 889-90; Hong-Suck Cho, supra note 2, at 339-343; Minjung Kim, supra note 
1, at 21. 
 
95 Sang-Chan Kim & Young-hwa Yang, supra note 20, at 248; Laurie A. Lewis, Law Student Mediators 
Wear a Triple Crown: Skilled, Sellable & Successful, 50 U.S. F.L. REV. 165, 171 (2016).  
 
96 JEROME T. BARRETT, supra note 74, at 9 (“The early Yi Dynasty (Chosun Dynasty) in Korea (1392-
1910) is remarkable for its longevity and its extensive use of arbitration.  Because of its isolation, the regime 
did not employ arbitration in international disputes, but it was widely practiced in a variety of commercial 
and civil dispute between citizens”). 
97  JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 73. 
 
98 Id; Lee, supra note 77, at 5-6. 
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civil mediation has not been successfully used by disputants.99   While civil mediation was not 
popular in trials, the Korean Supreme Court released an internal regulation to promote mediation 
in 1987.  It strengthened the council of mediation and expanded the application of earlier mediation 
laws (enacted in 1962 for seven cities) to the entirety of Korea.100 
However, in recent years, judges have been hesitant to settle disputes in the courtroom.101  
If they persuaded parties to mediate rather than ruling on the case, judges would be accused of 
doing so to escape from writing a ruling sentence or from being suspected of making an unfair 
decision in favor of one of the parties.102  Although the Supreme Court put effort into enhancing 
the mediation process, usage of that system was still very low.103  To remedy this, JCCDA was 
put into place, then amended eight times to unify the related laws and clarify the range of 
application.104  With the JCCDA, it is instead possible for parties to circumvent the court of first 
incident entirely and proceed directly to a “textbook” type of mediation.105  
The JCCDA of 1990 has been amended five (5) times to undermine the value of mediation 
and strengthen the court’s authority.106  For example, under this Act, the court of first incident 
                                                          
99 JUNG, supra note 13, at 73; Lee, supra note 77, at 6. 
 
100  JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 73; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 6. 
 
101 JUNSEO PARK, SEOUL BUBWONJOJEONGCENTER GAESOSIC INSAMALSUM [OPENING SPEECH OF SEOUL 
COURT MEDIATION CENTER], 7 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, COURT MEDIATION CENTER 
COLLECTION (2011) (Korean). [hereinafter JUNSEO PARK, OPENING SPEECH OF SEOUL COURT MEDIATION 
CENTER]; Please see infra Chapter III, “tiger judge.” 
102 JUNSEO PARK, Id, at 7. 
103 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 6. 
 
104 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7.   
 
105 JUNYOUNG JUNG, Id, at 73. 
 
106 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7. 
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could refer a case to mediation without the consent of the parties, or the court could mediate the 
case on its own without referral.107  At the beginning of this phase of mediation development, the 
law did not allow courts to refer cases to mediation without both parties’ consents.108  Then, 
contrary to the purpose of the Mediation Law and against the Supreme Court’s expectations, the 
number of mediation cases shrunk: the number of mediation cases was gradually shrinking because 
mediation referrals were significantly fewer following enactment of the law.109  Following the 
Supreme Court investigation, the Court determined that there was no significant fault on the part 
of the Mediation Law, and they attempted to increase the number of mediation cases by allowing 
the court to refer.110  The Supreme Court again amended the internal regulations in 1991 and 
amended the Act in 1992 under the revitalization policy.111   
Under the fifth (5th) amendment, the court-annexed mediation center (CMC) program was 
established by empowering a standing mediator with an authority equivalent to a mediation 
judge. 112   According to this amendment, Korean mediation could step forward to a “pure” 
mediation, which is not governed by the court of first incident.113 
                                                          
 
107 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74. 
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109 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7. 
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111 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7-8. 
 
112Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 7 (4) (S. Kor.) (“The standing 
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113 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72 (Koream mediation programs are gradually and steadly transiting 
from court-centered to party-centered). 
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In my opinion, enactment of the JCCDA and its several amendments has gradually 
improved two different mediation programs, such as regulations for leases and small claims, 
reflecting the current difficulties of applying mediation programs toward resolving disputes.114  
However, during the amendments to the JCCDA, the court of first incident would become a main 
actor of the mediation programs.  Because the court kept not only the authority to make a ruling, 
but also the authority to operate the mediation programs at the same location, the role of mediation 
shrunk in the court.  Before the 2009 amendment to the JDDCA, it was thought that the JCCDA 
would regulate the mediation programs in the courts.  The Supreme Court mistakenly calculated 
the number of mediation cases that would be settled, to reduce judges’ caseloads, as most 
mediation cases are nevertheless handled by the court of first incident.  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court ignored the possible abuse of mediation by the court of first incident.  Before the first 
amendment to the JCCDA, the Supreme Court found that the number voluntarily filing mediation 
cases had declined, and the courts needed to forcibly refer civil cases to the mediation process 
under the judges’ official authority.115   Some scholars criticize that parties would be forced by a 
judge to make agreements, because they may be unwilling to reject a judge’s proposal in front of 
him or her. 116  Although the Supreme Court put effort into implementing several mediation 
regulations, those laws did not provide detailed procedures, some laws conflicted with each other, 
                                                          
114 Id, at 74. 
 
115 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74. 
 
116 Contra. Youngki Kim, Beobwonnae Jojeong Hwalsunghwarul Wihan Jeyeon: Jojeongwiwonhoirul 
Tonghan Jojijojeongjedo [Proposal for Improvement of Court-annexed Mediation: Early Mediation 
through Council of Mediation] 4 (2013) (Korean) (not published, writer get this article in the inner and 
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and all mediators suffered because they were required to mediate cases without the benefit of 
precedent or traditional mediation training practice.117   
c. Sub-par Justice in Current Korean Mediation 
Some critics argue that Korean mediation would be secondary justice, because the court-
led mediation programs were operated to reduce the overloaded casework on the bench.118  Under 
this theory, the judiciary would take all the benefits rather than promote the mediation programs.  
Judges could save their time in mediation process; when parties could reach an agreement or a 
judge render a binding decision without parties’ objection, a judge does not need to write a full 
document of ruling.  And then, the rate of appeal could lower based on the consensual agreement 
in the mediaiton process.  However, the judiciary could counter-argue that, per the Fifth 
Amendment to the JCCDA in 2009, they lower the financial barrier by reducing the filing fee for 
voluntary filings.  
The major characteristics of Korean mediation are laid forth below.  First, unlike the U.S.—
which has primarily private mediation in Indiana, U.S.—the Korean court strongly controls the 
                                                          
117 Cf. Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7. 
 
118 JAEHONG LEE, ADR [ADR] 7 (2012) (Korean); Korean court and legal department focused on reducing 
the overloaded cases in the courts and increasing the number of legal professions. It could be stated that the 
Korean focused on the efficiency of the role of law and, somehow, ignored the effectiveness or fair justice. 
Also, under the Green Paper published by Minister of Justice and General Attorney of the British Columbia, 
Canada, the certain cases are taking longer even though the total number of cases is declined and investment 
is increased.  In this regard, the report proposed that the culture of delay and complex legal system cause 
the unexpected delay of procedure. available at 
http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/public/JusticeSystemReviewGreenPaper.pdf (last visited on Oct 2, 2012)  
According this data, it might be deduced that the complicated system is not helpful to access to justice for 
the ordinary or the poor. 
Therefore, I could argue that, in Korea, there is still gap between the expectation of investment and current 
circumstance of legal justice. In addition, it is necessary to consider the quality of legal professions would 
be a major role to figure out the delayed procedure and provide the better legal service to all. (See  
GALANTER & KRISHNAN, supra note 1, at 5-7).  In this regard, it is necessary to consider the relevance of 
quantity and quality of legal professions and enhancement of access to justice. 
 
30 
 
process of judicial mediation.119  Mediation operates within the territory of the courthouse, because 
this legal reform was led by the Korean Supreme Court.120   Under the policy, based on court-led 
mediation programs, lawyers in society and the general public did not approve of the court-oriented 
mediation program, because the process and outcome of mediation were similar to those of 
litigation under the Korean legal society.121   Therefore, courts were the primary beneficiary of the 
new judicial mediation system through reduction in the number of cases.  Some critics call this 
program “alternative judgment” instead of “alternative lawsuit,” because judges rule in either case; 
the only difference is that judges are not required to write down official rulings in mediation—a 
practice adopted to save time to review other cases.122 
Second, most judicial mediation cases in Korea are still handled by court of first incident,123 
and because the judge of the court becomes the mediator in the same case, parties might be under 
pressure to make an agreement.124  The Supreme Court recognized the potential for coercion by 
judges and tried to expand the mediation program to include court-annexed and court-connected 
                                                          
119 The Korean civil mediation programs are led by courts. In this regards, I proposed to call Korean civil 
mediation as court-led mediation.  All civil mediation cases go through court process and regulated by the 
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outcomes of Korean civil mediation have a same legal effect of a final and irrevocable judgment.   The 
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settlement or undisputed decision of recommendation could have a claim-preclusive effect as same as a 
final and conclusive judgment.  This legal effect might prevent participant from appealing based on the 
defenses in contract, such as mistake or fraud. 
120 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74. 
 
121 Interviewed with a Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015 and a lawyer on July 2, 2013. 
  
122 Siyoon Lee, supra note 8, at 478. 
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mediation programs.125  The judiciary explained that the CMC, successfully linked with early 
mediation, would be a milestone in the development of Korean judicial mediation, because it 
would be a first attempt for judges to release their cases outside of the courtroom under the JCCDA, 
which was enacted in 1990.126   Shortly after the adoption of the JCCDA, the Supreme Court 
established a new pilot program to refer certain mediation cases to outer-council mediation 
organizations.127   
However, one might criticize how, unlike the process of referral to the CMC, the court 
currently refers cases to those mediation organizations without the parties’ consent and question 
how such an organization is qualified to mediate cases outside the court.128  Even though the 
Supreme Court’s effort to promote mediation programs in Korean legal system, some judges and 
other legal professionals continue to resist the application of ADR in court, based on arguments 
that Koreans are not familiar with mediation or arbitration, do not have a tradition of ADR, and 
that Korean lawyers are hesitant to use ADRs instead of litigation—because with ADR they cannot 
award a sufficient “contingency fee”129  When the U.S. began to adopt ADR programs, mediation 
proponents faced similar opposition akin to that in the current Korean system.130   However, in the 
                                                          
125 Interviewed with a former judge on Dec. 12, 2014; Sumi Kang, Japan Yoiyi Bunjaenghaegyuljedoe 
Daehan Banchu [Reconsidering Alternative Dispute Resolution] 10-1 CIVIL PRO. 205, 223 (2006) 
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126 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 56-57. 
 
127 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 57. 
 
128 Interview with the Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015; Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 469. 
 
129 Interviewed with Korean Lawyer on July 2, 2014.  
 
130  Interviewed with U.S. mediators on Oct. 23 & Nov. 24, 2014; See STEPHEN GOLDBERG, FRANK 
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U.S., this problem was resolved through the gradual introduction of mediation and through test 
cases.131 
 For example, in Indiana, when the courts adopted some forms of mediation, judges, 
lawyers, and parties all strongly resisted its application in civil cases.132   Judges, in particular, 
thought it their duty and authority to rule on each case, and were dubious whether civil cases could 
be resolved through mediation.  Lawyers, on the other hand, were afraid of losing their role in the 
legal profession and of losing money.  The civil court decided to test whether these concerns were 
valid by closing the county courthouse for one day, during which judges would use mediation 
only. During that day, over 96% of the cases tried settled successfully.133   
According to the ADR movement, several state and federal courts tried to launch pilot 
mediation programs and considered whether to adopt one of the ADRs. 134  After they got a 
successful settlement rate in the mediation process, the resistance would decrease gradually and 
young lawyers preferred to be involved in mediation fields.135   Contrary to the U.S. circumstances, 
it is doubtful that the Korean judiciary has a similar result with successful settlement rates in the 
mediation process.136 
                                                          
131 Interviewed with U.S. mediators in Bloomington on Oct. 23, 2014 and in Indianapolis on Nov. 24, 2014. 
 
132 Interviewed with U.S. mediators in Bloomington on Oct. 23, 2014 and Indianapolis on Nov. 24, 2014; 
GOLDBERG, FRANK SANDER, & ROGERS, supra note 130, at 597. 
 
133 Interviewed with U.S. mediator on Nov. 24, 2014. 
 
134 Soonil Kwon, supra note 14, at 79-83. 
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COLE, supra note 130, at 597-609. 
 
136 It is still difficult to evaluate the benefits of CMC. (There is no research to review whether CMC 
successfully reduce the caseworks and provides greater satisfaction for the parties with better service than 
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Unlike in the U.S., even though the Korean Supreme Court has only adopted the judicial 
mediation program, they did not properly pilot the mediation program, or did not survey judges 
and lawyers before enact the JCCDA.137   Since the Supreme Court tried to promote the judicial 
mediation program by enacting the JCCDA in 1990 and establishing the court-annexed mediation 
center, it looks like continuously expending the judicial mediation as it appears.138 
i. Removing Barriers to Access the Courts 
The judiciary allows more liberal access to the courts through early mediation, with lower 
financial barriers and shortened processing times.139   Despite those efforts, the public still widely 
disregards judicial mediation and lawyers still prefer to go to trial over mediation. 140   The 
following provides a description of methods the court might use to convince the public to instead 
use the mediation system. 
First, the filing fee for voluntary mediation is 1/10 that of civil litigation.141  The judicial 
authority advertises that by utilizing more voluntary mediation, it could lower the financial barrier 
                                                          
litigation.  Professor Youngju Ham mentions that the benefits of CMC should be calculated by the 
participants’ satisfactions during the process and outcome of mediation). 
137 Mungu Kang, Minsajojeong Halsunghwa Bangane Gwanhan Silmunot [Promotion of Civil Mediation], 
509 BAR ASSOCIATION, 213, 217 (2005) (Korean) (Kang mentioned that he tried test the mediation 
programs in different places which were invented by himself). 
 
138  BYUNGCHUL KIM, BUBWON JOJUNGYI UNYOUNG HYUNHWANG [CURRENT OPERATION OF COURT 
MEDIATION] 137-38 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY 
OF KOREAN JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean) [hereinafter BYUNGCHUL 
KIM, CURRENT OPERATION OF COURT MEDIATION]. 
 
139 JAEHONG LEE, supra note 118, at 81-83. 
 
140 Interview with the Korean lawyer on Apr. 14, 2015. 
  
141 ($ 1.00= 1,180 Korean Won on Dec. 13, 2015) 
Requesting amount  Mediation filing fee 
Less than 10 Million Korean Won (Requesting amount*0.5%)*1/10 
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and provide an easier way for Korea’s “have-nots” to access the courts.142  Most Korean scholars 
concur that judicial mediation provides a more expedited and less expensive process than 
litigation, in part because the filing fee for judicial mediation is 90% lower than the filing fee for 
civil litigation, and early mediation could shorten litigation overall, because more parties would 
settle before a trial begins.143   
The judicial authority needs to advertise that judicial mediation provides a more expedited 
process than litigation.144   Judicial mediation usually adopts an early mediation process, which 
can lead to a final, consensual agreement before the first trial date.145  Even if a case is referred to 
the mediation process by a judge, the trial would not be delayed by the early mediation process.146  
When a party strongly expresses that it wants a judge to review the case, the mediator in that 
scenario would immediately release the case and return it to the court.147   
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142 In Joo, supra note 4, at 613. 
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144 Su-Hye Cho, Minsajojeonge Yihan Jojengjeolchayi Gongjeongsunggwa Dangsajayi Jeolchajeok Jiwiyi 
Bojang [ Procedural Fairness and quality of judicial mediation in the Korean Judicial Conciliation of Civil 
Disputes Act] 19-1 CIVIL PROCEDURES 393, 414 (2015) (Cho found that most early mediation programs in 
the court-connected and annexed mediation currently completed their mediation cases within 40 days).  
 
145 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 112-113.  
 
146 Id, at 117; Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 458. 
 
147 Interviewed with standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
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More than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases are handled by court of first incident.148  
In these mediation cases, the plaintiff is obligated to pay the full filing fee for civil litigation.  Even 
if a case is referred by the court of first incident to other mediation organizations and the parties 
reach an agreement, 9/10 of the filing fee is never refunded to the plaintiff.149  Parties also lack 
financial incentive to use mediation, because the filing fee is non-refundable: first, if the judge 
refers the case to the mediation process, the fee is non-refundable; second, the portion of small 
claims is reaching seventy (70) percent of civil litigations and the filing fee is relatively low.150   
From a practical point of view, Korean judicial mediation may prove helpful for both the 
court and the parties involved, because not only could the court reduce the burden of cases by 
having them settle, but the disputant parties could save expense and time: all in a less-stressful 
environment. 151   Some scholars, however, worry about whether Korean judicial mediation 
adequately provides access to the courts, even though the Supreme Court tried to carefully design 
the process of judicial mediation and firmly settle those programs during the transition period.152  
                 ii. Possibly Depriving Parties of Access to Courts (Justice) 
As previously mentioned, increasing access to judicial mediation in Korea would improve 
efficiency in the courts, because it is relatively less expensive than litigation and can be expedited 
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149 Interviewed with a Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015 (It is necessary to refund 9/10 of filing fee when the 
court refers to mediation process without parties’ consent and parties could reach an agreement). 
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151 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 63-64. 
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Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 61. 
36 
 
much more quickly.  Compulsory referral to mediation may, however, potentially put such a 
program at odds with certain readings of the Korean Constitution and Civil Procedures, as it might 
infringe on access to justice when the parties wish to file civil matters in court.153  From the 
standpoint of the court, it is beneficial to have the authority to refer cases to mediation 
organizations without the parties’ consent, because it dramatically reduces their litigation 
caseload.154  On the other hand, it might lead to discontent, because parties want the judge to 
review their case, not to negotiate or mediate with other parties.155   
First, we will examine whether compulsory referral to mediation without parties’ consent 
would infringe on their right of access to courts, as guaranteed in the Korean Constitution.156  
Parties can request to confirm their rights or obligations through application and interpretation of 
the acts, per judicial procedures by an independent and qualified judge.157  Mediation referral itself 
would not prevent parties from filing cases in courts, because they have the right to return to the 
court by expressing the desire to do so.158  However, any interruption of access to the court also 
might infringe on their rights.159  A conservative judge should carefully refer the case to mediation, 
                                                          
153 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 62-63. 
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inquire about the parties’ intentions and opinions on the referral, and not transfer the case without 
their consent.160  While our social system tried to balance two fundamental legal theories, such as 
“stability and justice,” the main purpose of the law is to provide equal protection and justice for 
all.  Under the court’s function, mediation process might be considered as a bypass of court and 
some scholars consider that there is no sefety net.  But, referral itself could not be a barrier to 
access to justice because parties in the mediation process could go back to the courtroom at anytime 
at their will.  However, in practice, some scholars criticized the formal court system for being 
ineffective, costly, and subject to significant delay.  Under the early mediation method, although 
a case is referred without consent, rights to access the court are not interrupted, because parties 
can return to court without delay.161 
For the first two years following passage of the JCCDA, compulsory referral to mediation 
by court of first incident was still prohibited, in favor of voluntary mediation, but when the number 
of voluntary filings for judicial mediation did not meet the court’s expectations, the judiciary 
requested that the Act be amended to allow referral without parties’ consent.162  Korean mediation 
at that time was still not developing toward court-connected or private mediation, instead simply 
turning judges into mediators.163   Currently, the judiciary does release mediation cases to outside 
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organizations, but this mediation program is distrusted and reveals problems, such as lack of proper 
mediation training, and distrust in the quality of mediation services in general.164 
There are two viewpoints regarding the legal effects of in-court settlement: The first posits 
that, since all in-court settlements—including both a consensual agreement by parties and a 
binding decision by a standing mediator—enjoy both res judicata and a claim-preclusive effect, 
these firm legal effects could provide for an effective means of implementation following the 
mediative process.  
The second viewpoint cautions against the possibility of depriving a right to trial by the 
parties.  As mentioned supra (footnote 9), both in-court settlements and standing mediators’ 
binding decisions share the same legal irrevocability of judgment if either party does not make an 
objection within two weeks of the judgment.  After this period, the claim-preclusive effect on 
mediated agreements and mediators’ binding decisions is rendered. Given that this would hardly 
constitute an element of retrial or quasi-retrial under Korean Civil Procedure Act,165 it might be 
an obstacle to deprive the right to trial. 
In summary, there is an urgent need to adopt more court-led mediation in Korea. Until now, 
judicial mediation has been directly court-annexed or court-connected, such as through the CMC 
and outside organizations.166   Mediation has transitioned through a wide spectrum of systems.  
The establishment of judicial mediation would be helpful for both the courts and the public, 
because the court caseload would be reduced and participants would save time and money.  
                                                          
164 Interview with Korean mediators on June 12, 2013 and Apr. 15, 2015. 
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Applications of mediation have revealed different aspects of public and judicial opinion on the 
subject; people tend to disregard mediation contrary to the judiciary’s expectation.  Because of the 
similarity of environment between a court’s trial and mediation processes, judicial mediation 
should complement self-determination when making a consensual agreement.    
The Korean judiciary did not experience private mediation, contrary to the U.S.-type 
mediation taught in ADR textbooks.167  When judicial mediation was adopted by the court, the 
judiciary and the scholars had only an illusion of mediation, because they did not consider the 
differences between U.S. private mediation and Korean judicial mediation.168   Therefore, the 
efficiency of the Korean judicial mediation does not meet expectations and the public and legal 
professional associations distrust the quality of mediation services. We should consider how 
mediators in judicial mediation programs ought to guarantee both parties’ self-determination, as 
guaranteed by the “pure” definition of mediation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72. 
  
168 Sang-Hyuk Im, Beobwonyi ADR [Court’s ADR], 12-2 CIVIL PROCEDURES 33, 36 (2008).  
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Chapter III.      Korean Mediation 
a. Overview 
This chapter reviews the typical characteristics of Korean civil mediation.  It will examine 
different court-led Korean (court-annexed and court-connected) civil mediation organizations 
within the category of Judicial Dispute Resolution (“JDR”)169 and explain the detailed distinctions 
between each of the mediation authorities, such as court-annexed versus court-connected 
mediations.   It will examine five primary actors that participate in mediated disputes and the 
problems faced by each, including the following: (1) court of first incident; (2) mediation judges; 
(3) court-annexed mediation centers (CMC’s)170; (4) inner council of mediation, court-annexed 
mediation; and (5) outer-council mediation organizations.171  
 
 
                                                          
169 Younghoa Jung, , supra note 3, at 466 (Professor Jung mentions that the U.S. federal ADR programs 
which is regulated by the Federal ADR act would be categorized as court-connected ADR. Furthermore, he 
adds that court-connected ADR would be include into Judicial Dispute Resolution (“JDR”)). 
 
170 Because the CMC program is the most outstanding and transitional mediation program in Korean civil 
mediation in promotion of ADR.  This dissertation will review the CMC program in Chapter IV.  
 
171 There is Sanggun (상상, 常勤) mediation program provided by the court of first incident.  But, this 
program is currently operated by the court, but there is no regulation or civil mediation code to regulate it.  
Therefore, this dissertation does not cover this program, but only mention an existence of this mediation 
program.  
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(Table 2) (Factors of Court-led Korean Mediation)172 
  Court of first incident Judge Same as judge 
Court-Led Court- Mediation Judge Judge Same as judge 
Mediation Annexed Court Mediation Center Standing Commissioner Same as judge 
  Council of Mediation Inner-Commissioner Occu. Professionals 
 Court-
Connected 
Council of Mediation Outer-Commissioner Lawyer Association 
 
Unlike voluntary mediation programs, court-related mediation programs have been 
standardized and legalized.173   Korea has adopted a primarily court-led mediation system; I 
classify such mediation as “court-led” because most mediation programs are established by, led 
by, or annexed onto the court.  Court-led mediation can legally influence the parties to make a 
decision, while the few private mediation programs in practice cannot.174  Korean mediators can 
be divided between those with authority to make binding decisions without parties’ consent (civil 
judges, mediation judges, and CMC mediators) and those without that same authority (mediation 
                                                          
172 Court-annexed mediation means that the process is operated inside of court territory and court-connected 
mediation means that the process is operated outside of court territory. 
173 RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 752; Brian A. 
Pappas, supra note 70, at 159. 
 
174 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 103. 
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council members and outside mediators).  Mediation judges and CMC mediators act with authority 
to make binding decision of mediation without parties’ consent.175   
There are different types of court-established mediation, and because of these differences, 
each type has its own unique processes.176  According to Article 7 and 8 of the Judicial Conciliation 
of Civil Disputes Act, there are five different types of official mediation organizations in Korea: 
(1) court of first incident;177 (2) mediation judges; (3) civil judges; (4) standing commissioners; 
and (5) mediation councils.178   It is also possible to categorize mediation according to where it 
proceeds: if it occurs on the courthouse grounds, for example, it is categorized in a different way 
than if it is conducted inside the court building with full court staff support.179 
The judicial authorities introduced the Mediation Act to the legislative in order to improve 
the mediation process.  Reviewing the development of the JCCDA, the judicial authorities were 
                                                          
175 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 7 (4) (S. Kor.) (“The standing 
commissioners and the court of the suit that conciliate cases under the main sentence of paragraph (2) and 
(3) shall have the same power as a conciliation judge”). 
 
176 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 7 and 8 (S. Kor.)  (Please see 
appendix.  This article explains the organs of court-annexed mediation in Korea). 
Art. 7 (1) Cases of conciliation shall be dealt with by the conciliation judge; 
Art. 7 (2) A conciliation judge may directly conciliate cases or have the commissioner (hereinafter 
referred to as “standing commissioners”) who regularly deal with the affairs related to conciliation 
under this Act and a council of conciliation conciliate case; 
Art. 7 (3) The court of a suit may directly conciliate case……if the court of the suit refers cases to 
conciliation pursuant to Article 6, and if deemed appropriate to directly handle case; 
Art. 8 A council of Conciliation shall be comprised of a chief commissioner and two or more 
commissioners. 
 
177 I want to emphasize the term of “court of first incident” that the judge, who handles a civil case, refers 
the case to him/herself and becomes a mediator for the same case in the same courtroom.   
 
178  Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art 7 and 8 (S. Kor.); Junyoung Jung, 
supra note 9, at 75; Sundong Lee, supra note 86, at 9. 
 
179 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 89. 
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strongly involved in the promotion of the civil mediation programs.180  Because there is a binding 
decision, through either process, by the judge-mediators and the standing mediators, disputants’ 
self-determination is potentially weakened by judicial authority.181   Generally, judges are proud 
of the practice of court-based mediation, because, in the past, judges suffered greatly from lack of 
time and manpower under the extreme pressure of their dockets,182 but mediation lessens that time 
constraint.   It is possible to criticize civil mediation as being weakened by judicial authorities, but 
the concept of private mediation has not been considered before now—therefore, the effects of 
private mediation have yet to be evaluated.183  
           There are at least five legal entities for civil mediation programs in Korea.184  In addition, 
there are settlement programs, before and during the trial, after filing a suit.185  Furthermore, 
because there are several different administrative ADR programs in Korea,186 several scholars and 
lawyers who were interviewed complained about the number of ADR programs and that the 
                                                          
180 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74. 
 
181 Cf. Youngju Ham, supra note 52, at 180; JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 84-86, 101, 126; Youngki 
Kim, supra note 116, at 1; Contra, BYUNGCHUL KIM, BUBWON JOJEONGYI WOONYOUNG HYUNHWANG 
[PRESENT CONDITION OF COURT MEDIATION] 145 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, 
CONFERENCE OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT 
(2010) [hereinafter BYUNGCHUL KIM, PRESENT CONDITION OF COURT MEDIATION]. 
182 Cf. BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 138, at 145.  
183 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 180. 
 
184 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74; Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 463 (the court of first incident 
currently uses Sanggun (상상, 常勤) mediator program, could be called as trial-day mediation beside of 
courtroom). 
 
185 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 91-93,103-110. 
 
186 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 68-75, 453 (Professor Ham makes a list of administrative ADR 
programs. He found 34 different programs operated by branch of administrative in 2014); Siyoon Lee, 
supra note 8, at 479 (Former judge Mr. Lee mentions that there are about 70 administrative ADR programs 
in Korea). 
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number of programs might cause confusion among lawyers or disputants when they decide to file 
a complaint.187  
The courts still operate the Sanggun mediator who fully works on certain days, but is not 
a full-time position.188  In addition, administrative governments, including the central and local 
governments, operate the several different ADR programs.  There are complaints, according to the 
interviewee-scholars and lawyers, that there are too many mediation or arbitration programs in 
Korea.  An interviewee-lawyer mentioned that he sometimes got confused over which program 
was suitable for filing a complaint for his client.189   
While it is generally believed that mediation would be more productive, and provide for a 
more efficient pretrial,190 the role of mediation in the current Korean legal system sees scholars’ 
approaches including the illusion of a mediation “advantage” and judges often tempted to resolve 
disputes without uncovering hidden issues that may help the parties’ future relationships. 191  
Several scholars have proposed the possibility of increasing development of mediation by using 
alternative methods of dispute resolution and, in turn, decreasing the number of cases per judge.192  
However, the courts respond that they are able to provide the most dynamic legal services within 
their judicial territories through court-established mediation, which could not exist without their 
                                                          
187 Interviewed with Korean lawyer on Apr. 14, 2015. 
 
188 Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 463-64 (“Sanggun” mediator is working for a trial-day mediation 
besides of courtroom). 
 
189 Interviewed on Apr. 14, 2015. 
 
190 RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 736. 
 
191 Cf. Professor Edwin Greenebaum’s statement in CJAM training course on September 2015. 
 
192 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 177. 
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support.193  Professor Greenebaum emphasized in my CJAM training manual that a mediator 
might be tempted to develop all possible issues which directly and indirectly caused a dispute and 
resolve hidden or unrelated problems at the same time.194   
I propose that encomiasts of mediation should not [untruthfully] influence the public in 
order to make the myth of ADR as the primary method of resolving disputes, but we simply 
understand that mediation might provide more diverse approaches than only the court’s ruling in 
litigation.195    
b. Civil Court of First Incident 
This section introduces the contemporary circumstances of the court of first incident and 
reviews its character. According to the theoretical approach and interviews with retired and current 
judges, this section reviews both strong and weak points of the court of first incident. 
Regardless of whether a civil case is litigated or mediated, judges still have a duty to resolve 
it: either through ruling or settlement. For example, in 2009, there were 1,074,236 civil cases filed, 
and civil courts referred 58,672 of those cases to mediation, but judges from the court of first 
incident handled 56,446 of them; in sum, 96.2% of referred mediation cases were handled by the 
same judges who acted as mediators.196  
                                                          
193  JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 89; https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-
View?Serial=91689&kind=AA  (last visited on Aug 15, 2015). 
194 Professor Edwin Greenebaum’s statement in CJAM training course in September 2015. 
 
195 Deborah R. Hensler, Court-annexed Arbitration 23 (ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES 
AND LAWYERS, Erika Fine, et al., (1987)). 
 
196 Please see Ch. I. 
 
46 
 
Professor Tae-han Kim stated that the mediation process by the court of first incident could 
not be categorized as ADR, because an ADR solution should be produced by the third-party 
neutral, who does not have the authority to make a final decision.197  Like Professor Kim, some 
scholars critically mentioned that the judge-mediator in a court of first incident should abstain from 
intervening in the process of mediation.  To the contrary, the judicial authority and judges in the 
civil courts counter-argued that the judge-mediator, like a same-neutral in the med-arb process, 
would be efficient because the same-neutral could continuously review the case.198  
The court of first incident have still taken about ninety (90) percent of mediation cases in 
Korea, even though the civil mediation programs have promoted since the enactment of JCCDA 
of 1990.199  Although the mediation programs have been externally developed and promoted by 
the judicial authority, the court of first incident take a main role in the mediation process in Korea. 
A judge in a civil court may choose to mediate a case in that court if he or she deems it 
appropriate so do so.200   Judges in Korean court of first incident have been traditionally hesitant 
to release their cases to other locations, because it is considered a virtue for the court of first 
incident to rule on disputes without outside help.201   Therefore, in practice, the majority of cases 
are resolved by court of first incident through mediation.202   In 2009, when the judicial authority 
                                                          
197 Tae Han Kim, Mikumyi Jaepanyie Bunjaenghaigyoljedo [A Study on the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in America] 13-2 J. OF ARB. STUD. 181, 183, Footnote 8 (2004) (Korean). 
198 Interviewed with a current judge on Apr. 15, 2015 and former judge on Dec. 12, 2014. 
 
199 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 76. 
 
200 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art 7 (3) (S. Kor.) (“The court of a suit 
may directly conciliate cases….if deemed appropriate to directly handle cases”); DONGWOOK KIM, supra 
note 62, at 309. 
 
201 Youngki Kim, supra note 118, at 3. 
 
202 Id. 
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adopted the CMC, only 11,382 out of 1,074,236 cases filed in civil courts (about 1.06% of the 
total) were filed by the parties directly to mediation. In that same year, the court of first incident 
handled 56,446 cases referred to court-based mediation, which totaled about 96.2% of the total 
mediation.203   
Even though the Korean Civil Mediation Law was enacted in 1990, the court of first 
incidents mainly handled the civil mediation cases, because the law permits the judge to become 
a mediator of the civil case from his or her court of first incidents.204  
Some scholars and judges state that mediation of suits has worked properly in Korea for 
some time and that there is advantage to the speed and continuity of process between mediation 
and trial.  They argue that because a mediating judge provides his or her proposal after having 
already reviewed the case file, it will save time and effort for both the judge and parties.205   
Because the same judge-mediator could review the same issue, even if both parties face deadlock, 
the same judge could continuously review it.  In addition, the same judge-mediator could have an 
opportunity to provide the final solution to the same case.206 
Contrary to previous arguments, several concerns arise about judges in the court of first 
incident playing such a major role in Korean mediation.207  Because the same judge will both refer 
                                                          
 
203 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 76. 
 
204Id, at 88: OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, MEDIATION PRACTICE 54 (2002). 
 
205 Youngki Kim, supra note 116, at 4. 
 
206 Brian Pappas, supra note 70, at 159. 
 
207 Generally see YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 54; BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 129; Sungtae Kim, supra 
note 8. 
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and mediate a case, parties might feel pressured to obey the judge’s proposal without considering 
further negotiation.208  This indistinguishability between ruler and facilitator is sometimes referred 
to as “Wonmim Jaepan” (원님재판), from a tradition harkening back to the Chosun dynasty, when 
officials acting as local governors were called upon to judge as well.209  Parties must also consider 
whether rejecting a judge’s proposal at one stage will necessarily change that same judge’s opinion 
in the next stage of mediation. In other words, the judge might also face pressure to make a 
different proposal based on discordance from an identical authority in the same case.210  
Before the judiciary adopted judicial mediation in the 1980s, the term “trial only,” instead 
of “trial first,” was commonly used to describe Korean legal society, because the court was 
considered the only public organization that could resolve disputes. 211   The JCCD Act was 
promulgated in 1990 to combat the flood of cases assigned to each judge.  Even after its enactment, 
however, many Korean judges still hesitate to release cases to organizations outside the trial 
process or to allow others to mediate their cases, out of fear that other judges or members of the 
public will laugh at them as “tiger judges.”212   The term “tiger judge” developed during Korea’s 
occupation by the Japanese Empire and spread by word of mouth through early Korean legal 
society.  As the story goes, during the occupation a certain man bribed a high-ranking officer with 
                                                          
208 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194. 
 
209 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 53 (2015); JUNGHUN LEE, supra note 76, at 292. 
   
210 YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194; Sunwoo Lee & Sungho Oh, Hyubsang Jojeongron [Negotiation 
Mediation] 59 (2011) (Korean). 
  
211 Siyoon Lee, supra note 8, at 78; also see Kangwoon Kim, Gundaeyi Beobyi Jibaewa Beobchijuyi [Rule 
of Law and Legalism in Modern Ages] 19 LEGAL RESEARCH 1. 1-6 (2005) (Korean). 
 
212 Siyoon Lee, supra note 8, at 477. 
 
49 
 
a tiger skin in return for being appointed to the judgeship.  When the new judge took the bench, 
however, he discovered that he had no capability to write official rulings or opinions for his cases 
because he had no legal education background.  To make rulings without creating an official 
record, he resorted to mediating almost every case he received.  Thereafter, whenever a judge 
mediates a case instead of creating an official ruling, other judges may call him or her a “tiger 
judge”: indicating that he or she is unwilling to do the work associated with drafting an opinion.213  
As a consequence, Korean judges’ concern for being traditionally considered and called a 
tiger judge, which means a lazy or an unqualified judge who refers cases into the mediation 
process, resulted in some judges suffering from overloaded workloads.214  Thus, there is a practical 
reason to reduce judges’ overloaded cases. 
The judicial system gradually recognized that judges were overloaded and that legal service 
in courtrooms needed to be improved.215  One example of such an “overloaded” year was 2008, 
during which 1,259,031 civil cases were filed on the lower level of the civil courts.  There were 
only 2,307 judges at the trial level, so each judge handled about 545.7 cases.216  The regional 
lawyers’ association reported that some judges led civil proceedings in an authoritarian manner 
and treated the parties unkindly.  According to my interviews with Korean judges, most judges are 
                                                          
213 Id, at 478. 
 
214 Id, at 477. 
 
215 Hyo-Jeon Kim, Rule of Law in Korea: Current Status and Challengers, 11-3 PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH 
510, 511-14 (2008) (Korean). 
 
216 COURT-CONNECT MEDIATION CENTER, supra note 54, at 9.  
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under time pressure and cannot give parties sufficient time to express their opinions in the 
courtroom.217 
This article draws upon interviews with two Korean judges, each of whom had more than 
ten years of judicial experience.218  One judge mentioned how Korean court cases are currently 
controlled through an exclusive internal network.  When he logs into his account, every case’s 
schedule pops up on the screen, and he can determine how long he will spend on a case. If a case 
will require more than one year to complete, it is automatically “red-flagged” for the judge to 
expedite it.219   This means that Korean judges are under pressure through both self-monitoring 
and supervisory reviewing by the judicial authority. 
One Korean judge explained his hard work. According to his statement, he opens his court 
once a week.  He usually sits up all night in his office in order to write the ruling on his cases the 
day before the court date.  After the judge comes back from his house, where he took a shower and 
had breakfast, he spends the entire day hearing and ruling on cases. By the late afternoon, he grows 
impatient and will likely interrupt an attorney or party if he thinks a statement is irrelevant to the 
case.220   
Gathering from an article written by a different judge (Judge Kwon), I uncovered that, 
while Korean judges made rulings on 68.9% of civil cases filed in 1991, in that same year only 
                                                          
217 Interviewed with Korean judges on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
218 Interviewed with Korean judges on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
219 Interviewed with a Korean Judge on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
220 Interviewed with a Korean Judge on Apr. 15, 2015 https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-
News-View?Serial=95107&kind=AD (last visited in Oct. 10, 2016) (This news article introduces that two 
judges worked themselves to death in August, 2015. Also, it interprets that Korean judges are under pressure 
of overworks). 
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about five percent of civil cases went further into the trial process and only about seven percent of 
civil cases filed were resolved through settlement. Judge Kwon opined that a U.S. judge would be 
astonished at how the Korean legal system can tolerate such a large number of civil cases with so 
few judges.221   
However, in my opinion, Judge Kwon underestimated the capacity of Korean civil courts 
when he mentioned the seventy percent ruling rate above, because, after the Korean Civil 
Mediation Law was enacted in 1990, judges in the court of first incident still handled both civil 
trial and mediation cases.222 
According to a recent survey of judges, seventy-two percent of those who participated said 
that mediation should remain primarily in the court of first incidents, while only twenty-eight 
percent of judges did not agree.223  The majority of civil court judges prefer to mediate cases in 
their courtrooms rather than release them to other mediation organizations.  In addition, seventy-
one percent of judges agree that it is reasonable to seek an alternative way of resolving disputes 
filed in court, such as through mediation.224  This means that there is still some portion of civil 
court judges, though they are a minority, who still hold very conservative or negative opinions 
toward mediation.  Furthermore, fifty-nine (59) percent of judges agreed to release mediation cases 
to the outer mediation organizations while forty (40) percent of judges disagreed with releasing to 
                                                          
221 Soonil Kwon, supra note 14, at 79 footnote 13 (According to Judge Kwon, about 70% of civil cases 
were resolved by judges.  But I believe that the civil court judges would handle more than 70% because the 
court of first incident also handle its mediation cases on the same bench). 
 
222 BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 138, at 138. 
 
223 Id, at 144-45. 
 
224 Id, at 142-43. 
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the outer.225  This means that almost half of judges want to keep their authority to rule and mediate 
in their courtroom.  Because judges are conservative not to release their cases, the cases could 
remain to go through and the number of civil cases could not be reduced.  It would be discordant 
with the Supreme Court’s purpose in initiating the legal reform in 1990 and 2009.  Therefore, 
Korean judges are still under deep pressure beneath overloaded caseloads.  Because the judges 
alternate position as mediator for the same cases in the same courtroom, the judges still take care 
of almost the same number of civil cases. 
c. Mediation Judge 
Mediation judges (Jojeong Jeondam Pansa, 조정전담판사, 調停專擔判事) have the 
same authority as judges of the court of first incident.226  As a main role of mediation judge, 
mediation cases referred by civil judges are filtered through mediation judges.  Mediation judges 
are responsible for “filtering” mediation referred by civil judges, and for distributing those cases 
to CMC or outside organizations.227  As of 2012, there were only about ten mediation judges in 
Korea, and those ten also hold additional positions in the court system.228   
Mediation judges hold a similar position to U.S. magistrate judges in a District Court, 
because they have the same authority to handle mediation cases as a civil judge.229   Whereas a 
                                                          
225 Id, at 143. 
226  Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 7 (1) (S. Kor.) (“Cases of 
conciliation (mediation) shall be dealt with by the conciliation (mediation) judge”). 
 
227 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art 7 (2) (S. Kor.) (“A conciliation judge 
may directly conciliate cases or have the commissioner (hereinafter referred to as “standing commissioners 
(mediators) who regularly deal with the affairs related to conciliation (mediation) under this Act and a 
council of conciliation conciliate cases”). 
 
228 Youngki Kim, supra note 116, at 3. 
 
229 Interview with magistrate judge on Nov. 20, 2014. 
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magistrate judge uses facilitative mediation, without the authority to make a binding decision, a 
Korean mediation judge might have the authority, the same as a judge in a court of first incident, 
to make a binding decision.230  The authority of the mediation judge is also similar to that of a 
med-arbitrator, because the mediation judge would be a same neutral in a med-arb case and hold 
the authority of arbitrator when both parties face deadlock in negotiation. 
Also, a retired Supreme Court judge argued to increase the number of mediation judges in 
order to promote civil mediation.231  To the contrary, instead of expanding the court-annexed 
mediation programs—including the mediation judges’ program—I propose a private mediation 
program as a court-connected mediation program.  Because the CMCs are handling too small 
numbers of mediation cases while the court of first incident still mainly operates the civil mediation 
programs inside of the court territory.  
In my opinion, this program is currently not properly working in court-annexed mediation 
and should instead be incorporated into court-mediation centers, due to the small number of 
mediation judges.   In order to properly distribute civil mediation cases into the CMC, court-
annexed and outer mediation organizations, and court-connected mediation programs, I guess the 
CMC and mediation judge programs should be transform the character of organization for auditing 
and training.232 
                                                          
 
230 Observation a mediation in Indianapolis in Nov. 20, 2014 (As previously mentioned, roles of judge and 
a standing mediator as a med-arbitrator would make parties to be confused and pressured to obey). 
 
231  http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201406231622161&code=940301 (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2016) (Youngran Kim, former Korean Supreme Court judge, proposed two things; first, a 
number of mediation judges should be increased. Second, it is necessary to establish the special mediation 
court). 
 
232 Interview with both Korean CMC mediator and U.S. settlement attorneys of circuit court; please see 
infra chapter V.  
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d. Mediation Council (Bisangim-Jojeongwiwon, 비상임조정위원, 非常任調停委員) 
Although the number of mediation council members is greater than any other organization, 
the portion of entire mediation cases handled by them is pretty small.  And, it is criticized that 
some members are unenthusiastically working or improperly mediating cases.  Although the 
mediation council has been used for a long time, it is still considered “lesser” than other mediation 
processes, because it is an extrajudicial process under the viewpoint of the judicial authority.233 
Because a member of mediation council does not have authority to make a binding 
decision, the facilitative method is used during the typical mediation process.234  Facilitation is 
meaningful in the history of Korean court-led mediation, because the council of mediation could 
provide better method of self-determination during the mediation process.235 The value of both 
inner and outer council mediation programs is much closer to a ‘pure’ mediation type, such as self-
determination and informal process in the court-led mediation.236 
 Each council of mediation shall be comprised of at least two commissioners (mediators), 
as well as a judge of a court of first incident or a mediation judge.237   A council of mediation 
consists of two sub-councils: the “inner council,” court-annexed; and the “outer-council,” court-
                                                          
 
233 Interviewed on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
234 Cf. Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act, art. 7.3 and 30; JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 9, at 125. 
 
235 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 113, 125. 
 
236 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72. 
 
237 Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act, art. 9 (“A Council of conciliation shall be comprised of a 
chief commissioner and two or more commissioner”); OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 54, 
at 39-40. 
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connected.238  Chief judges of courts usually appoint to the councils professionals who have 
advanced knowledge and high moral reputations.239  Inner councils are made up of commissioners 
personally appointed by the chief judge and a chief commissioner, who is a civil-court or mediation 
judge.240   Outer councils of mediation are used for early mediation, and are appointed from a 
group or association, such as the Korean Bar Association or the Korean Commercial Arbitration 
Board (“KCAB”).241 
As of 2014, there were around 6,200 Inner-members in mediation councils.242   Unlike the 
requirement for becoming a standing commissioner—first being a mediator—there is no specific 
requirement to be appointed as a member of a council of mediation.243  However, the court has 
usually selected members from the professions or professors, based on the expectation that council 
members will have advanced knowledge and high moral reputation.244   Despite having such a 
                                                          
238 BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 138, at 138. 
 
239 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 10 (1) (S. Kor.) (“A commissioner 
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241  JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 116; https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-
View?serial=75527 (last visited on Oct. 11, 2016) (This legal ‘Beobmusa’ association began to receive the 
referred mediation cases as an outer-mediation council in 2013). 
 
242 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10, 14 (in 2012, there are 6247 appointed commissioners). 
 
243 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 10. (S. Kor.) (“A commissioner 
(mediator) shall be appointed …….from among persons who have advanced knowledge and high moral 
reputation.”  Requirement of this position is vague and some members want this position in order to have 
a connection to judicial officers, according to interviews with judges and mediator). 
244 OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 227, at 39-40; Sundong Lee, supra note 86, at 9  (In 
2012, number of commissioners who have a professional job, such as lawyer, medical doctor and 
accountant, reach 2,636 of total number of 6,247. It occupied 42.2%). 
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high number of council members, in 2009 the council of mediation handled only 2,226 mediation 
cases out of 1,074,236 total civil cases, and fewer than three mediation cases were handled by each 
commissioner.245   
According to one interview with a previous mediation council mediator, the chief 
commissioner (judge) typically only takes part in the initial meeting and introduces the 
commissioners to the parties, then has the two lower commissioners facilitate the mediation.246  
For that particular judge’s cases, before he went to the court he simply reviewed copies of each 
file to prepare his proposal for each mediation case.  During mediation sessions, he did not urge 
the parties, but did explain his opinion on a possible agreement when parties were deadlocked.247  
He usually conducted mediation after his regular work, during the late afternoon, because most of 
the commissioners had their own professional jobs and were only available after work. 248   
According to that judge’s statement, he received about 90 U.S. dollars per day: a number based 
not on the number of cases, but on the number of days he attended mediation hearings.249 
                                                          
245 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 9. 
 
246 Interviewed with a former commissioner of council on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
247 Id. 
 
248 Id. 
 
249 Id; In 2015, the funding for legal service programs operated by the courts was reduced. This decree in 
funding responded to low interests rates across the Korean national economy: Legal funds for mediation 
committees are based on the effective interest rate of the funds, and the rates of these funds have 
decreased in recent years.  Because of this decrease in funding for mediation committees, courts were 
unable to refer cases to mediation committees in 2015.  
(https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?Serial=91689&kind=AA  (last visited on 
08/15/2015)) 
According to a mediation judge’s newspaper interview, court-connected mediation programs could not 
satisfy program demand because of a lack of funding.   In addition to this, during 2015, mediators at 
mediation committees generally worked on less cases, and received less daily wages, compared to 
previous years. Given the reduction in funds for mediation, courts began to worry about the quality of 
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Managing and operating a mediation council creates several problems. First, officers of the 
court must put in additional effort to run the mediation process, such as making copies and 
scheduling appointments for each commissioner and disputant in a mediation case.250  Second, 
judges have serious question regarding councils’ operations, because judges believe that 
commissioners only rarely or involuntarily participate in the mediation process: 251   some 
appointed commissioners will only handle one mediation case per year, because that is the 
requirement to be reappointed for another two-year term.252   Third, judges and lawyers have not 
been trained to conduct any other method of dispute resolution besides trial,253 and, according to 
the commissioners whom I interviewed, they also had no special mediation training before being 
appointed.254  The interviewed commissioner went on to say how one of the other commissioners 
spent more time speaking from his experience and scolding parties than facilitating mediation.  
Outer-council mediation program is the most experimental attempt in Korean judicial 
history, because it is the first time for the court to release its cases outside of court territory.255  
                                                          
settlements as well as increases in the backlog. (https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-
View?Serial=91689&kind=AA  (last visited on 08/15/2015)) 
  According to a Department of Justice report, the average of number of cases per judge was is 579 in 
2013. (http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201508151440111&code=940100 (last 
visited on 05/15/2015))   Bloated case backlogs are pressuring not only judges, but also parties and 
lawyers in both time and expenses. 
 
250 BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 138, at 138; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 3. 
 
251 Interview with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
 
252 Interview with a judge Apr. 15, 2015 and a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
 
253 RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 1. 
 
254 Interviewed a mediator on Apr. 15, 2015. 
 
255 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 71, 113-14. 
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This mediation program has jointly operated with the ‘early mediation’ program that court releases 
cases to a case by the first trial date.256 
The authority of outer-council mediators is similar to that of inner-council mediators, 
because they could mediate a case referred by the court of first incident and do not have the 
authority to make a binding decision.257  
Although several private mediation organizations are involved with civil mediation cases, 
there is no statistical data for research on the achievement of these private groups.258   Currently, 
several law schools, the Korean Bar Association, the KCAB, and other professional associations 
for specific industries have joined the mediation council.259  
In Japan, according to the Japanese Act on Promotion of Use of ADR, which was enacted 
in 2004 and effective in 2007,260 several private-service entities—sponsored by a specific industry, 
a local bar association, or an association of experts, and other ADR services—provide private ADR 
services.261  Unlike Japanese authentication for private mediation entities, the Korean judiciary 
                                                          
256 Id. at 71, 95, 113-14. 
 
257 Id. at 71, 113-14 (Hon. Judge Jung mentions that the JCCDA does not exactly indicate the outer-
mediation council as a mediation council. But, it is generally considered as mediation council). 
 
258 Minjung Kim, Sabeobhyung ADRyi Baljeonbanghyang [Promotion of Court ADR] 181, 214 in THE 
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL 
CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean). 
 
259 Id. at 204, 212, 215-220. 
 
260 http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/AOP.pdf (last visited in Oct. 11, 2016). 
 
261 Shusuke Kakiuchi, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Japan: Alternative Dispute Resolution and its 
Background, in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE 
CROSSROADS 269, 274 (Felix Steffek and Hannes Unberath ed.,2013). 
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does not prepare a certification program for private-mediation providers.262  According to the 
JCCDA, article 6, the court of first incident could refer the civil case into the mediation process.263  
But this article does not provide a list of possible legal entities.   According to the JCCDA, article 
8, a chief mediator and two or more mediators are needed to comprise the council of mediation.264   
Unlike the CMC, a chief mediator (judge) should compromise two outer-council mediators who 
are qualifying under JCCDA article 9.265 
In sum, this outer mediation could be a bridge to private mediation programs, because it is 
the first trial to release civil cases to outside of court territory.  However, it is necessary to prepare 
a unified ADR promotion act, like the Japanese Act on Promotion of Use of ADR, in order to 
promote the dispute resolution programs in private area.  
        
 
 
 
                                                          
262 Jeong-Il Suh, supra note 161, at 40. 
263 JCCDA art. 6, (“A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation 
(mediation) by a ruling before a judgment in an appellate trial is given”). 
 
264 JCCDA art. 8, (“A council of conciliation (mediation) shall be comprised of a chief commissioner and 
two or more commissioners”). 
 
265 JCCDA art. 9, “A chief commissioner (mediator) shall be as follows:  
1. In cases under Article 7 (2), a conciliation (mediation) judge or a standing commissioner; 
2. In cases under article 7 (3), the chief judge of the court of the suit; 
3. In cases under article 7 (5), a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge; 
4. In cases under a Si/Gun Court, a judge of the Si/Gun court.” 
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Chapter IV.  Court-annexed Mediation Center (“CMC”, 법원조정센터, 法院調停 
center) 
CMC programs were experimentally established in Seoul and Busan in 2009, then 
expanded to three other major cities in 2011.266  For this new program, several retired Supreme 
                                                          
266 MUJE CHO, BUSANBEOBWONJOJEONGCENTER GAESOSIK INSAMALSUM [OPENING SPEECH OF BUSAN 
COURT MEDIATION CENTER] 10, 13 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, COURT MEDIATION 
CENTER COLLECTION (2011) (Mediation centers are currently established in Seoul, Pusan, Daegu, 
Deajeon). 
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Court judges were appointed as standing commissioners, and CMCs were located in high appellate 
courts.267  There were a total of thirty standing commissioners in the CMC in 2014.268   According 
to JDDCA article 10, the standing mediators are hired as full-time bar-licensed mediators with at 
least fifteen years of legal experience each.269 
CMC mediation is similar to “med-arb,”270 because a CMC mediator has authority to make 
a binding decision without participants’ agreement at the end of a proceeding.271   According to 
JCCDA article 30,272 a current standing mentions that mediator could make a decision based on 
the interests of both parties for a fair solution of conflict, without conflicting with the applicant’s 
reason for proceeding.273  
As the judiciary concluded that the CMC program in Seoul and Pusan was successful, it 
has expanded the CMC programs to other cities.  However, it is doubtful whether the CMC 
program was well-operated in the first two cities.  As seen below, the number of referrals from the 
court of first incident to the CMC was generally less than the number voluntarily filing for most 
                                                          
 
267 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10. 
 
268 Id, at 10, 14. 
 
269 DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 73, at 309, 311; JCCDA art. 10 (1), …a standing commissioner shall be 
appointed by the Minister of National Court Administration from among persons who are a licensed 
attorney with certain careers determined by the Supreme Court Regulation.  
 
270 Generally see Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70; JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 132. 
271 DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 73, at 308-09. 
 
272 Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art 30 (S. Kor.) (“Where agreement has 
not been made or where the terms of agreement are unreasonable, a conciliation judge (‘mediation judge’ 
in this dissertation) shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of the case, considering interests of 
parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the purport of the 
application”). 
273 DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 62, at 308-09; JCCDA, art. 30. 
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of the first year.  Contrary to the first year of the CMC, the number of referrals dramatically 
increased in the second year; for example, the court of first incident referred 681 cases in April of 
2009.   However, comparing the voluntarily filing in the first two years, it seems that the number 
voluntarily filing would slightly decline in the second year.  Then, total number of mediation cases 
in the CMC would be increased by the referral.  Therefore, the number of cases dealt with by a 
standing mediator also increased; for example, the average number of mediation cases per standing 
mediator reached more than 100 cases in April of 2009.    
In sum, it seems that the public might not fully recognize the CMC as a mediation 
organization when the judiciary tries to expand to other cities.  Even though it looked like the total 
number handling mediation cases would increase, it is based on referrals by the court of first 
incident, not by the voluntary filing.  
 
 
(Figure 1) Seoul CMC 
 
(Table 3)  Seoul CMC  
0
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2009 2010
Seoul CMC
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    Voluntary 
Filing 
a 
Referral 
b 
Total  
a+b 
number of cases per 
mediator 
(a+b)/8 Year/Mon   
2009 
4 57 30 87 10.875 
5 101 77 178 22.25 
6 99 144 243 30.375 
7 123 87 210 26.25 
8 116 69 185 23.125 
9 123 92 215 26.875 
10 116 61 177 22.125 
11 126 80 206 25.75 
12 167 88 255 31.875 
2010 
1 99 61 160 20 
2 108 44 152 19 
3 131 226 357 44.625 
4 132 681 813 101.625 
5 101 382 483 60.375 
6 134 486 620 77.5 
 
However, as seen below, it might be counter-argued that the judiciary had just established 
the experimental program and the public did not recognize the existence of the CMC due to lack 
of advertisement.   Furthermore, the counter-argument would assert that the rate of settlement by 
parties is almost always higher than the rate of binding decisions by standing mediators.  This 
means that the CMC program might be close to the core values of ADR, such as self-determination: 
both parties would reach a consensual agreement, while the standing mediators contain themselves 
to making binding decisions. 
(Figure 2) Comparison of Percentage of Settlement and Binding Dedision 
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But the success rate of reaching settlement is reaching beyond forty (40) percent during the 
first two years.  Unlike the rate of successfully reaching agreement in the Korean CMC, the Indiana 
mediation program reached more than ninety (90) percent successfully reaching an agreement 
during the experimental period.    Comparing the two rates of settlement between the mediation 
programs in the U.S. and Korea, it is hard to conclude that the CMC program is efficient or 
successful at reaching settlements.  
 (Table 4) Comparison of Settlement in CMC 
Comparison of settlement in CMC 
   Number of 
cases in 
CMC 
Settlement  Binding decision 
Percentage of 
settlement 
Percentage of 
binding decision Year  Month 
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4 5            6           7           8            9           10         11         12           1           2      
Percentage
of Binding 
Decision
Percentage
of 
settlement 
2009 2010
65 
 
2009 4 87 7 5 8% 6% 
  5 178 57 24 32% 13% 
  6 243 30 42 12% 17% 
  7 210 34 32 16% 15% 
  8 185 31 19 17% 10% 
  9 215 55 25 26% 12% 
  10 177 48 32 27% 18% 
  11 206 52 24 25% 12% 
  12 255 48 23 19% 9% 
2010 1 160 41 10 26% 6% 
  2 152 54 33 36% 22% 
  3 291 68 27 23% 9% 
  4 657 84 32 13% 5% 
  5 250 99 59 40% 24% 
  6 437 78 106 18% 24% 
 
 
 Furthermore, it seems that there is an internal problem in the CMC program; even though 
the rate of settlement is beyond that of binding decisions, as seen below, the rate of settlement by 
the parties has been decreasing from forty-nine (49) percent to thirty-four (34) percent.  
(Table 5) 
Seoul CMC Filed by parties Referred by courts % of settlement 
2009 119.8/month 85.1 49% 
2010 115.1 375.4 43% 
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2011 91.1 461.3 37% 
2012 About 80 About 500 34% 
 
 
Although the CMC has stated that the number of mediation cases filed to the CMC has 
increased by 50% compared with the period prior to its establishment, and that satisfaction with 
CMC service exceeds 80%, it also indicates that the public still widely disregards mediation 
services offered by the CMC.274  According to the released information, there are several problems 
with CMC operation: the number of cases filed by parties is shrinking, the number of referred 
cases is growing (as seen above), and the percentage of cases reaching agreement is shrinking 
drastically.  
 
(Table 6) 
FY 2012 Filed by parties Referred by courts 
Number of cases in CMC 2013 7589 
% of reaching agreement  43% 37% 
 
 
                                                          
274 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 89; Interview with parties in CMC in June and July 2013 (Majority 
of parties express that they are satisfied with the process of mediation in CMC, but not outcome of 
mediation). 
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As seen above, the percentage of mediation cases concluded through agreement is a little 
higher when filed by parties rather than when referred by courts.  Therefore, we may draw the 
conclusion that the percentage of cases ending in agreement is shrinking because of the increase 
in referrals and decreased public interest in the CMC’s mediation service. 
In sum, court-annexed mediation would save litigants time and money, if the program was 
well-designed and managed,275 but it cannot be said that current Korean mediation will be accepted 
by the general public or be suitable for settlement in the place of trial.276  First, the percentage of 
mediations by the court of first incident remains too high and parties may be pressured to accept 
the judge’s proposal of agreement.  Second, the mediation process within current court-annexed 
mediations is too similar to a trial, because mediators make binding decisions, like a trial judge, 
when parties are in a deadlock.277  Third, although the Supreme Court tried to expand its service 
program into court-connected mediation, the number of mediations by outside council was too 
small to establish self-determination.278  By establishing early mediation, courts should start to 
release mediation cases to outside organizations as part of court-connected mediation, and 
therefore take a significant step toward developing self-determination.279 
 
 
                                                          
275 Cf. RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 737. 
 
276 Junyoung Jung, supra note 13, at 35. 
 
277 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 57 footnote 15. 
 
278 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 14. 
 
279 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 135. 
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Chapter V.   Characters of CMC 
Chapters III and IV generally review the Korean civil mediation programs and indicates 
the characters of each mediation program, comparing them with U.S. mediation programs.  This 
chapter theoretically reviews CMC because the CMC illustrates the typical character of Korean 
civil mediation programs.280  Because the CMC is the first independent entity from the court 
mediation program, it is meaningful to understanding the character of this body.  After the CMC 
program was beginning in Seoul and Pusan of two major cities as a pilot program in 2009, it has 
                                                          
280 In this chapter, I emphasize that the characteristics of a standing mediator are similar to a med-arbitrator 
and that the environment of the mediation-conference is becoming courtroom-like.  In addition, the legal 
effects of CMC mediation are the same as the judge’s ruling. 
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become a stable status and expanded four (4) other major cities, such as Daegu, Incheon, Kwangju, 
and Deajeon in 2011.281 
Chapter V will review the historical background of the CMC and the qualification of 
mediator and compare this with the U.S. mediators who work as private mediators and also court-
connected or court-annexed mediators at state or federal levels. Second, I compare the reference 
from the court and voluntarily filing by the party.  Third, I review the data of reference and 
voluntary filing to the CMC and investigate the current and possible issues of CMC in order to 
survive in the current harsh legal environment in Korea. Fourth, I review the typical characteristics 
of the CMC, comparing it with U.S. mediation programs in Indiana and the 7th Circuit Court 
through an empirical approach, such as interviews and observation of the CMC and U.S. mediation 
programs.  Fifth, I review the characteristics of each participant in the CMC process, such as the 
mediator, party, and lawyer, including reviewing the legal theoretical and empirical approaches of 
each. 
a. Qualification of Standing Mediator 
The CMC hired full time bar-licensed mediators with at least 15 years of legal experience 
each.282  Several retired Supreme Court judges were appointed as standing commissioners for this 
new programs283 and there were a total of 30 standing commissioners in the CMC in 2014.284  
According to the article 10 of the JCCDA, the qualification of the standing mediator in the CMC 
is that of a licensed attorney with certain type of career determined by the Supreme Court 
                                                          
281 Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58. 
282 DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 73, at 309, 311. 
 
283 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10. 
 
284 Id, at 10, 14. 
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Regulation.285  Because the CMC is the first legal entity that could independently make a binding 
decision without the judge’s review or instructions under the current Korean legal system, the 
Supreme Court hired the over-qualified judges in order to legitimate the CMC system as soon as 
possible.  For this reason, the majority of the standing mediators are highly-ranked retired judges, 
such as retired Supreme Court judges.286    
While the Supreme Court expanded to include four (4) other major cities after being 
satisfied with the outcome and processes of the CMC, it did not reveal how the CMC exactly 
produced these outstanding mediation results.  I believe that there are two mythic promises that 
are established by the Supreme Court in order to expand the CMC programs.287 
First, the CMC might reach almost 50 percent of successfully resolved agreements.288  But 
it inherently has a weak point to be criticized because the standing mediators have authority to 
make a binding decision as an arbitrator.  The CMC might produce a better mediation program 
than any other mediation organizations.  When the standing mediator could make a binding 
decision without either party’s protest, it could be counted as a successful consensual agreement.289  
                                                          
285 JCCDA art. 10 (“a standing commissioner (mediator) shall be appointed by the Minister of National 
Court Administration from among persons who are a licensed attorney with certain careers determined by 
the Supreme Court Regulations”). 
 
286 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72. 
 
287 Generally see Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70. 
 
288 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 90-91. 
 
289  JCCDA. Art. 30 (“Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are 
unreasonable, a conciliation judge shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of the cases, considering 
interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the 
purport of the application”). 
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It might be incorrectly assumed that the CMC and the standing mediator resolved more agreements 
than other mediators who do not follow this same process. 
Second, the CMC hired several retired Supreme Court judges and highly-ranked judges as 
standing mediator for this new program, expecting that the CMC would rapidly and successfully 
be settled as a mediation program.290   Also, the belief was that the highly-ranked retired judges 
and experienced lawyers would perform as well as mediators.291  But this proved to be a myth 
because the mediator’s role is totally different from the judge’s performance.292  In addition, there 
is no educational program for any mediators in Korea.  There is a seminar in an annual meeting 
for sharing information and techniques for providing better service.  But there is no official 
program for training candidate mediators as either a standing mediator or mediator.293   
Because a retired judge has an abundant experience of mediation in the courtroom, it might 
seem that there is no need to educate him or her.294  But several U.S. mediators report that retired 
judges receive certification in mediation after completing a mediator education program.295  Even 
though they put their name on the mediator’s list in the harsh mediator’s market, they are rarely 
selected based on the free market system.296  Based on this, it could be inferred that the judge is 
                                                          
290 Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10. 
 
291 Interviewed Korean judges on Dec 12, 2014. 
 
292 Interviewed U.S. mediators on Oct. 23, 2013. 
 
293 Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
 
294 Interviewed Korean standing mediator on June 12, 2013 (I emphasize that he was proud of having more 
than 15 years of legal professional experience even though he do not have a regular mediation training. But, 
I want to emphasize that a good mediator are a good listener who has a active listening skill). 
 
295 Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014. 
 
296 Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.; http://www.in.gov/judiciary/cle/2331.htm (last 
visited on Dec. 11, 2016) 
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accustomed to making a ruling based on legally gathered evidence instead of facilitating the 
sharing of information and opinions between adversarial parties.  Then the private mediator, who 
has recently retired from the bench and is new to the practice of mediation might be looked upon 
less favorably by the potential customers, possibly to the point of withdrawing from the mediation-
legal market system.297 
In sum, the majority of the standing mediators currently consists of retired Supreme Court 
or retied highly-ranked judges based on that, due to high standards and strict expectations, majority 
of the standing mediators in the CMC were appointed from the pool of retired judges.   They could 
be an elite for evaluating the legal issues because they devoted their entire legal careers to the 
courtroom, although they are less skillful at facilitating mediating without re-education of 
mediation.  Similarly in the U.S., retired judges serving as mediators might be unaccustomed to 
the practice of mediation.  I could not indicate whether the standing mediators would be 
unaccustomed or inexperienced in the mediation field.  But similar to the free legal market system 
in the U.S., the CMC had better regularly provide educational or training programs for standing 
mediators with long-term view of adopting private mediation program. 
Because a standing mediator has the same authority as a judge during the mediation process 
in the CMC,298 a standing mediator’s qualifications are considered higher than those of average 
lawyers.  However, there is no typical training program for either standing or general mediators.299  
                                                          
 
297 Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014. 
 
298 JCCDA art. 7. (4), (“the standing commissioner (mediator)...shall have the same power as a conciliation 
(mediation) judge”). 
 
299 Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
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While I interviewed one of the standing mediators in the CMC, who was proud of his 
qualifications, including his educational and legal backgrounds.300  And the standing mediator 
explained that there have been several annual seminars since 2009 so that the entire body of 
standing mediators gathered and shared their experiences and techniques for better mediation 
service.301  In addition, the standing mediator provided books that were published by the CMC as 
the editorial seminar books.  But, because these books are neither well known nor released to the 
public, the CMC is still not well known by the public.  
There is no training course or re-education program for standing mediators.  Therefore, 
before beginning work as a standing mediator, they are not trained for mediation.  It is doubtful 
that the retired judges could successfully facilitate communication between adversarial parties.  
Even though they have an outstanding legal background, they are not experts in the process and 
performance of mediation, as I mentioned above.    
 Before I critique the lack of training course for the standing mediators, I will compare the 
training course or re-education program for U.S. mediators.  First of all, the process is not easy 
because training programs and standards of qualification for mediators and conference attorneys302 
vary widely in each state and federal courts.  Therefore, I only focus on the mediation programs in 
Indiana and the 7th Circuit.  Similar to standing mediators in the CMC, magistrate judges of the 
appeals court of Indiana and settlement attorneys in the 7th Circuit Court are not trained in the role 
                                                          
300 I found that several standing mediators obtained more than legal master degrees in Laws; Interviewed 
with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
 
301 Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
 
302 In 7th Circuit Court, the standing mediator is called as a “conference attorney.”; Please visit the website 
for settlement conference in the 7th Circuit, available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Scoprgm.htm (last 
visited on Oct. 1, 2016). 
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of mediator.  Both magistrate judges and settlement attorneys are hired as mediators, similar to 
Korean standing mediators, and those whom I interviewed also indicated that they graduated law 
school received state bar certification, and had more than 10 years of legal work experience.303  
However, before taking a position as mediator, they did not have experience or specialization in 
the mediation or negotiation fields.  Furthermore, they explained that the law schools which they 
attended had not provided any negotiation or mediation related curriculum when they were in 
school.304   It could be inferred that both magistrate judges and settlement attorneys had not 
completed any mediation related training courses before they obtained the position of mediator in 
court-annexed mediation.  
With this in mind, the Korean standing mediators in the CMC are similar to the magistrate 
judges or the settlement attorneys in the United States.  It is possible that the Korean standing 
mediators have more legal experience in the courtroom than the U.S. mediators. Then it might 
argue that the CMC standing mediators do not need to be trained in the same way as the U.S. 
magistrate judges and settlement attorneys.    
However, unlike the U.S. mediators, the majority of standing mediators are retired judges 
and some of them are from the Supreme Court.  Therefore, majority of the standing mediators still 
do not have enough knowledge to mediate the adversarial parties because their primary legal 
experience has been based on ruling as a judge, not representing parties as a lawyer.   
In sum, the standing mediators in the CMC consist of the best judges and lawyers who 
have legal experience and knowledge in Korea.  During interviews with Korean scholars, former 
                                                          
303 Interviewed in Indianapolis and Chicago Nov. 10, Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014. 
 
304 Interviewed on Nov. 10, Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014. 
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and current judges, and mediators, all of them indicated that the Supreme Court has a strong 
intention to improve mediation, especially the CMC.305  But it is doubtful that the Supreme Court 
has its own volition to activate the CMC mediation for two reasons: the CMC’s portion of 
caseloads is minor, and most of the public do not yet recognize the existence of the CMC.306   
Furthermore, the standing mediators might have gathered vast experience in mediation 
despite not having any previous special training in mediation since 2009.  They could serve as 
trainers to provide a special educational mediation program for lawyers for a lower level.  In the 
appeal level, they could take the less number of cases and put enough time to mediate a case for 
better service.307  There is no typical negotiation or mediation culture in Korea.308  Because the 
standing mediators already have had a vast mediation experience in the CMC, they could serve as 
guides to establish the Korean mediation method. 
b. Operation of the Korean Court-Annexed Mediation Center 
The CMC gets mediation cases in two ways: referred by the court or voluntary filing by a 
party.309   When a party voluntarily files a mediation case, they should file in the court. Then the 
                                                          
305 Interviews on Dec. 12, 2014 and Apr, 14, 2015. 
 
306 Interview with Korean lawyer on Arp. 14, 2015.  
 
307 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 95; Interviewed on Arp. 15, 2015; I want to emphasize that standing 
mediators have tremendous mediation experience and they could newly build Korean mediation tradition. 
 
308 It already explained that, in Confucian culture, Koreans have been trained not to reveal a conflict to a 
group or community.  In addition, in Korean culture, commercial and merchant groups were disparaged 
during the Chosun Dynasty.  At that time, many Koreans were inexperienced in commercial dealings and 
no traditional way of negotiation.  Furthermore, some scholars guess that they are shameful to negotiate the 
price to purchase products. 
 
309 JCCDA art 2. 6. (“Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation with a court”) and 
art. 6 (“A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation by a ruling 
before a judgment in an appellate trial is given). 
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case is transferred to the CMC by the court clerk.  Likewise, when the court decides to refer the 
case to the mediation process of the CMC, the court clerk transfers a copy of the case to the 
CMC.310  Therefore, it is not only connected with the court system but also annexed with the court 
system because all mediation cases go through the court system.  During the interviews and 
observations, I found typical characters of CMC.  I found five (5) problems that prohibit 
participants and standing mediators from approaching a consensual agreement.  
Instead of using two conference room for separate session, CMC uses a single conference.  
Unlike U.S. mediation, the Korean mediation programs have used only one (1) mediation-
conference room.311  I found this significantly different to using a mediation-conference room 
between Korea and the U.S.  Not only the different number of conference rooms, but also the 
attitude of the mediator to mediate the case and to treat the parties in the conference room provides 
a tremendous difference based on the role of mediator. 
In the separate session of the U.S. mediation process, the mediator locates the two parties 
in two adjacent rooms which do not share a wall.  Then the mediator, regardless of private or court-
connected mediation, or the magistrate judge or settlement attorney of the court-annexed 
mediation, moves between the two conference rooms in order to convey the party’s offers and 
counter-offers during the session.312  
When I observed a certain mediation case in the court, the magistrate judge located one 
party in the courtroom and the other party in a conference room.  These rooms shared the rest area 
                                                          
310 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 95. 
 
311 Observation on June 12, 2013. 
 
312 Observation in Indianapolis on Nov. 20, 2014 and in Chicago on Nov. 10, 2014. 
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and were not too close.  However, during the separate session, the magistrate judge came and went 
between the conference rooms more than 30 times.313   
However, in the separate session of the Korean court-annexed mediation, the standing 
mediator occupies one mediation-conference room and askes each party to come in and go out of 
the room.  At that time, the standing mediator calls the other party with a loud voice to come in 
and, in addition, asks the party who was in the conference room to leave the room and notify the 
other party to come in.314  
In sum, it might cause unexpected problems or uncomfortable circumstances for the 
parties.  Regardless of using one conference room during the joint session, using one mediation-
conference might cause the parties to feel inconvenient during the separate session.  First, the 
mediation parties could be put into an awkward environment.  After each party tries to resolve 
conflict in vain, they may become upset by the unresolved problem, so that they do not want to 
meet each other even in passing during the separate session.  But the standing mediator might push 
them to look at each other each time they enter and leave the room.315  Second, there is no stable 
place for parties to consider and discuss the issues.  One of the parties should be out of the 
mediation-conference room and wait in the hallway or resting area next to the room during the 
separate session while the standing mediator works with the other party in the room.  The party 
outside the room does not have an isolated or secure place to talk with a lawyer or any other person 
because they do not know when the standing mediator will call them to come in. Therefore, the 
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314 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013. 
 
315 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013. 
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parties could not get secure advice from the lawyer.  Furthermore, they might be exposed in the 
open space with other parties who are in the other mediation cases in the adjacent mediation-
conference rooms.316 The parties could not focus on their own issues because, according to my 
observation, everyone in this space is chatting.  During the separate session, it is important for 
each party to consider the other party’s offer and make a counter-offer while the other party is with 
a standing mediator. However, the party who is located outside of the conference room might be 
distracted based on the unsecured and unfriendly environment.317 
However, because there are two different types of mediators in the U.S., each mediator has 
slightly different approaches to prepare the conference rooms.  Regardless whether the mediator 
is a solo or law firm-practitioner, before the mediators are selected by the parties, they prepare at 
least two conference rooms.318   When I interviewed a U.S. lawyer who was registered on the 
private mediator list, the mediator showed me six conference rooms in a row in his firm.  The 
conference room was prepared for 5 people with enough space.319  To compare and contrast with 
private mediators, I also interviewed non-private mediators, including magistrate judges, 
settlement attorneys, and mediators for a non-profit mediation organization in Indiana.   Magistrate 
judges in Indiana also used the courtroom as a conference room based on a lack of suitable 
available rooms in the courthouse.  The settlement attorney in Chicago, Illinois, and the mediators 
                                                          
316 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.  
 
317 Interviewed with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014. 
 
318 Observation and interview with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.  
 
319 Observation in two different law firms in Bloomington on Oct. 23, 2014 and Indianapolis on Nov. 24, 
2014.  
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for a non-profit organization in Bloomington, Indiana, had enough suitable available conference 
rooms in their locations.320     
 (Picture 1) 
 
According to my observations in Korea, the conference rooms in the CMC are almost twice 
the size of the U.S. conference rooms, with seats for up to 10 people and located adjacent to the 
standing mediator’s office.   During the separate session, the CMC could divide the large 
conference room into two rooms or temporarily share the available courtroom for the mediation 
process without interrupting other activities.321   A picture illustrates that Korean CMC mediation 
room is for at least 12 peoples. 
                                                          
320 Observations on Oct, 23 and Nov. 20, 2014 (Seoul neighborhood mediation center prepares at least two 
conference rooms for each case for separate session). 
 
321 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013 and in Indianapolis on Nov. 20, 2014. 
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Third, the Korean standing mediators are still in the authoritarianism because they are 
acting like a judge on the bench.  In contrast with the Korean standing mediators who use one 
conference room, all of the U.S. mediators use at least two different conference rooms during the 
separate session.  When I observed the U.S. mediation in Indianapolis, Indiana, the magistrate 
judge moved in and out two conference rooms more than thirty (30) times in the separate-morning 
session.322   The judge extended the morning session after obtaining both parties’ consent and put 
her efforts to mediate the issue with physical hard work.323  While I interviewed the magistrate 
judge after the observation, I questioned how the magistrate judge could endure a physically hard 
work.  The magistrate judge simply answered that she believed it is the calling and she never 
guessed that the ‘moving around’ was physical labor.  Furthermore, she explained that it is a just 
her job to help both parties reach a consensual agreement based on her work.324 
Fourth, the Korean standing mediators could not frequently move in and out of the 
conference room because they have an abundance of documents that have been submitted by the 
parties.  As mentioned above, the CMC’s mediation is similar with an evaluative or med-arb 
process.325    
In contrast to U.S. mediation, such as facilitative mediation, Korean mediation is, 
generally, evaluative mediation.326  Furthermore, because the standing mediators could make a 
                                                          
322 Observation on Nov. 24, 2014.  
 
323 During the interview, I found that the U.S. mediators or magistrate judges, regardless of private or non-
private, schedule on one mediation case in morning or afternoon session.  In contrast to the Korean 
mediation, they are not under the time pressure during the session.  
 
324 Interview in Indianapolis in 2014.  
 
325 Please see chapter II. 
 
326 Please see Ch. II. 
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binding decision when two parties could not reach a consensual agreement, the role and the 
authority of the standing mediators is similar to the med-arbitrator.  Therefore, because the Korean 
standing mediators should bring significantly large stacks of documents to the conference room, it 
is almost impossible for them to move in and out of two different conference offices.327 
In sum, using only one mediation-conference room during the separate session is not proper 
even when the court and the CMC have limited financial and building resources.  While the CMC 
focuses on the improvement and promotion of the mediation, it also might consider to also give 
some attention to investment.  When the CMC provides a comfortable environment during the 
separate session, both parties would have a better chance to reach an agreement because they have 
enough chances to consider and discuss the deal of negotiation.  Therefore, the CMC should 
consider that the purpose of the separate session and provide the proper environment for each party 
when they are not with the standing mediator. 
Standing mediators’ daily schedule is already set in one and half hour per case in CMC.  
During the observation of both Korean and U.S. mediation, regardless of private or non-private 
mediators, I found that the duration per session for Korean mediation is shorter than that of the 
U.S., even though both of the Korean and the U.S. mediation programs do not have a specific 
regulation to limit the duration of session.328 
                                                          
 
327 Observations on June 12 & June 14, 2013.  
 
328 Observation of the Korean court-annexed mediation cases and the U.S. private mediation cases in 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana, and 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, Illinois, in 2013 and 
2014. 
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While I observed the Korean mediation in the Court-annexed mediation center, the duration 
per session was only one hour per case.  I found that because of the short time limitation of the 
session, the mediator should stop and postpone discussion until the next session even when both 
parties negotiate well and the standing mediator works well with the parties.   When the mediator's 
schedule is full, the mediator would be unable to extend their session. 329   According my 
observations, the Korean standing mediator could not extend the session schedule. During the 
session scheduled in one (1) hour, the mediator spent several minutes’ greetings both parties.  Then 
in fact, they had to stop the mediation session due to a tight schedule even when while they are 
approaching an agreement.330    
In contrast with Korean mediation, the U.S. mediation follows a relatively flexible schedule 
in order to extend and complete the mediation when everyone agrees to extend the duration of a 
meeting.331   Like the Korean mediation session, private mediators usually schedule sessions for 
each case for one hour.  However, the mediator could extend the session with parties’ consent, 
because the mediator usually keeps his or her schedule open for a half day.  Therefore, when the 
mediator recognizes that the process of negotiation and mediation between parties turns smoothly, 
approaching a possible agreement, the mediator suggests both parties continue the session instead 
of reschedule the session.332  
                                                          
329 Observation in CMC on June 12 & June 14, 2013.  
 
330 Observation in CMC on June 14, 2013.  
 
331 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 9, at 109 (Judge Jung mentions that it usually takes 30 to 60 minutes.  
According to my observation, standing mediator schedules each mediation case for one hour). 
 
332 Interviewed a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014. 
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However, it might be counter-argued that the parties could be pressured by the private 
mediator or unable to make good decisions because they are not accustomed to negotiate for 
several hours at a time.  Such a situation might cause an unpleasant outcome of the mediation.   
But the private mediator explained that most of the parties involved in a mediation are with their 
lawyers and have enough time to discuss matters with them.  Furthermore, they do not sign the 
written agreement on the day they reach an agreement.333  Therefore, the parties are not relatively 
under pressure of extended time or physical fatigue. 
Standing mediator waste time for fact-finding.  During the observations of the Korean and 
U.S. mediations, I found a significant difference in the distribution of time for fact-finding, 
regardless of the joint and separate sessions.  During my observation of the U.S. mediation, I found 
that both private and non-private mediators tried to spend less time on fact-finding.  One of the 
U.S. private mediators explained that they are interested in the "number" or "figure" of dollars, 
instead of fact-finding.  They only spend time for fact-finding at the beginning of the joint session.  
Therefore, they are focusing on the negotiation and the amount of money they might end up giving 
or receiving at the end of the mediation.334  
However, I found a greatly different process in the Korean mediation.  The Korean standing 
mediator spent a time fact-finding in both joint and separate sessions.   Unlike the U.S. mediation, 
the parties frequently argued regarding the fact concerning who did or who did not.  In addition, 
the standing mediator also engaged in the fact-findings.335  I believe that there is one significant 
                                                          
333 Please see subchapter 6. 
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evidence and fact-finding in order to render his or her decisions instead of helping participants to make an 
agreement.) 
 
335 Observation in CMC on June 14, 2013. 
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reason that the Korean mediator spent time for fact-finding: the Korean standing mediators have 
authority to make a biding decision the same as the judge of the court in a suit.  When I observed 
the mediation cases in the CMC,336  all of the members tried to discuss the facts instead of 
negotiating to approach the new binding agreement.   
In the U.S. mediation, the mediator spent less time on the opening statement and fact-
finding in the joint session than that of the Korean mediation.337  Unlike the U.S. mediation, the 
Korean standing mediator explains his or her authority during the opening statement and gathers 
information and evidence, such as a hearing of the courtroom, because the Korean standing 
mediator should prepare to make a binding decision in certain cases under the JCCDA article 30.338  
Therefore, the Korean standing mediators must be ready to provide the binding decision when both 
parties cannot reach a consensual agreement.  In addition, the parties might have less time to 
mediate the issues with the mediators in the CMC because they focus on the argument of facts 
instead of the negotiation for an agreement.  During my interview with one of the Korean party in 
the CMC, he said that he was satisfied with the chance that he could talk with the standing mediator 
without hesitance or interruption from the mediator or other party.339 
                                                          
336 Please see supra Chapter II, Charters of Med-Arb 
 
337 Observations on July 2, 2013 and Nov. 24, 2014.  
 
338  JCCDA art. 30.  (“Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are 
unreasonable, a conciliation judge (‘mediation judge’) shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of 
the case, considering interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, 
to the extent of the purport of the application.”); The JCCDA recommends the Korean standing mediators 
make a binding decision when they could not find the reasons that the mediator had better not to make a 
binding decision. 
 
339 Interviewed with a participant on June 12, 2013.  
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In sum, the Korean parties in the mediation process might have relatively less time or 
chance to mediate than the U.S. parties based on the different approaches to the role of mediators, 
such as evaluative and facilitative mediators. 
It is doubtful whether both disputants in CMC fully understand the difference of legal effect 
of settlement and binding-decision by a standing mediator if either party does not make objection 
within two (2) weeks.  Both the Korean and the U.S. mediators kindly and carefully explained the 
meaning of the mediation, role of mediator, and effects of mediation in the opening statement.  
However, when listening to the opening statement of the Korean standing mediator, I was curious 
to learn whether the parties really and fully understood the entire meaning of the opening 
statement.340 
As mentioned above, especially in the mediation in the Indiana state and 7th Circuit Court 
of the federal mediation programs, U.S. mediation could be classified as the facilitative mediation 
while Korean mediation is classified as the evaluative mediation.  Therefore, the opening statement 
in the U.S. mediation is relatively simplified in comparison to that of the Korean mediation.341  
During the opening statement, the U.S. mediator explained several important elements of 
the mediation process in order to promote the rate of successful mediation and satisfaction of 
mediation.342  In addition, according to my observations, because most of the mediation parties 
attended the process with a lawyer, the parties could fully understand the meaning of the opening 
statement.  Furthermore, even when parties were assisted by their lawyers, the U.S. mediators 
                                                          
340 Observation in CMC on July 2, 2014. 
 
341 Observations on July 2, 2013, Nov, 10, 2014, and Nov. 24, 2014 
 
342 Observation on Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014. 
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explained the difference of the mediation and arbitration.343  Then they emphasized the informality 
of the mediation and repeatedly explained the role of the mediator during the joint and separate 
sessions.   
Unlike the U.S. mediation, there is significant difference in Korean mediation at the 
beginning stage with regards to the opening statement.  Because the Korean standing mediators 
have much more authority during the mediation than that of the U.S. mediator, their opening 
statements would be complicated and might cause the parties to misunderstand the standing 
mediator’s authority and the legal effects of the outcome.344 
During my interview with the U.S. mediators, I found that most U.S. parties already 
recognized the meaning of the mediation and requested their lawyers to pursue the mediation 
process instead of a trial.  However, I also interviewed the Korean parties, who used the process 
of the CMC, and I gathered important information about recognizing the meaning of the opening 
statement.  Even though the Korean standing mediator explained the legal effect of the CMC 
mediation in the opening and closing statements, several parties could not fully understanding the 
legal effect of the CMC mediation.345   Furthermore, most parties were also confused about the 
authority and role of the standing mediator.  
In my opinion, it might be caused by three reasons.  First, most of parties do not have 
previous experience either with trial or mediation.  Only one party of twenty (20) parties had 
                                                          
343 Observation on Nov. 20, 2014.  
 
344 Observation on July 2, 2013. 
 
345 Due to the interview with a small number of the parties, it is impossible for me to produce the percentage 
of understanding the opening and closing statements.   It could be another possible topic to research in the 
future. 
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previous mediation experience and fully understood the process and the legal effects of the CMC 
mediation.  Some other parties called the standing mediator a judge and some implored with tears 
in their eyes while they explained the circumstances of their cases.346   Second, only three cases 
involved lawyers’ assistance out of the 12 mediation cases in the CMC.   Then the parties that had 
no previous legal trial or mediation experience might not know the process of mediation because 
they had not previously consulted a lawyer in preparing for the mediation.  Third, the process of 
the CMC mediation is complicated due to the Med-Arb authority with the standing mediator.  I do 
not directly ask whether the mediation parties could understand the legal effect and outcome of the 
mediation and the standing mediator’s authority.   However, some of the parties indirectly 
mentioned or complained that they were surprised when the standing mediator made a binding 
decision all of a sudden.347  According to Bartel’s proposal, the ideal transition from mediation to 
arbitration requires the both parties’ consent.348  However, according to my personal observations, 
the standing mediator suddenly addressed that he would make a biding decision based on his 
observation during the mediation session.349  Therefore, it seems that the transition would be 
surprising for both parties even though they were notified of the possibility of transition from 
mediation to arbitration, including the standing mediator’s binding decision.  Then some of 
interviewee-parties complained that they could not know the possibility of a sudden transition 
without notification of the mediator’s decision.350  
                                                          
346 Observation and interview on July 2, 2013. 
 
347 Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70, at 199-200. 
 
348 Id, at 199 (reciting Barry C. Bartel, supra note 70, at 683. 
 
349 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013. 
 
350 Interviews with participants on July 2, 2013. 
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Therefore, an insufficient explanation in the opening statement regarding the mediation of 
the CMC could cause parties to misunderstand the process and legal effect of mediation and also 
decrease their satisfaction with the mediation.  Therefore, the standing mediator had better put 
more effort into explaining the meaning of the CMC mediation and the legal outcomes of the 
decision and agreement in the CMC even though the CMC standing mediators generally explained 
to the parties the process and the legal effects of an outcome in the CMC.  
The jurisdiction of the CMC mediation is the same as the civil jurisdiction because either 
party files suit in the court located in the jurisdiction, regardless of the reference by the court or 
voluntary filing by the party.351  However, when a case is in a remote jurisdiction, one of the parties 
might be distressing to attend the mediation.  I found an interesting application of technology in 
the scheduling of a telephone conference for the mediation in the 7th Circuit Court.352  This might 
be legally risky because the mediator may not be able to easily confirm the identities of each party.  
However, the settlement attorneys of the 7th Circuit Court in Chicago, Illinois, have used the 
telephone conference when either or all of the parties are located in a remote area in order to 
prevent the hardship of travel to Chicago.   
However, I observed a different case in the CMC.  Because the CMC has not adopted the 
telephone conference as a way to hold mediation sessions, one of the parties might spend many 
hours traveling to the CMC for a small claim case.353  During my interview with a party who had 
traveled more than six (6) hours to the CMC, he complained that he had to pay all travel expenses 
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352 Observation on Nov. 10, 2014. 
 
353 Observation on June 12, 2013. 
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and also give up his work as a day laborer.354  Therefore, he was under pressure to adopt the other 
party’s suggestions. Even if he had tried to negotiate a different amount, he could not believe that 
this would reduce the amount of his payment because if the process were prolonged or postponed 
to another day, he might lose more money on travel expenses and also the chance to earn his wages 
while away from work due to the mediation.  In this case, if he could have had the chance to 
schedule a telephone conference, the outcome might be different, or he at least would have had a 
better chance to negotiate with the other party. 
In sum, when I interviewed with a settlement attorney in Chicago, I found that it is useful 
for parties who reside in other cities based on saving the time and relieving the pressure and cost 
of travelling. 355   In addition, according to the settlement attorney’s statement, adopting the 
program of a telephone conference does not create an expense to the court and, relatedly, provides 
the better service to the parties.  
Because of urging disputants to sign on an agreement, there is weakness that disputant do 
not have enough time to consult with a legal adviser for post-agreement. While the U.S. mediator 
might facilitate the mediation between the parties, the Korean standing mediators might try to 
govern the entire process and outcome of the mediation.  Therefore, the Korean standing mediators 
usually try to complete a written agreement or make a binding decision before the parties.356  There 
is a wide TV-computer screen on the wall that every party in the mediation-conference room can 
watch.357  At the end of mediation stage, regardless of whether it ends with a binding decision by 
                                                          
354 Interviewed with a participant on June 12, 2013. 
 
355 Interviewed with a mediator on Nov. 10, 2014. 
 
356 Observation on June 12, 2013. 
 
357 Observation on June 12, 2013. 
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the standing mediator or an agreement by parties, the mediator promptly types the decision or the 
agreement before the parties who watch it on the screen.  While they reach an agreement, the 
mediator types and prints out the document of the agreement.  As soon as the document is reviewed 
by each party, both immediately sign a written agreement prepared by the mediator on the 
conference room.358  This situation presents possible unfairness because the parties are expected 
to sign a written agreement without having had a chance to get legal assistance to review what they 
are signing.  In addition, based on the mediator’s neutrality, the mediator would not be permitted 
to help or assist any parties who are not represented by legal professionals or have no experience 
in the mediation process.359  
Unlike the U.S. mediation, most of Korean mediation cases, including Korean civil cases, 
are not represented by an attorney.360  Therefore, during interviews with U.S. mediators and 
observations of U.S. mediation cases, I found that the U.S. mediators do not immediately request 
the parties to review and sign a written agreement.  When the parties reach an agreement, the U.S. 
mediator requested that each part review it again or get assistance from a lawyer.  In addition, the 
mediator does not prepare the written agreement but asks either party’s attorney to prepare it.  
During the interviews with U.S. private and non-private mediators, he explained the 
reasons that mediators might not request, but also should not urge, the parties to sign an agreement 
without being given extra time to review.361   First, the process protects the mediator based on the 
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mediator’s neutrality.362   Regardless of the positions of the private and non-private mediator, U.S. 
mediators generally give the parties several days to reconsider what they agreed upon during the 
mediation session.  Some U.S. mediators explained that even though they try to take a neutral 
position during the mediation, either party might believe that they were unfairly treated by the 
mediators.   Therefore, giving extra time to reconsider by themselves following the mediation 
session might reduce any possible dissatisfaction with the outcome and strengthen the mediator’s 
neutrality.  Second, taking time to consider the agreement might also protect the parties from 
signing an unwanted or premature agreement even though they had voluntarily agreed on it in the 
mediation session.  In addition, I questioned that, after orally agreeing and before signing the 
written agreement, taking time to review the agreement might cause the process to be prolonged 
if one or both parties request to re-open the mediation conference.  But the mediator interviewed 
mentioned that the parties very rarely request to negotiate again or adjust what they agreed on.    
In sum, it might be said that the efficiency of completing the mediation process and 
participation of parties is improved because the Korean standing mediators prepare a written 
agreement with the parties, by watching a computer screen on the wall.  On the other hand, the 
satisfaction or protection of the mediator and the parties might be sacrificed because the parties 
might be urged to sign on the written agreement without having a chance for review. 
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Chapter VI.   Structural elements (members) of in the CMC 
This chapter reviews three members of the CMC: the standing mediator, the lawyer, and the 
party.  It provides the comparison with both the U.S. private and non-private mediators in the 
theoretical and empirical viewpoints. 
      a. Standing Mediator 
93 
 
The authority of the standing mediators in the CMC is specially designed in order to 
promote civil mediation based on the mixture of mediation and arbitration.  Comparing with other 
mediation programs in Korea, the CMC mediation is relatively independent from the court system 
because the complainant could file the mediation without filing the litigation in the court.363  Other 
mediation programs could receive the mediation cases through the reference from the court.  Even 
though the complainant voluntarily wants to file the mediation case to the CMC, they file it into 
the court. But the mediation cases which are voluntarily filed by the parties are not distributed by 
the judge of the court.364  
During my interviews with Korean standing mediators, the U.S. private and non-private 
mediators, I found the standing mediators are relatively suffering from the stressful environment, 
such as the overloaded caseworks.365  First, in order to reduce the overloaded working condition 
for the judges, the courts try to refer the cases to CMC.  At the beginning stage of the CMC, the 
Korean Supreme Court expected that the CMC could get enough number of mediation cases 
voluntarily filed by the party. Then the CMC could independently operate with voluntarily filed 
mediation cases.  However, in general, the number of voluntarily filed mediation cases has 
gradually reduced while the number of referred cases from the courts has grown.366  Therefore, the 
courts selected a method to refer civil cases to the CMC.  Meanwhile, the CMC would be suffer 
from mediation cases overloaded because the court refer too many cases that would be above the 
                                                          
363 JCCDA. art. 2 (“Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation (mediation) with a 
court”). 
 
364 Interviewed on June 12, 2013.  
 
365 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013. 
 
366 Please see Table 5. 
 
94 
 
CMC’s capacity.  Since the standing mediators complained they are overloaded with work, the 
CMC does not have a reason to develop any incentives that encourage possible parties to 
voluntarily file into the CMC. 
From a different view, the Korean Supreme Court already anticipated that the CMC could 
not be an independent organization based on the previous experience.   With the enactment of the 
Civil Mediation Act of 1990, the first version of the act did not allow judges to refer civil cases to 
mediation without the parties’ consent.367  But the amendment of 1992 allowed judges to refer 
cases into mediation without the parties’ consent.  Some scholars indicated that the amendment of 
1992 diminished the parties’ self-determination.368  In other words, the parties might hesitate to 
use the mediation program because if the case does reach the trial branch then they might want the 
judge to review and rule on the issue instead of going through the mediation program.   
Second, compared with U.S. mediators, the Korean standing mediators would be under 
pressure because the Supreme Court is reviewing the results of the mediation in the CMC.  The 
judicial authority determines whether the mediation cases would be determined by his or her 
authority as a Med-Arbitrator, and they should consider the rate of appealing against their binding 
decision.369  Relatively, the U.S. private or non-private mediators mentioned that they are not 
influenced by whether the parties could not reach an agreement during the conference.370  Because 
U.S. mediation could be categorized as facilitative mediation, they only focus on the negotiation 
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95 
 
between two parties.  Then their duty as a mediator is to help parties correctly share information 
and adjust the agreement instead of evaluating the issues or evidence.371  Therefore, U.S. mediators 
are not interested in the outcome but in the process.  
However, Korean standing mediators need to review the entire case before beginning the 
mediation in order to prepare the role of arbitration when parties fail to reach an agreement.   For 
example, the standing mediator frequently reacted with a sigh when he heard the denial of their 
communication during the separate session.372  In my opinion, it looked good because the standing 
mediator was impassioned and responsible for the case, but the standing mediator is also locked 
into their role the same as a judge. 
The standing mediator’s authority is similar to the neutral’s authority in Med-Arb.373  In 
general, the standing mediator makes a binding decision when both parties could not reach a 
consensual agreement.  However, unlike the Med-Arb, the standing mediator does not always or 
mandatorily make the binding decision at the end of the stage.374  The standing mediator also 
                                                          
371 GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS, & COLE, supra note 130, at 107 (“Mediation is negotiation carried out 
with the assistance of a third party. The mediator, in contrast to the arbitrator or judge, has no power to 
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neutral third party, the mediator, assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution”). 
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not review the entire case file for preparation when a mediator could not fully understand a case in detail. 
In this conversation, disputants anticipated that the standing mediator should govern the case like a judge). 
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decides whether they had better make a binding decision for the issues, instead of transferring the 
case back to the court.   For this reason, the Korean standing mediator’s authority is very similar 
to the Med-Arbitrator, but not identical. 
As more and more ADR programs have been developed over time, ADR has been 
increasingly legalized,375 and it is “becoming more evaluative and adversarial regarding U.S. 
mediation.”376  Moreover, some scholars have suggested that because arbitration has become 
increasingly similar to litigation that it would be “too costly and too inefficient” and will become 
the “new litigation.”377    
 But some scholars support that Med-Arb “reduces the cost and increase efficiency” while 
ADR is becoming legalized.378   They believed that Med-Arb could provide parties with stable 
opportunities by including the best of both mediation and arbitration. 379  First, Med-Arb might 
provide a “flexible” process because they could begin with mediation and move to arbitration.380   
Some scholars suggest that the “flexibility” of Med-Arb is useful in different ways for various 
types of disputes and this could be a strong point when comparing with other ADR programs.381  
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Second, Med-Arb could provide “efficiency” because the third-party neutral gets information 
about the dispute during the initial mediation and the same-neutral does not need to review these 
details again for arbitration.382  Instead of hiring another neutral for the arbitration process, by 
allowing the same-neutral to review the case, the Med-Arb process then promotes cost- and time-
effectiveness.383  Therefore, Med-Arb could resolve the dispute quickly and efficiently.384  Third, 
Med-Arb could provide “finality” even though both parties could not reach an agreement.385  
Instead of prolonging the mediation process, the same-neutral gives a binding decision regarding 
the mediation case.386  Therefore, both parties possibly reach their goal when they agreed on an 
agreement.  In addition, when both parties agreed on it, the court also reduce the case-work on the 
bench.  Fourth, Med-Arb could be more effective than a simple mediation program. During the 
joint or separate session of Med-Arb, the parties are “more conciliatory and less hostile than under 
mediation alone.” 387  In addition, parties more actively take part in sharing information and 
proposing the settlement during the process of negotiation.388 
In sum, Med-Arb not only provides arbitration with “flexibility,” but also provides the 
mediation with “finality.”389  Hiring the same-neutral med-arbitrator promotes an efficient process, 
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without the need to repeat the hearing, as well as conservation of resources, including cost and 
time.390 
Regarding disadvantage of Med-Arb, some scholars argue that Med-Arb takes advantage 
of mediation and arbitration in order to improve the efficiency of the process.391  However, others 
could counter-argue that Med-Arb avoids the disadvantages of mediation and arbitration 
programs.392  It could be expected that the goals of Med-Arb could not be achieved by take 
disadvantages of each mediation and arbitration.393 
First, the Med-Arb program might infringe on the core value of self-determination.394  
Because it is possible that the med-arbitrator could propose a binding decision against the parties, 
their chance to reach an agreement by themselves with an assistance by the mediation might be 
infringed based on the arbitrator’s authority.  Second, the third-party neutral takes two different 
position at the same time, as mediator and arbitrator.395  However, the neutral could take one role 
and its authority even though they take the other role and its authority in other stages of the process; 
for example, the mediator still keeps the role and the authority of arbitrator during the mediation 
process.396  
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Third, during the separate session, the role of the med-arbitrator is to facilitate communication, so 
they could be trapped by the issue of confidentiality.  The med-arbitrator could be made privy to 
confidential information during the separate session.397  One party might disclose a certain issue 
during the separate session but requests that the mediator not release it to the other party.398   In 
such circumstances, the other party might not recognize the argument issued and might lose a 
chance to make a counter-argument against it. Fourth, the experienced parties might not openly 
discuss the issues with the other party. 399   Because the revealed information might be gathered 
during the joint and separate sessions and used by the med-arbitrator for the arbitration session, 
the parties might be afraid of being honest and frank when negotiating.  If either of the parties 
recognizes whether the med-arbitrator could obtain confidential information during the separate 
session, the parties might be not be honest.400   Furthermore, they deflect their efforts in order to 
persuade the med-arbitrator instead of the other party because the med-arbitrator will prepare the 
arbitrator’s final ruling if both parties fail to reach an agreement. 
       b. Lawyer 
According to my personal interviews and observations, Korean lawyers do not accumulate 
experience in the court-led mediation programs.  Young lawyers from the U.S.-type law schools, 
in particular, have relatively less experience than lawyers from the Judicial Research and Training 
                                                          
397 Id, at 91. 
398 KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, supra note 11, at 180; James T. Peter, supra note 383, at 91-92. 
399 KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, supra note 11, at 180. 
 
400 Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70, at 186-88. 
 
100 
 
Institute.401   When I interviewed Korean lawyers, none of them revealed a preference toward the 
CMC mediation. 402   As mentioned above, the lawyers’ reactions to the CMC mediation are 
different.  I believe that the difference comes from their own experience in the CMC.  Basically, 
they would like the mediation programs, regardless of the CMC or any other mediation programs 
because they could save their time and efforts.  But some revealed a slightly different opinions 
I observed three (3) mediation cases which were represented by lawyers in the CMC in the 
summer of 2013.  Lawyers wanted to go back to the trial process and requested that the standing 
mediator release the cases back to court.  Then the mediator released the cases without persuading 
either the lawyers or the parties to take part in mediation.403  Therefore, I got the impression that 
the cases involving lawyers are preferred to be reviewed by judges instead of going through 
mediation in the CMC.  
Regarding the fact mentioned above, I asked interviewee-lawyers why it seemed that 
lawyers involved in mediation cases want to go back to trial.  I got three (3) opinions: (1) it would 
be a winning case in trial; (2) the lawyer wanted relief from complaints from client; or, (3) the 
lawyers might receive a contingent fee if the case is decided in court rather than mediation.404  
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First, the lawyer might believe that the party had a good chance to win the case and advise 
their client to pursue a trial rather than mediation.   All of the interviewee-lawyers mentioned that 
they strongly recommended that their clients pursue a trial instead of using mediation programs 
after they evaluate whether their client’s case would win in civil litigation.405  Second, the lawyer 
should inform the client whether the ADR programs might be helpful in resolving the dispute and 
that the case might be referred into mediation programs by the court and without client’s 
consent.406  However, even when client received this information, they would later complain to 
the lawyer for referring the case into mediation program.  At that point, the lawyer sometimes 
requested that a mediator send the case back to trial without explanation but due to the client’s 
complaints.407  
Third, according to the client-attorney agreement, reaching an agreement in mediation would be 
treated as winning a case in trial.  Therefore, the lawyer could receive the contingent fee related to 
the amount agreed upon in mediation.  However, some clients complained that the lawyer’s role 
was less significant in mediation compared to trial, so they refused to pay the contingent fee, which 
some lawyers then chose to give up rather than fight the client for payment.408 
On the other hand, some lawyers gave up receiving the contingent fee due to encouraging 
their client to reach an agreement.  One interviewee-lawyer gave me such an example: His client 
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had almost reached an agreement except for a difference that was only a small amount of money.  
But both parties were getting stuck on the small difference, so he instructed his client to step back 
in order to meet the goals of both sides and he gave up his contingent fee as a way to persuade his 
client that the agreement was good.409 
       c. Parties 
According to the statics of the Supreme Court, the satisfaction of the parties in the CMC 
almost reached eighty (80) percent.410  Similarly, when I interviewed parties, most of them showed 
that they were satisfied with the mediation program.411  But the interviews also indicated slightly 
different results between satisfactions with the result and with the process of mediation.  Most 
parties in the CMC revealed that they were fully satisfied with producing outcomes of mediation.  
However, a minority of interview-participants showed that they were urged to give up their 
appropriate rights in order to reach an agreement by focusing on the outcome of mediation.412  
Most interview-participants indicated that they were satisfied with the process of mediation 
regardless of the outcome of mediation.  According to the interview, one party was fully satisfied 
with the process of mediation in the CMC because he had experience in both the trial and mediation 
with the same case.413  Therefore, he could distinguish the differences between the courtroom and 
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mediation-conference room. He mentioned he felt he had had enough chances to share his opinion 
and arguments during the separate session while during the trial he had always been interrupted 
by the judge.  
The other interview-participant complained that he was disappointed with the sudden 
referral by the judge without his consent.  He mentioned that he had filed a suit to be determined 
by the judge instead of resolving the dispute by themselves.  According to the lawyer who 
represented him, she had already explained the possibility of referral to the mediation programs, 
including the CMC or other mediation programs. But she complained that some clients do not fully 
understand the judge’s authority to refer and then might show their disappointment toward the 
lawyer for not preventing the referral.414 
During observation of CMC mediation, on the condition that they were not represented by 
lawyers, the parties who had previous experience in the CMC or other mediation programs might 
have had an advantage during negotiation.   In my personal observation,415 one party had already 
won the civil case but found it difficult to implement the ruling.  He recognized that he could not 
enforce the ruling until he got the result of the Supreme Court’s ruling.  However, he also knew 
that he could enforce a mediated agreement or the binding decision by the standing mediator in 
order to implement the outcome of mediation.  In this case, the party could distinguish the different 
legal effects of mediation and trial based on the implementation of the ruling.  Therefore, the party 
knew the incentive of the mediation of the CMC.  In addition, the experienced parties might fully 
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understand the standing mediator’s opening statement and instruction and so could use the full 
benefits of mediation.  
However, inexperienced parties who were not represented by lawyers or any legal 
professionals, Beobmusa (법무사, 法務士), had a relatively difficult time during the separate 
session with the standing mediator.  Even though the mediator tried to give equivalent time to 
listen each party’s opinion and proposal toward issues, the inexperienced parties failed to submit 
properly prepared documents and the mediator had been bored with the argument’s irrelevant 
issues.416  
In sum, on the condition that parties are not represented by the lawyers, experienced parties 
could be in a better position when negotiating with an inexperienced party and in persuading the 
standing mediator through their presentation of the relevant legal issues.417   
  In the above section, only a few percent of civil cases are represented by lawyers and a rare 
portion of mediation cases are assisted by lawyers or other legal professionals, Beobmusa.418   This 
might put additional work on the standing mediator and infringe on the neutral position of the 
standing mediator.  In this section, regarding the issue that the majority of mediation cases are not 
represented by lawyers, I will review two issues: first, the standing mediator should put additional 
time and effort to mediate, and, second, the parties who are not represented by a lawyer may not 
fully understand the process and legal effects from the outcome of mediation.  
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 First, even though I could not take any observation related with this kind of scene in the 
CMC, several judges and mediators mentioned that they are cautious when they give advice to a 
party during the joint or separate session.  In addition, the mediators commonly mentioned that the 
majority of mediation cases were not represented by the lawyer and the mediators faced difficult 
circumstances because no lawyer was present to assist the party.  I also observed a similar 
mediation cases in the CMC; the parties were confused about the process and the legal effects of 
the mediation even though the standing mediator had explained both during the opening 
statement.419   During the separate session, each party worried about the legal effects from the 
outcome of the mediation.   In this case, the standing mediator covered the role of the lawyer for 
each party and put in additional time and effort to instruct them.420  Then the mediators frequently 
worried about the shaky neutrality of their role.  
Second, during interviews with the mediators and judges, I learned that they do not 
seriously consider whether the parties fully understand the process and the legal effects from three 
outcome of mediation.421  They believe that they fulfill their duty by explaining the legal effects 
of mediation in the opening statement.  It seems that they do not care whether the parties in the 
mediation programs understand the process and legal effects regardless of being assisted by the 
lawyers.   
However, I observed several mediation cases in which the parties were still confused about 
the process and the legal effects of mediation.422  I considered that the mediation programs would 
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move actively forward if the parties could be helped by the legal assistants, such as lawyers or 
Beobmusa (even though Beobmusa are not allowed to represent the parties in the conference 
room). By actively being assisted by a lawyer, the standing mediators could be assured of 
maintaining their duty of neutrality.  
 In sum, because of the low rate of the lawyers’ participation in mediation based on my 
observations, the standing mediators must cover the lawyer’s role during the mediation sessions.  
Then while the standing mediators gave advice and instruction to the parties who were not 
represented by the lawyers, the other parties would complain that the standing mediator infringes 
his or her role regarding the neutrality by giving excessive instruction. 
 As a fundamental member of the mediation, each party’s participation is the most 
important element to promote the CMC program.  However, I observed the parties’ hesitation to 
share their opinions and propose their solutions against the other’s bargaining during mediation.423  
Two significant issues affect whether parties might participate the mediation with good faith.  First, 
if the parties recognize that the third-party neutral could be an arbitrator, they might try to persuade 
the med-arbitrator to adopt the arguments of their own side.424  Also, neither party also has any 
incentive to frankly share their confidential information or proposal with the standing mediator.  
For example, in the observation of the CMC, the party hesitated to share confidential information 
with the standing mediator after he recognized that the mediator showed some favor to the other 
party, regardless of the reason causing the misunderstanding by the neutral’s behavior or by the 
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party’s own opinion.425   Because of this non-cooperation, the standing mediator might face 
difficulties in gathering confidential information regarding the issues of mediation.  
In addition, some parties might show bad faith beyond hesitation to reveal the proposal, by 
misleading or lying to mediator during the separate session.426  However, some argued that the 
parties could be put in a better environment, such as a less structured and less formal conversation, 
because they recognized the hybrid form of mediation and arbitration.427  In order to prepare the 
standing mediator’s binding decision, each party might have incentive to mislead the mediator to 
obtain the better outcome from the mediation.  Furthermore, related with confidentiality issues, 
the parties might have no chance to counter-argue against the other party’s statement which was 
spun or manipulated.428   
In sum, because the standing mediator has authority similar to that of a med-arbitrator, the 
parties in the CMC might have a temptation not to frankly reveal the issues or opinions or to 
mislead the mediator in order to get a better result when the standing mediator takes an arbitrator’s 
position.  
One of core values of the mediation, including entire ADR programs, is providing parties 
with a chance to voluntarily reach a consensual agreement through informal and efficient methods.   
There might be two different views to see this as promoting the party’s self-determination or 
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diminishing it.429  On one side, as both parties recognized the mediator could change their role into 
an arbitrator at a certain point, they might be tempted to resolve the dispute by themselves, so that 
the med-arbitrator does not rule on it.  Therefore, they voluntarily share their ideas and the possible 
proposals in order to reach an agreement.430  However, the standing mediator’s authority, which 
is similar to that of a med-arbitrator, might frustrate the parties’ core authority to voluntarily reach 
an agreement.   Based on the standing mediator’s strong authority, the mediation process in the 
CMC might be more similar to a trial and, in turn, the role of the standing mediator more like a 
judge.431 
 
 
 
Chapter VII.  Possibility of Private Mediation in Civil Mediation 
In this chapter, the question begins with whether the promotion of Korean civil mediation 
might be too slow compared with the U.S.: it seems that while the U.S. ADR programs increased 
about 260% from 1993 to 2002,432 the Korean mediation programs are almost in a bottleneck.433 
In order to promote the mediation programs in Korea, this chapter reviews the possible solutions 
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and problems of adopting private mediation programs, law school clinics, and independent outer-
council mediation organizations.434  
While several scholars conclude that the strong point of the CMC program is its reduction 
of overloaded court work and its provision of a new or alternative method of resolving disputes 
besides litigation, research into the weaknesses or promotion of the CMC program is rare.435  This 
dissertation reviewed the character of Korean civil mediation programs in chapter III and IV and 
deeply investigated the character of the CMC in chapter V and VI.  While previous Korean 
research papers could not properly provide possible ways of promoting mediation, this dissertation 
considers whether private mediation is possible to use in contemporary Korean mediation 
programs. 
This chapter reviews the possibility of private mediation by reviewing justifiability, 
effectiveness, and the possible resources to adopt private mediation.  Furthermore, in order to 
accept a private mediation program in Korea, this dissertation also indicates the possible obstacles 
and solutions to using private mediators for resolving disputes in Korea.436  
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First, under the Korean civil mediation system, it is impossible to directly compare it with 
the U.S. private mediation programs.437  And it would also be difficult to directly adopt the U.S. 
type of private mediation without preparing regulations or assistive programs.  
Unlike U.S. private mediation, the Korean court system does not allow private mediators 
in judicial dispute resolution (“JDR”).438   There are several outer mediation organizations outside 
of the court, such as Korean lawyer associations and law schools, that the courts refer meditation 
cases to outer-council mediation organizations. 439   But, they are not private mediation 
organizations, because they could not survive without other organizational assistance and cannot 
compete with other outer mediation organizations in the legal market.440 
Currently, several U.S. programs are described as private mediation programs, such as the 
community mediation center or neighborhood justice.441  But, they are not exactly equal to the 
private mediation program under judicial dispute resolution (“JDR”), because these community 
mediation center or neighborhood justice programs or organizations are operated as an 
administrative ADR—such as by a city or other government organizations—and these U.S. 
community mediation organizations do not provide enough private income to support a living by 
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the members of the organizations.442  Some of these organizations survive by getting case referrals 
from cities or sub-city organizations and are maintained by government funding.443 
a. Why Korea Needs Private Mediation 
This section reviews the necessity for private mediation in Korea.  In previous chapters, 
this dissertation already reviewed the difficulties associated with reducing overloaded caseworks 
on the bench under the current mediation programs.  It also reviewed the possibility of adopting a 
private mediation process approach while considering the barriers associated with adopting private 
mediation practice under the current Korean legal culture.  
Since the enactment of the JCCDA in 1990, the Korean civil mediation programs have 
been dramatically promoted and established several different programs, like the U.S. multi-door 
courthouse. 444   Here, I emphasize that the Korean judiciary provides the several different 
mediation or settlement programs in court-annexed and court-connected mediations.445  They look 
like the U.S. multi-door courthouse programs, which could provide several different dispute 
resolution programs at one place. 446   As mentioned in Chapter II and III, the judiciary has 
developed mediation and settlement programs, such as settlement before filing-suit and during 
trial, and several different mediation programs that are mentioned in Chapter III.  
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However, because the development of civil mediation was led by the court-centered 
programs, there is no chance to consider a private mediation program.447  Since the Korean civil 
mediation programs have been continuously promoted under the Korean legal structural and 
cultural backgrounds, the CMC was then established as an additional new promotion.  Professor 
Young-ju Ham mentioned that the CMC mediation is the most similar to U.S. private mediation.448  
Because Professor Ham does not provide the reason for his explanation regarding the similarity, I 
could not provide a counter-argument against his reasoning.  However, my reasoning is that, first, 
while the standing mediator has the same authority as the judge, the other mediators do not.  The 
mediator of the inner or outer mediation organizations usually facilitates the mediation, instead of 
evaluating the mediation.  Unlike the U.S. private mediators, the standing mediator in the CMC 
adopts the evaluative method in the mediation process to make a binding decision for parties’ 
deadlock.  Therefore, I disagree that the CMC is the most similar to U.S. private mediation.  The 
outer-council mediation organization would be more similar to private mediation, because the 
process of location and mediator are isolated from the court’s territory and the judiciary’s 
interference.  Furthermore, because it might protect the core value of self-determination by non-
interference of any judicial authority, the outer council mediation provides the most similar 
environment to private mediation. 
Conversely, the conference attorney is the most similar to the Korean standing mediator. 
The reasons for this are that the settlement program in Chicago is strongly annexed with the federal 
court, and the conference attorneys has their “strong authorities” in the process.  There are three 
                                                          
447JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72 (Judge Jung mentions that there is no “pure” mediation program 
that is completely separated from interference or influence from court in Korea.  He expects the 
development of private mediation in S. Korea). 
 
448 Contra. Id, at 125. 
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ways for a conference attorney to obtain mediation cases: referrals from the court, voluntary filing 
by the parties, and selecting mediation cases by the conference attorney.449  Even though a Korean 
standing mediator has the same authority as a mediation judge, the standing mediator could not 
pick up mediation cases from the court without the judge’s consent.450   
First, the core value of mediation should be provided through the private mediation 
program.  As discussed in previous chapters, the contemporary civil mediation programs could not 
adequately provide the core values of “self-determination,” “informal method,” and 
“confidentiality” through the med-arb or evaluative mediations of current Korean civil mediation.  
Second, the “core” type of private mediation program might provide more efficient 
methods than med-arb or evaluative mediation.451  Some scholars might argue that the med-arb or 
evaluative mediation programs could be more productive, by assembling the advantages of each 
mediation and arbitration.452  But other scholars counter-argue that there is a possibility of taking 
the disadvantages of both mediation and arbitration.453   Even though the Korean standing mediator 
could save time by making a binding decision, it would be condemned under an argument that the 
CMC was trying to wrap up cases to improve efficiency. 
Third, the public still has doubts that the standing mediator could carefully complete 
discovery and hearing before making a binding decision.  This might also cause a problem in 
                                                          
449 Interviews on Chicago in Nov. 10, 2014. 
 
450 Interview with a Korean judge on Arp. 15, 2015. 
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452 Brian A. Pappas, Id, at 164-65 (2015). 
 
453 Generally see Id. 
 
114 
 
implementation of the binding decision, because it was not made by each party under a consensual 
agreement. For example, the community mediation center located in Kwanju city is fully 
sponsored by the city and it is acting similar with the U.S. neighborhood dispute resolution center. 
This center reports that it received 138 cases and resolved 115 cases in 2015.454   
In sum, the Korean judiciary could not successfully reduce judges’ overloaded casework 
through the contemporary Korean civil mediation programs.  Furthermore, the current court-
annexed and court-connected mediations could not keep intact the core values of mediation, such 
as self-determination and confidentiality. 
b. Justifiability, effectiveness and possible resources for private mediation 
 This section reviews the justifiability, effectiveness, and possible resources to adopt a 
private mediation program in Korea.  In previous chapters, this dissertation reviewed the 
justifiability of adopting ADR and mediation programs in Korea and, at first, reviews whether 
there is justifiability to adopt private mediation.  It also reviewed, in previous chapters, the 
contemporary Korean mediation programs and concluded that they are ineffective in reducing the 
judges’ casework. This dissertation reviews whether a private mediation program would be 
effective in reducing overloaded casework, and whether the Korean judiciary has enough financial 
and human resources to establish private mediation. 
The Korean Supreme Court has a strong intent to establish civil mediation programs and 
tries to expand the programs—from court-annexed mediation, which is mediated by the judge of 
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a court of first incident, to court-connected mediation, which is mediated by inner or outer-council 
mediators appointed by the judiciary.455  
In contrast to the Korean Supreme Court’s progressive support, the civil mediation 
programs still struggle to settle down in the legal system.  I agree that the mediation programs are 
fairly successful.  But I cannot agree that the mediation programs have successfully reduced the 
benches’ overloaded work and settled down in the legal system as a system of dispute resolution.   
Per the current mediation programs, the Supreme Court allows the court to refer cases to 
outer-council mediation organizations.456  These organizations consist of professional and well-
trained members, but they are not trained as private mediators.  The private mediator who 
completes education and training courses for mediation might provide a better service than one 
who does not obtain the certification. 
In sum, the court already releases mediation cases to appointed outer-council mediators but 
does not require a certification.  As the judiciary provides mediation courses to certify private 
mediators, the private mediation program might rapidly expand and provide a better mediation 
service. 
The judiciary’s strong authorities in the current mediation programs might be the weakness 
to promote and apply for resolving disputes in the contemporary Korean legal system.  Then, it 
assumes that the current court-annexed and court-connected mediation programs might be 
insufficient or inefficient in the legal system, because the number of civil cases per judge is still 
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456 JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 9, at 100. 
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increasing and judges of courts are still suffering from overloaded casework since the enactment 
of the JCCDA in 2009.457 
 What if Korea adopts a private mediation program, could the mediation programs be more 
efficient than current programs?  As mentioned above, even though the Supreme Court reveals a 
progressive intent to expand the mediation programs, the size of mediation organizations is still 
too small to take over the mediation process from the court of first incident.  Even though the civil 
mediation programs have aggressively expanded since enactment of the JCCDA 1990, the number 
of civil cases per judge has gradually increased. 458   Therefore, under the current mediation 
programs, it is clearly difficult to reduce the civil judges’ workloads.   
Under the current referral system, the court of first incidents could release civil cases to 
certain organizations, which might mediate cases. Unlike the expectation of the outer-council’s 
usage selected and appointed as a mediation organization by the administrative courts, the private 
mediation program would take over more volume of mediation cases from the courts, because the 
civil courts would release the cases to a private mediator.459 
In order to be an effective private mediation program under the current referral system, is 
it necessary to change the fundamental legal system, such as changing from the reference to 
mandatory mediation before being reviewed by court?  Like the mandatory mediation process of 
civil cases in Monroe County, Indiana, the mandatory mediation program might promote the 
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private mediation program, because all civil cases should go through the mediation process.460  
Without considering whether or not the Korean judiciary should adopt mandatory mediation, in 
my opinion, it is unnecessary for the Korean judiciary to fundamentally change the civil procedures 
in order to adopt a mandatory mediation process.461  
Currently the Korean civil court system only requires domestic matters to go through 
mandatory mediation before going to court.  If the civil court requires a mandatory mediation 
process for all civil matters, it might cause massive antipathy toward adopting mandatory 
mediation based on two reasons: first, there are too many civil cases filed; second, for similar 
reasons, the mediation programs are not prepared for it.462 
Like the outer-council mediation program, the court of first incident could refer civil cases 
to a mediation process outside of court territory.  Because the private mediator might be certified 
by completing the required training course, the private mediator might be more reliable and 
provide more optimal solutions through agreeable informal methods.463 
When it comes to the effectiveness of mediation, there are two important facts in Korean 
civil mediation.  The mediation programs should not only reduce the overloaded casework in lower 
level court, but also cut off the number of appeals to higher levels of court.  For example, the 
Korean Supreme Court consists of 12 judges and handled 37,652 cases in 2013.  With similar 
                                                          
460 Interview a mediator on Nov. 24, 2014. 
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462 Interviewed with a scholar who was a former judge on Dec. 12, 2014. 
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conditions in their civil law culture, 15 Japanese Supreme Court judges took 5,000 cases in the 
same year.464 
It is important that a majority of civil cases could be released to the mediation process 
while maintaining high satisfaction.  Because of the authority to make binding decisions, 
dissensions to the binding decision during the mediation process lower the satisfaction toward 
mediation.465  In addition, under the current mediation programs, only a limited number of civil 
cases could be exposed to the mediation process.466  Therefore, private mediators who are qualified 
and certified by the judiciary could provide a wide range of mediation services for the majority of 
civil cases. 
In sum, the current Korean civil mediation programs have progressively operated since 
1990, but it remains to be seen whether the contemporary mediation is effective in the Korean 
legal system, because it failed to reduce judges’ overloaded casework.  Private mediation might 
comparatively reduce the number of civil cases filed per judge. 
In order to adopt a new private mediation program, the Korean judiciary might need 
additional resources to launch it.  But is it a massive expense to the judiciary to train a private 
mediator?  It probably does not need a significant financial expense for three reasons: first, there 
are several currently mediating entities, such as outer-council mediators; second, there are well-
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465  DUKNAM HWANG, BOEBWONJOJEONG-CENTERYI UNYOUNGHYUNHWAN [COURT MEDIATION 
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qualified young lawyers who just graduated from U.S. type law schools; and there are well-
qualified and experienced standing mediators in the CMC who can train applicants to be private 
mediators.   
First, the court already uses outer-council mediation organizations, such as Korean lawyer 
associations and law schools—categorized as court-connected mediation.  As mentioned above, 
the court currently refers civil cases to outer-council mediation organizations.  Even though current 
outer-council mediators do not need to be regularly trained by officially certified mediation 
courses, they already accumulate mediation experience in the mediation field. 
Second, as mentioned above, since the judiciary adopted the U.S. type law school system 
in 2009, law schools are releasing a huge number of graduate law students every year, and 2,000 
students pass the bar exam and obtain a bar license.  Within the small legal market, young lawyers 
are facing tough legal competition and struggle to survive in it.467   
Third, there are about 30 standing mediators in the CMC.  As mentioned above, they not 
only have terrific legal experience and knowledge as a high level judge or well-experienced 
lawyer, but also have accumulated mediating experience since 2009.468 
As mentioned in chapter III, not only the civil courts but also the Korean Supreme Court 
are suffering from overloaded casework.469  All civil courts and the Supreme Court are struggling 
                                                          
467 http://v.media.daum.net/v/20161010194633157 (Last visited on Dec. 11, 2016). 
 
468 Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013. 
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with the massive number of cases filed and the judiciary might spend tremendous financial and 
human resources to maintain the current operation of the legal system. 
The Korean judiciary could spend less financial and human resources by establishing a 
private mediation program, providing certification to private mediators who complete a training 
program. It could be similar to the Indiana mediator program or Japanese certification program.470    
Because the judiciary could provide the training programs for the private mediator applicants, this 
private mediator program does not need to be a massive mediation entity.   
Several law schools have participated in the mediation program as outer-council 
mediators.471  These law schools might develop mediation legal clinics, where participants could 
not only train to be private mediators, but which could also be a place to provide mediation training 
courses for law school students.  In addition, the CMC has already accumulated mediation 
experience by developing Korean mediation customs.   Therefore, the CMC could easily transform 
its role into being a training course provider. 
In sum, the judiciary could comparatively save financial and human resources by 
establishing a private mediation program under the current Korean legal system without a 
significant change. 
c. U.S. private mediator program 
As briefly mentioned above in chapter IV, it is hard for a researcher to generally review 
U.S. mediation, because the U.S. mediation programs do not exist as a unified form.472  But, this 
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dissertation reviews the Indiana private mediator program and the conference attorney program in 
the 7th Circuit, in order to predict the possible promotion of Korean civil mediation. 
During my research, the U.S. private mediators, all of them except the community 
mediators, had typically obtained two certifications: bar license and mediation training 
certification.  The Indiana private mediation program especially requires that an applicant to the 
mediation education program should have previously obtained the bar license.473   
Even though a private mediation program might be the best way to provide the “pure” 
values of mediation, adopting the “pure” meaning of private mediation could face three difficulties.  
Furthermore, the court could efficiently reduce backlogs and provide multiple methods of 
resolving disputes through a private mediation program. 474   This dissertation reviews the 
difficulties from the viewpoint of the extra expense or cost between the Supreme Court, disputant 
parties, and lawyers related to mediation by the parties. 
The disputant parties should feel an obligation to pay for their privately retained legal 
services even though the parties previously paid the filing fee for the court.475  In order to hire a 
private mediator, the disputant parties should pay him or her based on the hourly-rate.  In Indiana, 
the website of the Supreme Court provides a list of private mediators, showing how much each 
private mediator charges per hour.476  
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Because of this additional possible expense, which should be paid by each of the parties, 
there are three possible obstacles.  First, it might be against the Supreme Court’s policy.  The court 
has reduced the filing fee by ninety (90) percent,477 in order to provide parties with an incentive to 
voluntarily file with the CMC.  The policy for increasing voluntary usage of the CMC also includes 
reducing the cost and expense of mediation programs.478  However, paying an additional expense 
for a private mediator might be against the Supreme Court’s policy of establishing a stable CMC 
mediation program, because the private mediator program might cause the parties to pay extra 
money.479   
According to interviews with both Korean lawyers and disputant parties in the CMC, they 
negatively responded to the U.S.-type private mediator requiring an additional fee for the private 
mediator.  According to the interviewee-disputant parties, I might conclude that parties do not want 
to pay an additional payment for the private mediator. But I do not care whether their mediation 
cases are reviewed by private or non-private mediators.480  Most of my observations in the CMC 
were related to small claims, and most of the parties were not represented by lawyers.  Therefore, 
the parties tried to save money in resolving their disputes and did not want to pay additional money.  
Per these parties’ responses, the parties might refuse to use private mediators and paying that extra 
expense based on an hourly-charge.  This might be a significant obstacle in adopting a private 
mediator program.   
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Korean lawyers might resist adopting a private mediation program, because they are afraid 
of losing revenue.481  As mentioned above, Korean lawyers showed two different opinions for and 
against the mediation program.  In addition, because young lawyers are in a tough legal market, 
they might hesitate at finding a new method in hopes of making a bigger pie of the legal market. 
There are more than 20,000 lawyers in Korea.  After the Korean government adopted the 
U.S.-type of law school system, a law school could produce more than 2,000 lawyers per year.  
Therefore, the legal market could be getting tough, and each young lawyer could represent less 
than two cases per month in the Seoul area.482 
 
 
 
(Table 7)  Numbers of Cases Represented by Young Layers in Seoul rep Per Month 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of cases represented 2.83/mon 2.33 2.0 1.97 1.99 
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As seen above, the Korean legal market is getting tough, and young lawyers graduating 
from law schools might face a difficult environment.   However, there might be another viewpoint 
to reduce excessive competition in the tough Korean legal market.    
 There are no private mediation programs in Korea.  Currently, the outer-mediation 
programs, such as lawyers associations, might provide similar work to a private mediation 
program.  It could be called a transition-to-private mediation program, because it might have a 
mixture of characteristics between court-connected and private mediation.  The primary difference 
with the U.S. private mediator: the mediators in Korean lawyer associations do not compete with 
other mediators.  Generally, the association gets the mediation cases through referrals by the court, 
and it distributes to pro bono lawyer-mediators.483   
 In addition, a private mediation program might open up a new legal market, in order to 
expand the size of the pie.  As mentioned above, most of the U.S. civil cases could be resolved by 
mediation before reaching the bench; it is necessary for all U.S. practicing lawyers to understand 
the mediation process in order to provide proper service to their clients.484  
d. Alternatives to promote Korean Mediation 
As mentioned in Chapter III and Chapter IV, Korean civil mediation might be closed to 
private mediation in certain views.  Indeed, in order to go forward with private mediation, the 
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system still needs to prepare the required programs, such as education and training programs and 
a unified ADR act.485  
First, it needs training programs for educating private mediators, in order to provide 
certification that a private mediator is qualified.486  Like U.S. law school students, Korean law 
school students are suffering from high tuition and bar exam pressure.487   There is an over-heated 
Korean legal market, based on an oversupply of lawyers compared with the demand in the Korean 
legal market.488  Therefore, young Korean lawyers could face difficulty in settling down in the 
tough lawyer-legal market.489  
However, only a small number of Korean lawyer schools provide ADR programs in their 
curriculum.490    Furthermore, law school students do not have a chance to have as marketable of 
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an experience compared with lawyers from the legal institute.491   In preparing the practice-ready 
law graduate, the law schools provide legal clinic programs.492  Before considering the private 
mediator program, the training or educational program for mediation should be established in the 
law schools.493  Without the lawyers’ or law graduates’ previous preparation, the private mediator 
program should be settled in the Korean civil mediation system.  
In this regard, the possible solution is that the current CMC could become the educational 
institute, because the CMC’s standing mediators might have better mediation experience than any 
other lawyers in Korea.   Then the standing mediators could share their advanced experience with 
law graduates in the legal clinics of law schools, even though they did not take educational 
mediation programs themselves.  
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VIII.   Conclusion 
Disputes have always existed, and methods for resolving disputes have developed in every 
society in history.494  Similar to contemporary ADR forms, such as mediation and arbitration, 
ancient Koreans had their own forms for resolving disputes.495  Unfortunately, after independence 
from Imperial Japan in 1945 and the Korean civil war in 1950, the current legal system was 
instituted independently, rather than evolving naturally, to replace the traditional legal methods for 
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resolving disputes.496  Then the Korean judicial authority continuously developed the Korean 
mediation programs, which can be categorized as court-related mediation, including court-annexed 
and court-connected mediations.497   
Similar to other states’ judicial problems, Korea has also faced overloaded case dockets, 
congestion of the civil process, an expensive legal process, and emotional stress on parties during 
the procedures.498  This dissertation might serve to offer a viable, transitional example to promote 
the incorporation of ADR process in Korea.  As mentioned above, although both judicial areas 
considered in this study—i.e., Korea and Indiana in both its State & Federal appeals fora—have 
conservative legal cultures, both judicial authorities have aggressively established mediation 
programs.  Currently, the Korean judiciary is particularly involved in providing a set of lessons for 
the adoption and implementation of civil mediation programs. 
With similar desires of providing inexpensive and fast track of legal process, the Korean 
Supreme Court has a strong desire to promote civil mediation programs and tries to expand the 
programs.499  Unlike U.S. mediation, court-led civil mediation does not need to be attractive to all 
participants, such as the lawyers and disputant parties.500   
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The judicial authority has mainly led during the development of the civil mediation 
programs in Korea.501   The Korean Supreme Court has led a series of improvised changes to 
extend judicial power. 502   It launched court-annexed mediation and outer-council mediation 
programs as pilots in 2009, but it is doubtful whether it was successful enough to extend to other 
cities and other outer mediation organizations.  Ultimately, Korean mediation programs are 
extemporaneously promoted according to the court’s need.503  
The Korean Supreme Court has usually developed the court-annexed mediation and 
gradually promoted the court-connected mediation.  But the court of first incident still handle more 
than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases in their courtrooms. 
The promotion of Korean civil mediation can be reviewed from two different viewpoints.  
At the beginning, it should be known that the promotion of civil mediation was mainly led by the 
Korean judiciary based on its necessity.  The judiciary recognized an urgent need to promote 
mediation based on the quality of legal services for two reasons.  First, judges were already under 
pressure from overloaded dockets.504  Second, they recognized that as the U.S. law school system 
was adopted in Korea, apprenticeship training for judges would not be sustainable.505  
As an external promotion, the Korean judiciary has established five (5) different mediation 
organizations in order to resolve civil disputes. 506  And, as a contextual promotion, the judicial 
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authority established the court-annexed mediation center and outer-council mediation programs to 
provide independent authority to the court of first incidents.507   
Even though the judicial authority has exerted effort in promoting the mediation program, 
I conclude that court-led civil mediation cannot be popular to the public and the judiciary has also 
hardly completed its main goal of reducing the case-load on the bench. 
While the judges were under pressure from overloaded cases, the Korean Supreme Court 
recognized the necessity of adopting ADR programs.   In the earliest stages of their promotion of 
mediation, the courts used the mediation program for disputes involving the lease of properties 
since 1962 and in small claims since 1973.508  
Korean mediation was reviewed in this dissertation based on theoretical and empirical 
approaches. First, it reviewed whether the current Korean mediation programs might infringe on 
the right to a trial.  There are two different points about this issue: referring a case to mediation 
process without a party’s consent and providing a binding decision by a mediator. 
Some might argue that reference to mediation without a party’s consent infringes on the 
right to a trial because, by filing suits in the court, disputants want a judge to review their cases.  
However, others also might argue that because referred cases could return to the courtroom per 
disputant’s will, the right to a trial is not deprived.  In addition, the financial barrier to access to 
the court would be lowered by reducing by ninety (90) percent the filing fee.509  In contrast to Lok 
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Adalat, a binding decision by a standing mediator is not “final and binding with no appeal.”510   In 
Korea, even though the mediator could make a binding decision when the parties fail to reach an 
agreement, each party has a chance to appeal in two weeks.511  
Second, under the empirical approach, I observed both U.S. and Korean mediation cases 
and interviewed mediators from both countries in 2013 and 2014.  I found that the Korean judiciary 
could not successfully reduce judges’ overloaded casework through the contemporary Korean civil 
mediation programs.  Furthermore, the current court-annexed and court-connected mediations 
could not keep intact the core values of mediation, such as self-determination and 
confidentiality.512 
In chapter VI, comparing Korean and U.S. mediation cases, I provide differences based on 
observations of both mediation cases.  According to the CMC standing mediation program, the 
CMC mediator uses only one mediation conference room for a short time period (about one hour) 
per session.  Based on the CMC mediator’s authority to make a binding decision, the mediator 
spends time for fact-finding in a joint session.  Regarding the CMC mediator’s authority, I worry 
about disputing parties’ misunderstandings and dissatisfaction with the process and legal effect of 
mediation, based on the mediator providing an insufficient explanation of those details in the 
opening statement.  Furthermore, there is no post-settlement period.  The standing mediator drafts 
                                                          
510 Galanter and Krishnan, id, at 832. 
 
511 JCCDA. art. 34.(1) (“A party may file an objection against the decision under article 30 or 32 within 
two weeks from the date on which an authentic copy of the court record was served on him/her….). 
512 Observations on July 4, 2013; Brian A. Pappas, supra note 115, at 171-72, 184-85. 
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the agreement before the parties and asks them to sign it.  Even though parties are not represented 
by a lawyer, they do not have a chance to review the document with legal assistants.513 
Therefore, I conclude that most Korean mediation programs, including CMC mediation, 
are Med-Arb type, because the standing mediator can make a binding decision.514  This judge-like 
mediator may delay the propagation of mediation.  They might lose disputants’ trust by providing 
intuitive justice, due to the absence of lawyers’ assistance and insufficient evidence to make a 
binding decision when parties could not reach a consensual agreement during the mediation 
process.  
Why does Korea need private mediation?  Why ADR provides convenient and useful legal 
service that formal adjudication could not complete?  According to Professor Galanter, “only small 
portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; [and] only a small portion of these become law 
suits.”515  The Korean judiciary’s strong tie to mediation programs might delay the propagation of 
the mediation process.516  In my opinion, the mediation program is fairly successful, but still 
struggles to settle down in the legal system despite the Korean Supreme Court’s strong support.   
While the U.S. ADR programs increased about 260% in the last two decades, the Korean mediation 
programs are in a bottleneck.517  In order to promote the Korean mediation programs, considering 
                                                          
513 Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013 and July 4, 2013.  
 
514 Brian A. Pappas, supra note 115, at 184. 
 
515 Thomas Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 331 (2005) (reciting Marc Galanter, 
Reading the Landscape of Dispute: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think We Know) About Our 
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Sociey, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5, 12-16 (1983)). 
516 See JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 115, at 88. 
 
517 THOMAS C. FISCHER, supra note 463, at 66, footnote 32. 
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education and training programs for independent outer-council mediators, it is necessary to adopt 
private mediation programs.518 
This dissertation not only reviews the possibility of private mediation, by reviewing 
justifiability, effectiveness, and the possible resources to adopt private mediation, but also reviews 
the possible obstacles and solutions to using private mediators for resolving disputes in Korea.  
The Korean judicial authority already allows courts to release civil mediation cases to outer-
council mediation organizations, and current Korean mediation programs could not successfully 
reduce the benches’ overloaded work.519 
 The sizes of mediation organizations, except the court of first incident, are too small to 
take over the mediation process from the court of first incident.520 Therefore, the current court-
related mediation programs could not reduce the civil judges’ overloaded work.  In order to 
effectively reduce the benches’ work, the court should release its cases, not only from the court’s 
territory, but also from the court’s authority. 
Even though there are several outer-council mediation organizations in Korea, they are not 
equal to the private mediator per the traditional ADR definition, because they are acting pro 
bono.521   Outer-council mediation organizations are not purely from the private sector, but feature 
court-related process (they are merely out-of-court territory).  Therefore, in order to create a private 
                                                          
518 JAEHONG LEE, supra note 110, at 44. 
519 JUNYOUNG JUNG, id, at 100. 
 
520 BYUNGCHUL KIM, supra note 129, at 137. 
 
521  Interview an outer-council mediator in Apr. 15, 2014; 
http://www.kjaa.or.kr/public_html/news/news.asp?div=VIEW&Number=1114&gubun=new (last visited 
in Dec. 11, 2016) (Korean Beobmusa association donate all reward the Beobmusa outer-council mediation 
center). 
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mediation system, it is necessary to make mediation out-of-court process and independent from 
the judicial authority.  In Korea, the civil mediation cases are still referred and released to the 
outer-council mediation organization.  Furthermore, the private mediator should be independent 
from the judicial authority when it comes to making money. 
In addition, a private mediation program might open up a new legal market, in order to 
expand the size of the pie.522  In order to establish private mediation, the judiciary needs to set up 
training and educational programs: because the judiciary should take responsibility for the private 
mediator’s function during the mediation process, it is necessary for them to be the ones 
responsible for preparing these training and certification programs.   Because of an over-heated 
Korean legal market, law school students might struggle in such a tough environment.  The private 
mediation program would be a new legal market in Korea for these new graduates to find 
employment, if the additional legal cost and expense would not be imputed to disputing parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
522 Laurie A. Lewis, supra note 5, at 167; 
http://media.daum.net/society/others/newsview?newsid=20150720173454767&RIGHT_REPLY=R15 
(last visited in Dec. 15, 2016). 
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[Statement] 
Professor Edwin Greenebaum’s statement in CJAM training on September 2015 
 
APPENDICES 
Questions for interviewing mediators  
Mediator’s role-How to make a mutual agreement through mediators or parties 
What is the role of mediator in the CMC? 
Does mediation help parties find causes of disputes (fact-finding) or propose a solution for 
parties? 
What is the legal foundation in determining or proposing an agreement to the parties? 
Are you trained to propose an agreement? 
Do you use any specific techniques to induce the agreement between the parties? Is there 
any pressure on parties or mediators to reach an agreement? 
 
Mediator’s previous work experience 
What is your work experience before joining the CMC? 
What approach does the CMC take to hiring mediators without a legal background? 
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Standard to induce an agreement  
If the processes and determinations in the CMC are not based on a legal standard, what is 
the main standard? 
Without applying for the rule of law in CMC, how can a mediator fairly reach an agreement 
and strike a balance between the parties? 
Between a disadvantage party and an economically and socially strong party, how can a 
mediator protect the disadvantage party’s rights? 
Do disadvantage people have a fair and equal chance to argue in the CMC? 
Does the CMC consistent induce similar outcomes in similar cases?  
If the CMC produces various outcomes from similar cases, how does it make the social 
integration from the Korean Constitutional Law? 
 
Development of CMC 
After the CMCs were established in 2009 in Seoul and Pusan, how did the CMC expand 
three more major cities?  What is the CMC’s own perception of efforts? 
What is the rate of parties’ satisfaction with the CMC? 
How does the CMC cooperate with private ADR? 
Do you have a general idea of how to improve the CMC or ADR system in Korea under 
the Korean Constitutional Law? 
 
(Korean)  조정위원에 대한 질문 
조정위원의 역할-조정위원과 당사자들사이에서 어떻게 쌍방의 동의를 유도해 내는가 
 법원조정센터내에서 조정위원의 역할은 무엇인가? 
 조정이 분쟁의 원인을 확인하거나 당사자들에게 해결책을 제공하고 있는가? 
당사자들에게 동의할 만한 해결책을 제시하거나 해결책을 결정할시에, 법적인 
근거는 무엇인가? 
동의안을 제시할수 있도록 별도의 교육을 받은적이 있는가? 
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당사자 사이에서 동의안을 도출해 낼수 있는 특별한 기술을 가지고 있는가? 쌍방 
동의가 이루어져야 하는 압력이 조정위원이나 당사자들에게 있는가? 
조정위원의 경력 
 법원조정센터에 참여하기 이전의 경력은 무엇인가? 
 법원조정센터는 법적 경력을 제외한 조정위원의 선발에 어떤 방법을 쓰고 있는가? 
쌍방 동의를 도출하기 위한 방법 
법원조정센터가 법적인 방법이 아닌 과정과 결정을 통한다면, 센터는 어떤 근거를 
가지고 조정을 이루어 내는가? 
법원조정센터가 법원칙의 적용이 아니라면, 조정위원은 어떤게 공정한 쌍방 동의를 
도출할수 있는가? 
사회적 약자와 경제적, 사회적 강자 사이에서, 어떻게 조정위원은 사회적 약자의 
권리를 보호할수 있는가? 
법원조정센터내에서, 사회적 약자는 공정하고 평등하게 자신의 권익을 주장할수 
있는가? 
법원조정센터는 비슷한 사례에서 비슷한 결론은 유출하고 있는가? 
만약 법원조정센터가 비슷한 사례에서 서로 다른 결과를 이끌어 냈다면, 한국헌법에 
보장된 사회적 통합을 어떻게 만들수 있는가? 
법원조정센터의 발전 
법원조정센터가 2009년 서울과 부산에 설립된 후에, 다른 세 도시에 어떻게 (어떤 
계기로) 법원조정센터를 확장하였는가? 법원조정센터는 어떤 노력을 하였는가? 
현재 법원조정센터에 대한 신청인의 만족도는 어느정도인가? 
 법원조정센터는 사적 대체적분쟁해결제도와 어떤 협업체계를 갖추고 있는가? 
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한국의 헌법체계에서 ADR 시스템또는 법원조정센터의 기능을 향상시키기 위해서 
어떤 아이디어를 가지고 있습니까?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions for interviewing parties  
1. How do you get information about the Mediation Center? 
a. Does a legal provider, such as a lawyer, introduce this mediation center? 
b. Does a legal provider also introduce other alternative methods? 
2. During the mediation, do you have enough chance to express your opinion? 
a. Do you have any legal assistance from legal providers for this mediation? 
b. Do you think that this mediation proceeding for your case produces win-win result 
and benefits for both parties? 
3. Are you satisfied the result of this mediation? 
a. If not, why are you unsatisfied? 
b. If not satisfied, will you file a suit in the court? 
c. If you have same or similar problems, will you use this mediation program? 
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i. If not, what is the reason? 
(Korean) 
1. 신청인은 조정센터에 대한 정보를 어떻게 구하였습니까? 
a. 변호사와 같은 법률전문가가 조정센터를 소개하였습니까? 
b. 법률전문가가 다른 대체적 방법을 소개해 주었습니까? 
2. 조정하는동안, 신청인은 자신의 의견을 밝힐 기회를 충분히 받았습니까? 
a. 이번 조정을 위하여 법률전문가로부터 법률자문을 받았습니까? 
b. 이번 조정이 신청인  쌍방에게 이익이 되는 결과를 이끌어 냈다고 생각하십니까? 
3. 신청인은 이번 조정의 결과에 대하여 만족하십니까? 
a. 그렇지 않다면, 왜 만족하지 않습니까? 
b. 만족하지 않는다면, 법원에 소를 제기하시겠습니까? 
c. 신청인에게 동일하거나 비슷한 분쟁이 있다면 신청인은 조정을 다시 
이용하시겠습니까? 
i. 그렇지 않다면, 이유는 무었입니까? 
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JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT523 
[Enforcement Date 31. Mar, 2010.] [Act No.10200, 31. Mar, 2010, Partial Amendment]  
 
Article 1 (Purpose) 
The purpose of this Act is to settle civil disputes according to a simple procedure based on the 
mutual concession between the parties, common sense and actual circumstances. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 2 (Case of Conciliation) 
Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation with a court. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 3 (Competent Court)   
(1) A conciliation case shall be under the jurisdiction of the district court, the branch court of the 
district court, the Si court or the Gun court (hereinafter referred to as "Si/Gun court"), which has 
the jurisdiction over one of the following subparagraphs: 
1. The place of general forum of a respondent under Articles 3 through 6 of the Civil 
Procedure Act; 
2. The place of business or business office of a respondent; 
3. The place of work of a respondent; 
4. The location of the subject-matter of disputes; 
5. The place where damage occurs. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a conciliation case may be placed under the jurisdiction of an 
exclusive competent court of a case equivalent thereto, or a court determined by agreement of 
parties. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 4 (Transfer) 
(1) A judge in charge of a conciliation case, as designated by the chief justice of the high court, 
the chief judge of the district court or the chief judge of a branch court of the district court, or a 
judge of a Si/Gun court in charge of a conciliation case (hereinafter referred to as "conciliation 
                                                          
523 Available at 
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20%
EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%A1%B0%EC%A0%95%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0 (last visited in Jan. 
10, 2017) 
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judge"), shall transfer cases to the competent court by means of a ruling, if no jurisdiction exists 
in his/her court: Provided, That this shall not apply where a respondent makes a statement in a 
conciliation procedure without a plea of non-competence or if a stay is deemed particularly 
necessary to resolve a case. 
(2) A conciliation judge may transfer a case to another competent court ex officio or by decision 
according to the application of a party, if recognized as reasonable notwithstanding its competence 
thereof. 
(3) No appeal against decisions prescribed in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 5 (Form of Application) 
(1) An application for conciliation may be filed in writing or orally. 
(2) In cases of an oral application, an applicant shall make a statement in the presence of a court 
official of Grade Ⅳ, Ⅴ, Ⅵ or Ⅶ (hereinafter referred to as "court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc."). 
(3) In cases under paragraph (2), a court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall make a court record of the 
application for conciliation, and sign his/her name and affix his/her seal thereto. 
(4) In cases of application for conciliation, an application fee shall be paid, as prescribed by the 
Supreme Court Regulations. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 6 (Conciliation Referral) 
A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation by a ruling 
before a judgment in an appellate trial is given. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 7 (Organs of Conciliation)  
(1) Cases of conciliation shall be dealt with by the conciliation judge. 
(2) A conciliation judge may directly conciliate cases or have the commissioners (hereinafter 
referred to as "standing commissioners") who regularly deal with the affairs related to conciliation 
under this Act and a council of conciliation conciliate cases: Provided, That he/she shall allow the 
council of conciliation to conciliate cases if a party makes such application. 
(3) The court of a suit may directly conciliate cases, notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), if the 
court of the suit refers cases to conciliation pursuant to Article 6, and if deemed appropriate to 
directly handle cases. 
(4) The standing commissioners and the court of the suit that conciliate cases under the main 
sentence of paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) shall have the same power as a conciliation judge. 
(5) In cases under paragraph (3), the court of the suit may have a commissioned judge or an 
entrusted judge take charge of conciliation. In such cases, the commissioned judge or the entrusted 
judge shall have the same power as a conciliation judge. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 8 (Council of Conciliation) 
A council of conciliation shall be comprised of a chief commissioner and two or more 
commissioners. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 9 (Chief Commissioner) 
A chief commissioner shall be as follows: 
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1. In cases under Article 7 (2), a conciliation judge or a standing commissioner; 
2. In cases under Article 7 (3), the chief judge of the court of the suit; 
3. In cases under Article 7 (5), a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge; 
4. In cases under a Si/Gun court, a judge of the Si/Gun court. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 10 (Commissioner)  
(1) A commissioner shall be appointed, in advance, by the chief justice of a high court, the chief 
judge of a district court or the chief judge of a branch court of a district court from among persons 
who have advanced knowledge and high moral reputation: Provided, That a standing 
commissioner shall be appointed by the Minister of National Court Administration from among 
persons who are a licensed attorney with certain careers determined by the Supreme Court 
Regulations. 
(2) The term of office of commissioners shall be two years: Provided, that under special 
circumstances, a commissioner may be commissioned with his/her term of office fixed within two 
years. 
(3) Any commissioner under paragraph (1) shall execute the following affairs: 
1. Participating in a conciliation case; 
2. Hearing opinions of persons involved in cases to resolve disputes or conducting affairs 
necessary to deal with conciliation cases according to entrustment of a conciliation judge 
or a chief commissioner. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 10-2 (Commissioner Comprising Council of Conciliation) 
Commissioners, who comprise a council of conciliation, shall be designated under agreement of 
the parties or by a chief commissioner, from among commissioners under Article 10 (1) for each 
case. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 11 (Conciliation Proceeding) 
The conciliation proceeding by a council of conciliation shall be conducted by the chief 
commissioner. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 12 (Allowance, etc. of Commissioners) 
In accordance with the Supreme Court Regulations, a commissioner shall be paid an allowance 
and, if necessary, travelling expenses, daily allowances, and lodging cost. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 13 (Examination of Payment of Fees) 
(1) If an applicant fails to pay fees prescribed by Article 5 (4), the conciliation judge shall 
determine an appropriate period and issue orders for payment of such fees within such period. 
(2) If an applicant fails to comply with an order under paragraph (1), the conciliation judge shall 
dismiss the application by order. 
(3) An immediate appeal may be made against an order under paragraph (2). 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 14 (Service of Written Application for Conciliation, etc.) 
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A written application for conciliation or a court record of an application for conciliation shall be 
served on a respondent without delay. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 14-2 (Separation or Joinder of Cases) 
Conciliation organs provided for in Article 7 may order a separation or joinder of conciliation 
cases, or may revoke such order. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 15 (Date of Hearing for Conciliation) 
(1) The hearing date for conciliation shall be notified to the parties. 
(2) Notification of the date may be made in any appropriate manner, such as the service of a writ 
of summons. 
(3) Where both parties appear before the court and apply for conciliation, a hearing for conciliation 
shall be held on the day of the application, except where any special circumstance exists. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 16 (Joining by Interested Person)  
(1) A person interested in the result of conciliation may join the conciliation proceedings upon 
permission from a conciliation judge. 
(2) The conciliation judge may, if it is deemed necessary, allow a person interested in the result of 
conciliation to join the conciliation proceedings. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 17 (Rectification of Respondent)  
(1) If it is obvious that an applicant has designated a wrong respondent, a conciliation judge may, 
upon application of the applicant, grant permission for rectification of the respondent by decision. 
(2) When the decision of permission is made under paragraph (1), an application for conciliation 
on a new respondent shall be regarded to have been raised at the time an application for 
rectification is filed under paragraph (1). 
(3) When the decision of permission is made under paragraph (1), an application for conciliation 
against the previous respondent shall be regarded to have been withdrawn at the time of an 
application for rectification is filed under paragraph (1). 
(4) With respect to cases referred to conciliation by the court of first instance pursuant to Article 
6, the rectification of a respondent made under Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Act shall be 
binding in the legal proceedings. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 18 (Representative of Party)  
(1) If a party consists of not less than one person with a common interest, those in the party may 
appoint one or more persons among themselves as the representative of the party. 
(2) The appointment under paragraph (1) shall be attested in writing. 
(3) The conciliation judge may, if necessary, order the party to appoint the representative of the 
party. 
(4) The representative of the party may, for the interest of the party, perform all conciliation 
activities individually except the following cases: 
1. Acceptance of conciliation condition draft; 
2. Withdrawal of application for conciliation; 
3. Activities related to decisions under Articles 30 and 32; 
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4. Appointment of an attorney. 
(5) If the representative of the party is appointed, a notification of the hearing date for conciliation 
may not be served on the persons in the party, other than the representative of the party. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 19 (Place of Conciliation) 
A conciliation judge may hold a conciliation hearing, according to the actual circumstances of the 
case, in an appropriate place out of a court. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 20 (Non-Publicity) 
Conciliation proceedings may not be disclosed publicly: Provided, that a conciliation judge may 
allow other persons to attend conciliation proceedings, if deemed appropriate, even if such 
conciliation proceedings are not open to the public. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 21 (Disposition before Conciliation) 
(1) Where deemed particularly necessary for conciliation, a conciliation judge may, upon 
application of one party, issue the following orders to the other party or other person interested in 
the case, before such conciliation: 
1. Prohibition of changing the status quo (the site), or disposing of goods; 
2. Prohibition of other acts which make it impossible or considerably difficult to 
accomplish the purpose of the conciliation. 
(2) In taking measures under paragraph (1), a sanction against infringement under Article 42 shall 
be informed. 
(3) An immediate appeal may be made against any measure under paragraph (1). 
(4) Any measure under paragraph (1) shall not have the executive power. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 22 (Hearing of Statement and Investigation of Evidence) 
If a conciliation judge hears the statement of a party or any person interested in the conciliation 
and, if deemed necessary, he/she may investigate the facts and the evidence by appropriate means. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 23 (Restriction on Use of Statement) 
The statement of a party or any person interested in conciliation proceedings shall not be used as 
evidence in a civil procedure. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 24 (Preparation of Court Record) 
The court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. attending conciliation, shall keep a court record: Provided, That 
he/she may omit a part of its content with permission of a conciliation judge. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 25 (Dismissal of Application for Conciliation)  
(1) Where the hearing date for conciliation cannot be served on the party, a conciliation judge may 
dismiss an application for conciliation by decision. 
(2) No appeal against dismissal under paragraph (1) shall be filed. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
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Article 26 (Rulings Not to be Proceeded with Conciliation)(1) Where a case is deemed not 
suitable in its nature for conciliation or a party is deemed to file an application for conciliation 
with unjustifiable intent, a conciliation judge may terminate the procedure by decision under which 
no conciliation shall be proceeded with. 
(2) No appeal against the decision under paragraph (1) shall be filed. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 27 (Failure of Conciliation) 
If a case falls under any of the following, and a conciliation judge makes no decision under Article 
30, he/she shall terminate such case as failed conciliation: 
1. If an agreement fails to be reached between the parties; 
2. If it is deemed that details of agreement are inappropriate. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 28 (Completion of Conciliation) 
Conciliation shall be made by writing the terms of agreement between the parties in the court 
record. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 29 (Effect of Conciliation) 
Conciliation shall have the same effect as a settlement in court. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 30 (Decision in Lieu of Conciliation) 
Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are unreasonable, a 
conciliation judge shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of the case, considering 
interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent 
of the purport of the application. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 31 (Non-Appearance of Applicants)  
(1) Where an applicant fails to appear for the hearing for conciliation on the hearing date, another 
hearing date shall be determined and served on the applicant. 
(2) Where an applicant fails to appear for hearing on the new hearing date under paragraph (1) or 
one of subsequent hearing dates, the application for conciliation shall be regarded to have been 
withdrawn. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 32 (Non-Appearance of Respondent) 
Where a respondent fails to appear for hearing for conciliation on the hearing date, a conciliation 
judge shall make a decision provided for in Article 30ex officio unless any reasonable ground 
exists. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 33 (Service of Court Record on Conciliation)  
(1) If falling under any of the following subparagraphs, the court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall 
write such fact in the court record: 
1. If there is a ruling not to proceed with conciliation for cases; 
2. If conciliation fails; 
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3. If a decision is made in lieu of conciliation. 
(2) The court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall serve a copy of the court record stating a ruling not to 
proceed with conciliation or failure of agreement, and an authentic copy of the court record under 
Article 28 or the court record stating a decision made in lieu of conciliation, on each party. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 34 (Objection) 
(1) A party may file an objection against the decision under Article 30 or 32 within two weeks 
from the date on which an authentic copy of the court record was served on him/her: Provided, 
That an objection may be filed prior to the service of the authentic copy of the court record. 
(2) Where an objection is filed within the period under paragraph (1), the conciliation judge shall 
notify the other party without delay. 
(3) A party who has filed an objection may withdraw the objection with the consent of the other 
party until any court of a corresponding level makes judgment on the case. In such cases, Article 
266 (3) through (6) of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis, but "suit" in the 
provisions shall be regarded as "objection". 
(4) Where it falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the decisions under Articles 30 and 
32 shall have the same effect as a settlement in court: 
1. When no objection is filed within the period under the provisions of paragraph (1); 
2. When an objection is withdrawn; 
3. When an objection is dismissed under the Supreme Court Regulations. 
(5) The period mentioned in paragraph (1) shall be peremptory. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 35 (Interruption of Extinctive Prescription)  
(1) An application for conciliation shall have the effect of interruption of extinctive prescription. 
(2) If any ground falling under any of the following subparagraphs exists with regard to the case 
for conciliation filed by an applicant, it shall not have the effect of interruption of extinctive 
prescription unless he/she files a suit within one month:  <Amended by Act No. 4505, Nov. 30, 
1992> 
1. When an application for conciliation is withdrawn; 
2. When an application for conciliation is regarded to have been withdrawn under Article 
31 (2). 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 36 (Shifting to Civil Procedure Due to Objection)  
(1) Where it falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a suit shall be regarded to have been 
filed at the time an application for conciliation is filed: 
1. Where there is a ruling not to proceed with conciliation pursuant to Article 26; 
2. Where a case is terminated by the ruling that agreement has failed to be reached pursuant 
to Article 27; 
3. Where an objection is filed within the period mentioned in Article 34 (1) against the 
decision in lieu of conciliation under Article 30 or 32. 
(2) Where a suit shall be regarded to have been raised at the time an application for conciliation 
pursuant to paragraph (1) is filed, the fee shall be added to the amount needed to file a suit. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 37 (Procedural Costs)  
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(1) Where agreement of conciliation has been reached, expenses incurred therein shall be borne 
by each party unless otherwise specially agreed upon between the parties, and where agreement of 
conciliation has not been reached, they shall be borne by the applicant. 
(2) Where an application for conciliation has shifted to a civil procedure under Article 36 (1), the 
expenses under paragraph (1) shall be regarded as part of the costs involved in a suit. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 38 (Application Mutatis Mutandis of Civil Procedure Act)  
(1) With regard to conciliation, Articles 51, 52, 55 through 60 (excluding the latter part of Article 
58 (1)), 62, 63 (1), 64, 87, 88, 145, and 152 (2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply 
mutatis mutandis. 
(2) The provisions of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the fixed date, period, 
and the service of documents, as prescribed in this Act: Provided, That Articles 185 (2), 187, and 
194 through 196 of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis only to the service of the 
court record prepared under Article 28 of this Act. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 39 (Application Mutatis Mutandis of Non-Contentious Case Litigation Procedure 
Act) 
Part I (excluding Article 15) of the Non-Contentious Case Litigation Procedure Act shall, unless 
it is contrary to its nature, apply mutatis mutandis to the conciliation, except as especially provided 
for in this Act. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 40 (Authority of Council of Conciliation and Chief Commissioner) 
Where a council of conciliation conciliates a case, the council of conciliation and the chief 
commissioner shall have the authority of a conciliation judge, as classified below: 
1. Council of conciliation: The authority vested to a conciliation judge prescribed under 
Articles 16, 17 (1), 18 (3), 19, 21 (1), 22, 25 (1), 26 (1), 27, 30 and 32; 
2. Chief commissioner: The authority vested to a conciliation judge prescribed under 
Articles 13 (1) and (2), 20, 24, 34 (2) and 42. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 40-2 (Legal Fiction as Public Officials of Standing Commissioners) 
In the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, standing commissioners shall 
be deemed public officials. 
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 9417, Feb. 6, 2009] 
Article 41 (Penal Provisions)  
(1) A person, who is or has been a conciliation commissioner, has revealed the process of 
conference, the opinion of the chief commissioner or the conciliation commissioner, and the 
number of conciliation commissioners by opinion without a justifiable ground, shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding 300 thousand won. 
(2) A person, who is or has been a conciliation commissioner, discloses any confidential 
information of another person he/she has become aware of while performing his/her duty, without 
a justifiable ground, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine not 
exceeding one million won. 
(3) The public prosecution against the crime under paragraph (2) shall not be charged without 
accusation. 
159 
 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 42 (Sanction against Breach of Order before Conciliation)  
(1) Where a party or a joiner fails to comply with the order before conciliation under Article 21, a 
conciliation judge shall impose upon him/her a fine for negligence not exceeding 300 thousand 
won ex officio. 
(2) The provisions concerning the public prosecutor in Articles 248 and 250 of the Non-
Contentious Case Litigation Procedure Act shall not apply to a trial for a fine for negligence under 
paragraph (1). 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
Article 43 (Delegation Provision) 
Except as provided for in this Act, the hearing of opinions, the examination of facts, the 
investigation of evidence, the prepayment of procedural costs in conciliation procedures, the 
relationship with civil procedures, the relationship with executory procedures and other matters 
necessary for conciliation shall be determined by the Supreme Court Regulations. 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KOREAN CIVIL PROCEDERE ACT524 
Article 451 (Grounds for Retrial)(1) A petition for a retrial against the final judgment which 
has become conclusive may be made when falling under any one of the following subparagraphs: 
                                                          
524http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20
%EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%86%8C%EC%86%A1%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0  (last visited on 
Apr. 11, 2017). 
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Provided, That the same shall not apply when a party has alleged such grounds by an appeal, or 
has not alleged them even while he/she became aware thereof: 
1. When an adjudicating court has not been constituted pursuant to the provisions of Acts; 
2. When a judge, who is ineligible to take part in the relevant judgment pursuant to the 
provisions of Acts, has participated therein; 
3. When there is any defect in granting a legal representation right, powers of attorney, or an 
authority required for the procedural acts of a representative: Provided, That the same shall not 
apply when it has been ratified under Article 60 or 97; 
4. When a judge, who took part in the judgment, has committed a crime as to his/her official duty 
in respect of the case; 
5. When a party has been led to make a confession, or obstructed in submitting the method of 
offence and defense to affect the judgment, due to the criminally punishable acts of another 
person; 
6. When a document or any other article used as evidence for the judgment has been forged or 
fraudulently altered; 
7. When the false statements by a witness, an expert witness or an interpreter, or those by a 
sworn party or legal representative have been adopted as evidence for the judgment; 
8. When a civil or criminal judgment or other decisions or administrative dispositions on which 
the judgment was based have been altered by a different judgment or administrative disposition; 
9. When judgment has been omitted in respect of an important matter which might have affected 
the judgment; 
10. When a judgment, against which a petition for retrial is to be filed, is contrary to the final and 
conclusive judgment which has been previously declared; 
11. When a party has, in spite of being aware of an address or residence of the other party, 
instituted a lawsuit by stating that he/she has been unaware of the latter's whereabouts, or by 
telling a false address or residence. 
(2) In cases falling under paragraph (1) 4 through 7, a lawsuit of retrial may be instituted only 
when a conviction or a judgment to impose an administrative fine has become final and 
conclusive against the punishable acts, or when it is impossible to render a final and conclusive 
conviction or a final and conclusive judgment to impose an administrative fine, on account of 
other grounds than the lack of evidence. 
(3) When the court of appeals has rendered a judgment on the merits of the case concerned, no 
lawsuit of retrial shall be instituted against the judgment of the first instance. 
Article 461 (Quasi-Retrial) 
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Where the protocol under Article 220, or a ruling or an order objectionable by an immediate 
appeal, has become final and conclusive, if it has the grounds as referred to in Article 451 (1), a 
retrial may be petitioned by correspondingly applying the provisions of Articles 451 through 460 
against the final and conclusive judgment. 
 
 
 
